


Marine Corps Gazette



SEPTEMBER 1961
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
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Volume 45, Number 9

Marine Corps Gazette

September, 1961

The Berlin Crisis: Walk, Don't Run—Yet

Still to be decided is whether the Berlin Crisis will turn out as a high-stake international card game or Russian Roulette—with ICBMs. Marines—regular, reserve, and retired—are concerned, but somewhat confused.

Fact is that so far no one has pushed the panic button. Let's review the bidding:

- President Kennedy reviewed the Eisenhower defense budget, asked for 3,000 more Marines, more dollars.

- Continued DoD task force studies pointed to need for better conventional war capability. Result: a revised budget request boosting Corps to 190,000, enough for three full division-wing teams. Reason: just so we'd have "arms sufficient beyond doubt" for world conditions.

- President Kennedy met Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna, heard remarks that raised some doubt. Action: a talk on TV, a request for a big jump in defense spending, a request for authority to call up Reserves, keep servicemen on active duty. Congress quickly granted both requests.

- Next bid? It's up to Mr. Khrushchev. But you can bet U.S. has several moves planned out—one of which has to be partial mobilization; the final one, all-out war.

How does this affect Marines? Depends on which phase you're talking about. Call the approved buildup so far **Step 1**, call some sort of mobilization **Step 2**, call all-out war **Step 3**. Unofficially, it looks like this:

Step 1: The Buildup. The Marine Corps goes from 175,000 to 190,000—a simple 8.6% increase. About 500 more officers will be needed, all temporary or reserve and mostly lieutenants. New ALMAR 13 asks active duty reserve officers who are shorttimers to extend for six months. Also, 2,500 Reserve corporals and below get a chance at volunteering for two, three or four year tours of active duty. That's less than one in 11 of 208,000 Ready Reservists and 27,000 Standby Reserves.

Note: 500 extra officers are needed *before* 1962-63 Basic School harvest.

Will there be a problem getting Marines needed? It's unlikely. The other three services (Extension School please copy) have different problems. Air Force needs transport aircraft available only in Reserve and Air National Guard. Navy needs many specialists to take 42 ships out of mothballs. Army already relies on draft to keep present strength, now gets a big boost. But Marine enlistments look good. Reserves are volunteering, so are some retired war horses. Also, those on active duty will think twice about leaving just now.

Unless a problem develops, **Step 1** itself won't require extending enlistments or officer tours, stopping retirements, or calling Reserve units or individuals to active duty involuntarily. Biggest personnel effect of **Step 1** is that you can expect to see all FMF units at full manning levels this fiscal year, with several units retained, a few added. Details are classified.

How about modernization of equipment? Total requests double USMC procurement dollars over last year. The last budget request added \$67 million. That's a lot, but only about one quarter what it would take to replace all 105mm howitzers, say, with a new weapon. You won't be seeing new weapons and gear too much faster this year. But procurement in 1962 and 1963 will be expedited.

Actually, biggest single effect of President Kennedy's Berlin message will be to correct the "listlessness about our liftiness." De-mothballed Navy ships include about half amphibious types, will boost amphibious lift available to bunk space for two divisions.

Step 2: Limited Mobilization. If and when the ante has to be raised, the President can use more of the authority Congress just gave him. He also (See **Berlin Crisis**, next page)

More Marines, More Readiness

A Brigade is a brigade is a brigade.

Despite public announcements and last month's orders section in the *GAZETTE*, there really is no 4th Marine Division. And the **Step 1** buildup does not call for one to be formed.

What it does call for is a 190,000-Marine Corps, enough for three full-strength division-wing teams. The 4th Marines historically belong to the 3d MarDiv; MAG-13 to 1stMAW. Both are at Kaneohe and will be built up. So will Brigade Headquarters.

Besides Marines, the Headquarters will get more field gear, just in time for a significant improvement in Hawaiian training.

The Brigade has always been hurting for amphibious shipping for maneuvers, had to make do with infrequent exercises and rather limited maneuver area on Oahu. Thanks to outstanding Navy-Marine teamwork between CG FMFPAC and COMPHIBPAC, there's a solution.

Beginning this fall, Okinawa-bound transplacement battalions and replacements drafts will stop off in Hawaii for about two weeks. Transplacement battalion makes landing, then acts as Aggressors. Brigade will borrow shipping. Replacement draft will train at Kaneohe. Visiting Marines and Navy crews will get some Waikiki liberty. Result should be increased readiness at minimum cost.

Meanwhile, Hawaiian private pilots are agitating to use Bellows AFB, the Brigade's main Oahu training area. That could cause problems.

It doesn't really matter whether the Headquarters is or is not redesignated as 4thMarDiv Hq. Congress provided for three, and that's what there'll be—ready to fight. One infantry regiment and one air group are deployed in Hawaii with an air-ground headquarters organization. They can be called a brigade and wear another hat to plan for mobilizing another division. Or they can be called a Division Headquarters and wear another hat to train their subordinate brigade. But before there's a 4thMarDiv again on the ground, someone will have to pull a switch for more money and Marines.

Meanwhile, the Brigade at Kaneohe will be better trained, more ready.

Berlin Crisis, Cont'd

has power to declare an emergency and call one million Ready Reserves for up to 24 months. This includes a classified number of the 208,000 Marine Ready Reserves. Note that one million is about 35% of the Ready Reserves, not all of them.

If the President should declare an emergency, these actions could then be authorized (and under new powers, can be done w/o actual emergency declaration):

- Call up "x" Ready Reserves as individuals or units, with at least 30 days notice when possible.
- Extend regulars as required (probably all but hardship cases) for the "duration and six months." Suspend regular officer resignations and retirements.
- Extend standard written agreements (SWAG) for reserve officers on active duty without consent. Also, extend Reserve officers without SWAGs.
- Recall retired officers, enlisted, and members of Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, as required and without consent.

Korea was such a national emergency and Congress wants to be sure the burden is spread around better next time than then. SecDef McNamara told them that the priority for the quarter-million man buildup in Step 1 would be: 1) Voluntary reenlistment, 2) Voluntary recruitment, 3) The draft, 4) Extend enlistments or call non-volunteer Reserves (Organized Reserves first). It's probable the same priorities would apply if Step 2 were needed.

But remember this: there'd be a wide choice in mobilization and it might not affect all services equally. Best guess: planners have contingency plans for the contingency plans.

Step 3: Declaration of War, or of National Emergency. Only Congress can declare war. Also, if President gets Congress to declare an emergency, he automatically gets same powers as in war. Powers in an emergency he declares are restricted. War-time powers include:

- Extend Reserve enlistments for the "duration and six."
- Call up all Ready Reserves.
- Call up Standby Reserves, but only generally after all Ready Reserves and if Selective Service approves.

Summary: Standing guard over the Free World is routine business for the Marine Corps. The watch will be strengthened slightly, but so far there's no reason to call for help. The Marine Corps Reserve stands ready. Planners are counting on it, but it won't be needed unless Mr. Khrushchev forces Uncle Sam to raise the ante.

General Officer Slate

	From	To	Date
MajGen R. E. Cushman, Jr	ADC 3dMarDiv	CG 3dMarDiv	Oct
MajGen D. M. Weller	CG 3dMarDiv	DepCdr, FMFPAC	Nov
MajGen C. H. Hayes	DepCdr FMFPAC	Dep C/S, (Plans) HQMC	Oct
MajGen F. L. Wieseman	Dep C/S (Plans) HQMC	CG 2dMarDiv	Nov
MajGen J. P. Berkeley	CG 2dMarDiv	CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune	Oct
MajGen R. B. Luckey	CG, MCB, CampLej	Not announced	-----
MajGen A. F. Binney	DirAvn, HQMC	DepCdr, FMFLANT	15Sep
MajGen R. C. Mangrum	DepCdr, FMFLANT	CG 2dMAW	Oct
MajGen R. K. Rottet	CG 2dMAW	Dir MCEC, MCS	-----
BGen J. C. Miller, Jr	Dir, MCEC, MCS	Dir, MCLFDC, MCS	-----
MajGen S. S. Wade	AC/S, G-3, HQMC	LnO, VCNO	1Sep
BGen H. W. Buse, Jr	LnO, VCNO	AC/S, G-3; HQMC	1Sep

Decisions, Decisions!

Worst chore in being on a selection board is briefing the files of fitness reports. Higher ranks (and longer service) take the most time. One member can do only 4 to 8 a day.

Solution: use computers and magnetic tape records. All records for one board can then be automatically printed in a few hours. There are two problems. First, it takes time to set up and check the system, so this year's boards still brief reports by hand. Next year officer reports, and probably some or all enlisted, should be on magnetic tape. Second problem will remain: the machine is just doing clerical work. It does NOT evaluate, interpret, or weigh. Board members will still make all decisions. One prime example—determining whether "remarks" are favorable, or otherwise. Machines can't do that; at least, won't be allowed to try.

Data processing machines originally were set up to have just a short form of your SRB or jacket. Idea to include fitness report data came from career monitors, was snapped up and expanded by promotion branch. For monitors, machine provides summary of where you've been, what you did, and how well. Fitness report tapes are kept separate, given "Private Official" handling. New system next year may not get you selected, but you'll know that the board handling your case will be in a better frame of mind.

Meritorious Promotions

Odds that HQMC will approve a recommended meritorious promotion are one in four (25%) currently. Main reason for disapproval: check of previous fitness reports. HQMC can't understand how a *period* of service suddenly gets outstanding when previous reports don't show it. (There's a special provision for meritorious *acts*.)

Shipping Over?

In first seven months this year more SNCOs applied to ship over beyond 20 than in all of last year. What are the odds of being accepted? 92%. Last year it was 89%. Some cases not clearly outstanding are authorized to ship over for less time than requested.

Anchors Aweigh

If the IG asks (and he probably will), CNO is no longer Adm Arleigh Burke. New CNO is Adm George W. Anderson, Jr.; new Vice CNO is VAdm Claude V. Ricketts. Both are aviators.

SNCO Promotion Pattern

There's a new pattern to SNCO promotions. It uses different method, but works out much the same as officer system. What you can expect:

- Several chances at rapid advancement through meritorious promotions, WO, or LDO programs.
- A close look at your record and a slim chance to be promoted as soon as you become technically eligible for consideration.
- A "moment of truth" look at your record and a real, fighting chance to be promoted when you get time in service and grade to meet that year's average.
- Thereafter, a continued close look at your record each year, and a real chance to be selected if you just missed before or can improve your record.

How this works is best understood by analysis of just how FY '62 board chose SgtsMaj from eligible 1stSgts.

Board considered all 1stSgts with legal minimum TIS (10 years), and administrative minimum of two years TIG. There were 546. Board had quota of 74—a promotion chance of 13.6%, or one-in-seven.

But CMC told board to select from Marines with less than average TIS only in exceptional cases. Average TIS was 20 yrs, 2 mos. Only 210 of eligibles had served that long. Board selected 34% of them, or one-in-three. This was the "moment of truth" for this group. Top one-third made it; bottom two-thirds were specifically considered and rejected. Next year they'll still be eligible, but will compete against top Marines entering average TIS "zone." As a group they'll have less chance; better odds for those who just missed this year.

How about the 336 who were technically eligible but lacked TIS? Their records got a close look, but board picked only three, less than one-in-100. Obviously, this group was not rejected or "passed over." Matter of fact, board noted that the group had very fine records. They'll get their big chance when they get more time in.

Does this mean promotions are being handed out just to old timers? Definitely not. Only senior 40% (in this case by service) were given a big selection chance. But from there on, board looked at the record.

Of those eligible w/1955 date of rank, board chose only 23%. They chose 46% from 1958, and 32.7% from 1959. Thus, 1959 group, coming up for first time, did almost as well as the 34% average selections for the whole "zone." 1955 group, well picked over, did less well.

Note that TIS was chosen because E-8 and E-9 grades are new and there's little spread in TIG. For other boards, TIG, TIS or both can weigh heavy—depending on what analysis of grade or MOS indicates is most fair. Figures will be computed by MOS fields and announced as each board meets.

Meanwhile, here are some "average" figures to give you an idea how the pattern has been running:

Your grade	Required TIG for promotion to next higher	Average TIS of your grade	Past Average TIG for promotion to next higher	Past Average TIS for promotion to next higher
E-4	1.8	5.5	4	8
E-5	2.5	10.9	3	11
E-6	2.5	14.5	3	14
E-7	2	16.9	4	18
E-8	2	19.0	1.3	19.2

Thus, it's theoretically possible to make SgtMaj in about 13 years, if the boards picked you as exceptional each time. On the average, though, it's been taking 19.2 years. Now this year it takes 20.2 years. With E-8 selections now required to agree to serve three more years, this figure might go higher. This would match the University of Michigan study which recommended that promotions to E-8 and E-9 be held only for servicemen with over 20 years in.

Remember: average time in service of your grade will be less than the average TIS of those who come up for promotion with you. And it will vary by MOS field. For example, average TIS of E-7 Marine Corps-wide is 16.9 years; TIG has averaged 4 years. Compare that with this breakdown of E-7's eligible for selection to 1stSgt and MGySgt: →

Hydrofoils

BuShips, not ready to single-basket its landing craft program either in design or concept, has contracted for a pair of engineering model LVHs (Landing Force Amphibious Support Vehicle, Hydrofoil). Contracts to design and develop a hydrofoil landing craft (GAZETTE: Feb '60) went to Lycoming Division of Avco Corporation, Stratford, Conn., and to FMC Corporation, San Jose, Calif. Planners are also interested in planing hull concept (LOOKING AHEAD: Mar '61) and GEM (Ground Effect Machine) (LOOKING AHEAD: Apr '61.)

SATS As a Recruiter

For the first time in seven years, USMC met its quota on 30 June for new naval aviation candidates. There's a big problem simply contacting enough applicants (NEWSLETTER, Apr '61).

That's why there's a major effort during Quantico training to interest PLCs in aviation. But Quantico doesn't have the big, new jets and there were no funds to take the PLCs where jets are.

SATS to the rescue. Quantico is building a Short Airfield for Tactical Support which should be finished by next summer. It will handle most jets. PLC meets jet, later PLC learns to drive jet. Problem solved—it's hoped.

Four Wheel Drive

Familiar M-37 weapons carrier, fast disappearing from Marine Aviation flight lines, will be replaced by ¾T 4-Wh drive pickup C-20 (International Harvester Co). Mostly, aviation vehicles match those of ground units. C-20 is an exception; 200 have been bought to fill specific aviation needs.

Mos	Field	Average TIS Yrs.	Mo.	Average TIG Yrs.	Mo.
01	18	7	8	8	8
02	18	1	7	2	2
03	17	8	3	10	10
04	17	4	3	8	8
07	17	9	3	7	7
08	17	0	3	6	6
11	17	7	7	5	5
13	16	11	4	11	11
14	15	8	6	2	2
15	17	11	7	8	8
18	17	8	5	3	3
21	21	6	9	4	4
23	18	0	4	11	11
25	14	11	4	6	6
26	18	5	7	7	7
27	15	5	4	7	7
30	17	1	6	9	9
31	17	1	7	7	7
32	19	7	8	3	3
33	18	10	7	1	1
34	17	7	10	4	4
36	18	2	7	8	8
40	16	0	5	6	6
41	17	3	7	8	8
43	17	9	6	1	1
46	18	2	8	4	4
55	17	7	3	0	0
57	18	6	7	2	2
64	18	6	7	6	6
65	17	10	5	11	11
66	17	4	7	7	7
67	18	1	9	0	0
68	15	5	6	4	4
69	16	5	5	7	7
70	16	8	7	2	2
71	17	0	5	9	9
99	19	0	8	0	0

News Roundup

It appears Marines everywhere beat the heat in August by working. Work makes news. News, like chicken salad, is usually shortlived. Problem: fitting it all in your NEWSLETTER. We had to chop, chop, chop; might have missed important details. If you want to know more about any of these, write us.

Sixty percent (96) of 162 SgtsMaj/MGySgts picked can start wearing seven stripes 1 Sep; remaining 66 must wait. Same board is slated to announce 1stSgt/MSgt selections on anniversary of Pelielu campaign (see *Corps Calendar*, p. 19). . . . (Also see *SNCO Promotion Pattern* page 3.)

CG, MCSA, Phila. (BGen P. R. Tyler), told of a new 100 percent wool cloth for summer service "A" uniform. (We want to know more about this one ourselves.) . . .

American Motors gets \$3,616,660 to keep on turning out Mighty Mite (1/4T Trk) for USMC. This provides for filling total order of 1,232 vehicles. . . . Shortages everywhere: Attractive offers being made to Marines to fill billets with Dept of State (Embassy Duty) overseas (see new MCO 1306.2C.) Jump in authorized Corps strength means more work for recruiters. HQMC has directed commands to pick Marines for recruiting duty (see MCO 1300.9D). They must meet same strict requirements as volunteers. One reason Marines may be shunning recruiting duty is mistaken belief they can't hack Recruiters' School. Most Marines, says procurement branch, can take curriculum in stride. . . .

Newest fighter, F4H, is slated for delivery next summer. To learn more about the plane, selected pilots, AOs (Aerial Observers) and ground crewmen will attend Navy's RCVG (Replacement Carrier Air Group) school at Miramar, Calif; course lasts three months. WOs have inside track to fill AO seat. To fill out a planned six F4H squadron would take 156 WOs. . . .

Heard about ASH? It means Assault Support Helicopter and is geared to replace fixed wing OE and HOK observation aircraft for VMOs (Marine Observation Squadron). ASH will be a four-place helicopter, must meet current VMO missions, including airborne control of tactical air support and casualty evacuation. It will come off the shelf. . . . An Expeditionary Medal for Lebanon, Formosa, Laos? Possibly. One unresolved problem: What to do about Army units who participated. Army has no Expeditionary Medal, probably couldn't wear Marines' since too many soldiers were involved. . . . Incidentally, Expeditionary Medal last awarded to Wake Island Marines in 1941; not for Antarctica as reported in May GAZETTE. Thanks and five to Capt W. M. Rush who set us straight. . . . MCOs and MCBs are promulgated on need-to-know basis. Every field command doesn't get one. Too many units are asking for directives w/o (without) first checking to see if they rate getting one. Now directives can only be requisitioned from MCSA, Phila, by CGs and some COs (See MCO 5604.6D. Everyone gets this one.) . . . Revised Senior Extension Course now available from Extension School has less review of intermediate instruction. . . . That pine tree MajGen A. F. Binney, DirDivAv, gave Shirozaemon Nakamura in Iwakuni four years ago is flourishing. So is Mr. Nakamura, now 104 years old. In the Orient a pine tree is symbol of long life and prosperity. . . . FY 62 WO program for young Marines is open. Those selected can fill billets in one of 45 MOS categories. (See MCO 1040.18.) . . . LtCol J. G. Jewett's 2/9 (now 2/5) is back at CampPen after transplacement. Bn arrived from Okinawa along with 1,800 Marines of 131st Rotation Draft. . . . On 30 June 61, MarCorps strength was 176,550, almost 6,000 more than a year ago. . . . MCI urges COs to administer final exams as soon as possible after student completes course. They'll do their part by mailing exams promptly. . . . New construction: \$57,700 for decorating planned MCRD, San Diego SNCO Club, "inside where members will appreciate it most."

\$8 million for rebuilding Camp Del Mar, across Hy 101 from CampPen. . . . 100 more Capehart homes for MCB, 29 Palms, making a total of 250 when completed. . . . Sealift: First of 1,200 Marines slated to go aboard *USS Valley Forge* in Sep. Ship begins new career as LPH-1. . . . New attack transport: *USS Francis Marion*, former merchant ship converted to carry Marines at Bethlehem Steel's Baltimore yard.

Combat Rations: Back to the Old Can Opener

You might as well plan to learn to like "C" rations. New irradiated and dehydrated meals (Rations: Combat Supply Class I, GAZETTE: Jul '61) won't hit the field for several years.

It's now hoped to get the Quick-Serve Meal (dehydrated) by 1966 and the Ready-to-Eat Meal (Irradiated) by 1969. There could be more slippage. The Army QM R&E Command, Natick, Mass., within last three months has set back the predicted date to get these new rations by two years. Problems: lack of processing machinery, high costs.

A Force in Readiness

"Only colossal," is the report on new 28-minute Technicolor Marine film, "A Force in Readiness," just previewed at HQMC.

As previously reported, it's the product of Hollywood VTU 12-36 (PI) commanded by LtCol Bill L. Hendricks. Subject, narrated by Jack Webb (The D.I.) is training, mobility and striking power of USMC and the balanced fleet. It should reach your TAL by 1 Oct, in plenty of time for 10 Nov use.

Shooting History

If you're a Distinguished shot, active, retired, or discharged, you're entitled to a brand-new, 400-page, illustrated *History of Marine Corps Competitive Marksmanship*. Author is Maj Robert E. Barde, USMC (Distinguished Pistol). It covers 1901 through 1959 with an extensive appendix listing Distinguished shooters and match winners.

Write CMC (Code A03D), HQMC, Washington 25, D.C. Give complete name and address, year and location of "legs," and year Distinguished Badge was awarded.

Flying WOs

Deadline for reserve officers wanting full time duty as WO helicopter pilots has been extended until 30 Jun '62. At press time, special screening board was sifting 51 applications received since program was announced two months ago. Sixty MOS 7335 billets for WOs have been offered.

Hell's Acre

Good neighbor RCAF (Royal Canadian Air Force) is hot weather testing its first 4-engine turbo-prop transport plane "Yukon" at MCAAS, Yuma, Ariz. Choice of Yuma as test site was elementary, mean summer temperature this year: 112 degrees.

The Dangerous Summer: August in Arlex

Midsummer Washington heat accounts for only part of the glazed look on Marines assigned to the un-grandiose Arlington Annex (Arlex) which shelters HQMC.

Gone are the bright-eyed short-timers, bound for their dreamed-of FMF tour. In their places, new blood learning the tangled ropes. Will they have to learn a whole new organization? Probably not in one gulp.

The **Pepper Board** got its recommendations in on deadline (1Aug), but they're under wraps. A few current reasons why they're likely to be implemented gradually, a step at a time:

- The Step 1 buildup to 190,000 requires many, many studies and major decisions on who, when, and where. Behind locked doors, the heat's on to study other possible steps, as always.

- The new DoD concept of "program packaging" (Newsletter, Aug '61) also rushes the cadence to be ready for this fall's preliminary budget go-round. This in turn lights a fire under future Marine Corps organization and equipment needs. That's why the Troop Test Program takes high priority.

- Summer officer and SNCO selection boards take HQMC officers away from their desks for weeks at a time. That's one reason why HQMC asked MCS, Quantico to check the possibility of having Junior and Senior School students serve on SNCO selection boards. There are serious problems, also significant advantages. So far, nothing's been decided.

- Besides, carpenters were building the new Emergency Action Center (EAC) and the painters working over USMC spaces.

What can you expect from a reorganization? Probably consolidation, grouping of functions. Leading candidate (after prominent mention in more rather noted 4 January remarks) "one personnel department."

More likely to affect the field directly, possible assignment of Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM) to Marine aviation control and planning. Affected: Hawk (LAAM) and Terrier (MAAM) battalions, and the forthcoming Redeye. It appears that missile battalions would, however, have to stay in garrison at the only available range: 29 Palms, while Redeye is planned as organic to the MarDiv. Remember: this is a staff proposal, not a decision.

But all's not this major in a Washington summer. Traditionally, hot weather is the "Silly Season" for John Q. Public, notably when he takes pen in hand.

Seems an MS&M Bn Marine on Okinawa got into trouble. A General Court found him guilty of unauthorized absence, aggravated assault, conspiracy to steal, larceny of and selling to an Okinawan over \$17,000 worth of government property, escaping and resisting arrest, and spitting in the face of a superior officer. He got busted, a DD, and five years. He appealed and his civilian lawyer hit the papers, TV and national newsweeklies with the claim that he'd been confined in a "box."

Irate, and massively misinformed citizens promptly took pen in hand and wrote the President, SecDef, SecNav, CMC, and their Congressman or Senator—or all of them. One such modest proposal was that, UCMJ or not, the young man be allowed to publicly horsewhip CMC. Result: many man-hours spent patiently explaining that this aggressive escapee had been confined in an authorized brig in full compliance with regulations and had been mistreated by no one.

Meanwhile, back at Camp LeJeune, a PFC took pen in hand and wrote his Congressman. Seems he'd decided the M14 was no good and the whole thing ought to be investigated. . . . That was August in Arlex.

Small Plug

How's the GAZETTE doing? Three out of every four new members are snaffling onto our new free offer of the *Pictorial History* with a two-year membership. (See inside front cover). However, there's another advantage. Seems some Marines haven't noticed that two and three-year memberships are "sustaining" memberships. No expiration problem. We'll renew them automatically for you unless you resign in writing.

Welcome aboard. Come I Jan Troop Copies will be as scarce around your unit as PFCs on payday night.

Press time note: Cols selection boards due to report 14 Sep.
(More Newsletter on page 66)

All About Planes

Aviation notes: 3dMAW's MAG-36 was due to jump one squadron 1 Sep 61, with planned formation of HMR(L)-364. This puts West Coast helicopter punch on par with East Coast, five transport squadrons each. 1stMAW has only three but has fewer scattered commitments, e.g., 2dMAW's MAG-26 which furnishes Marines and machines for Mercury project, Solant Amity cruise, etc.

LtCol J. H. Berge's VMA-242, just back from extensive ground/air exercises in Vieques, gets a reprieve. Earlier budget cut would have caused dropping one attack squadron; new funds make this unnecessary at this time. Without new money, squadron was slated for mothballing 1 Oct 61.

3dMAW's VMGR (Marine Transport Refueling Squadron)-352, getting GV-1 at rate of one a month, will readdress December delivery, forward it to 1st MAW in Japan. VMR-253 then becomes VMGR-253, will build up to 8-plane (GV-1) squadron by July '62. Same deadline will see 8 GV-1 in 2dMAW. VMR-252 gets its first GV-1 next month, then becomes VMGR-252. Eventually each wing will have one transport squadron of 12-GV-1 (MCA NEWSLETTER: May '60). With this goal reached (sometime in FY-63), Marine Aviation's remaining transport squadron (VMR-353) will phase out.

Equal Footing

In August '61 NEWSLETTER we asked: "Why take a SWAG (Standard Written Agreement) to stay on active duty for a set time as a Reserve officer?"

New question: In the long run are Reserve officers actually on equal footing with Regulars?

As far as Personnel Department is concerned they are. Example:

In this year's keen competition for two much sought after flying billets, two Reserve captains got the nod.

Reason: they were judged by CMC screening board to be best qualified.

Capt D. F. Newton, USMCR, MAG-32, Beaufort, S. C., will fill exchange billet with USAF, Castle Air Force Base, Calif. Judged best of 49 applications (Regulars and Reserves), he's first Reserve pilot to make this program. Three Regulars were selected at same time to fill future exchange billets with Air Force this FY.

Capt J. P. Lane, USMCR, MAD, Pensacola, Fla., was selected to take Test Pilot Training and subsequent duty as test pilot at Patuxent River, Md. A qualified jet pilot, he'll test jets and helicopters.

SEPTEMBER 1961

VOLUME 45

NUMBER 9

50¢

ADVERTISERS' INDEX

A. M. Bolognese & Sons	18
American Telephone and Telegraph Company	7
British Aircraft Corporation	55
First National Bank of Quantico	64
FMC Corporation	19
Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation	16, 17
Ling-Temco Electronics	10, 11
Marine Corps Association	Cover II, III
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation	Cover IV
Navy Mutual Aid Association	61
Radio Corporation of America	21
Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Aircraft Corporation	9
Standard Brands, Inc.	63
United Services Automobile Association	65
Vertol Division, Boeing Airplane Company	13

Advertising Representative: Thomas
O. Woolf & Son, Inc., 225 Park Ave.,
New York 17, N.Y.; 266 S. Alexandria
Ave., Los Angeles 4, Calif.; 151 Fleet
St., London E.C. 4, England. Printed
at 32d Street and Elm Ave., Balti-
more, Md.

Opinions expressed in the Gazette are
those of the authors. They do not
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Marine Corps Gazette

Professional Magazine for United States Marines

*Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to pro-
vide a forum for the expression of matters which will ad-
vance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.*

IN THIS ISSUE

22	Something to Fight For	Dr. George K. Tanham
27	Marines Afloat	Capt William M. Cryan
30	Marine Aviation Needs More Command Billets	LtCol N. G. Ewers
32	Eyes Aloft	Maj J. A. Schimmenti
36	Combined Fire	Jac Weller
44	Soviet Comments on Vertical Envelopment	Maj Richard F. Staar, USMCR
48	Report from the Ready Forces: 1stMAW	Maj Walter E. Sullivan, Jr.
52	Combat Maintenance	Col J. A. Donovan, Jr.
56	FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment)	

DEPARTMENTS

MCA Newsletter	1-5, 66-72	Professional Scrapbook	14
Message Center	8	Administrative Time	20
Extension School Challenge	12	Observation Post	60

Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association (unofficial, non-profit) Box 1844, Quantico, Va.

Rates: Members, 1-yr \$5; 2-yr \$9.50; 3-yr \$13. Subscribers, 1-yr \$6; 2-yr \$11; 3-yr \$15.
Foreign postage: Add \$1 per year to above prices. Reduced Member's Rate to enlisted and
officer candidates, 1-yr \$4; 2-yr \$8; 3-yr \$12.

Free Writers Guide on request.

POSTMASTER: Forward to U.S. servicemen when address changed by military orders (includ-
ing FPO) per section 157.4 Postal Manual. Send Form 3579 to Marine Corps Gazette, PO Box
1844, Quantico, Va.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS: must be received by 10th of month before publication. A complete
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Out at Six

► Re Rifle Team question in your August issue. If this was intended as a debate, I'm afraid it was a little out at six. I would have suggested that Hickey's presentation commence on page 28, and the Team Shooters' article follow on subsequent pages as proof of the sergeant's argument. (Or did you purposely intend it as "Problem, Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations," in that order?)

Maj G. E. McKain

4500 Weyburn Drive
Annandale, Virginia

Trial and Error

► Interesting to note that Col Metzger's comment in *The Care and Feeding of Young Officers* (GAZETTE: Jul '61) "... seniors all too often don't take the time to know the lieutenants ..." is restated three pages later by 1stLt Warren as "I have been in an infantry battalion where the commander did not know the 44 officers in his command by name to say nothing of their performance of duty."

I believe the colonel's most telling comment concerns allowing young officers to participate in decisions regardless of the

mistakes which may arise in the process. By assigning officers back to the FMF as soon as possible after promotion and then assigning them to command upon arrival in the division, I believe the Marine Corps would reap a twofold benefit: "free-wheeling" thinkers for whom Col Metzger asks, and we would be building experienced battalion and company commanders for future assignment as needed during full mobilization or police action expansion.

Capt J. J. Keenan

MCS, Quantico, Va.

Typhoon

► Amen to those thoughts put forth by 1stLt J. M. Gratto in *Home, Sweet Home*, August MESSAGE CENTER. I can recall a previous duty station where huge sums of money were poured into the never ceasing typhoon season/football field struggle while same typhoons wreaked havoc within the trooper's quarters. Football field remained forever green and lush—quarters just barely remained

Bachelor officers find themselves in more
(Continued on page 11)

QUESTION OF THE MONTH

We asked: What type aircraft . . . is best for CAS in today's Marine Corps?—not too sure in this jet age that anyone would come out in favor of props. LtCol

► There can be no question as to which aircraft is best suited for CAS (Close Air Support) in today's Marine Corps, any more than there can be a question as to which gun is best for hunting mice. We all know you use a mouse gun. Use of the word "today," however, may well change the entire picture.

We cannot overstress the word "today." We must have a plane that can meet the threat of today. It's different today than yesterday. Today the threat is the oblique thrust and the invasion by proxy. We can't wait for production, or even scheduled delivery of new aircraft. The times require that we use a weapon from the shelf. Business as usual in receiving this plane into the inventory must be replaced by an urgency commensurate with the times we live in. There isn't much time remaining—perhaps a year. In that short time we must accept this aircraft, organize and train three squadrons, and deploy them.

The AD is the aircraft that is best suited for CAS in today's Marine Corps. It exists in sufficient numbers to support a Marine Corps inventory of 66 planes. It meets the operational requirements of effective CAS in lift, endurance, and ability to survive under the conditions and in the element in which it must fight. The AD can be operated from the most primitive airfields with a minimum of support facilities.

Heresy? It is not! If we have learned one lesson in the last year, that lesson is that if we are going to conduct CAS operations in Asia during the next four years we must use the AD. The A4D has too much capability in other tasks to make it suitable for use in the CAS role. Is this a step backward? It is not! The enemy is doing just great in Laos using the seventy-five pack. Was the country really too primitive? Who knows? But we do know that the logistical aspects of the fuel requirements for one A4D squadron for one day were so staggering as to make any discussions of foreign object damage, dust free maintenance, SATS, TAFDS, nav aids and etc. little better than academic.

I would like to be able to fight from a wide place in the road if needs be, and I could do just that with one squadron of ADs.

Now before you publish the parade order and drum away my wings let's look at a few of the whys and wherefores, and just who gains at what price. Also please bear in mind a few of the basic rules of the employment of air power.

The air commander applies the principle of the offense to the battle with his attack aircraft. His fighters defend, his "recc" aircraft seek information, and his choppers and cargo planes support. His attack planes strike the enemy. Let us not beguile ourselves. The air commander still contributes most to the victory by the proper conduct of counter air operations and the effective interdiction of the battle area. To detract from this effort by making his limited high performance attack sorties available for other uses is not in his own best interests or in the ultimate interest of the ground commander.

W. L. Traynor did, and presented his argument so well he wins \$25.00 first prize. LtCol Roy Gray voted for jets, specifically FJ4B, but thought the question academic.

To exploit the full capability of his limited attack sorties he must employ the aircraft in the role they do the best. To misuse these aircraft is to waste offensive power and erodes the total effect of the air effort. This waste exerts a direct influence on the ground effort, as we have just seen in Cuba. It is true that a high performance jet such as the A4D can destroy a machine gun emplacement. It is also true that such employment is to waste a weapon with theater level capabilities on a platoon level target.

Where, then, does this leave the ground commander? He's the same place today as he was yesterday. There he stands, hat in hand, requesting CAS sorties which must compete in the open market with counter air and interdiction sorties. This is a sad but true lesson that for some very astonishing reason we refuse to learn. The Army learned it years ago, and we are supposed to be the experts.

In my judgment the conditions of today demand that we make available to the ground commander a source of CAS sorties to use as he requires without regard to the air tasks of the air commander. These sorties cannot be tied to a finished air base, neither can they be encumbered with elaborate support requirements. They must have great flexibility under adverse conditions of weather and terrain. They cannot be preassigned to strategic use. They must be able to meet today's threat.

For today, and the next four years, it's got to be the AD for CAS.

LtCol W. L. Traynor

% Navy #990, FPO

► Your question asked for the best CAS airplane, and we should remember that there are other requirements that might favor a jet-type attack airplane for today's Marine Corps. A few:

- Nuclear or conventional weapon attacks against deep support targets.
- Cover for helicopters by taking under fire hostile ground AA defenses with guns, rockets.
- Versatility of new air-guided missiles, such as Bullpup, are enhanced by the speed and altitude capabilities of jets.

Jet vs prop is interesting for academic purposes but it should be pointed out that this very same question has already been considered and resolved by higher authority. Prop-driven AD and F4U were phased out of yesterday's Marine Corps some years ago. Next question would logically be "what type is best for tomorrow's Marine Corps? This one should generate some interesting proposals.

LtCol Roy Gray

Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

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Robert McCulloch
Chairman of the Board

Gifford K. Johnson
President


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**LING-
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BE

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(Continued from page 8)

or less the same public boat. Subjected to a YMCA type of living. I, for one, would like occasionally to entertain friends, have no idea when or what the officer six doors down the hall plays on his hi-fi, have a refrigerator and enjoy an easy chair I don't have to purchase myself. The present installation does a fine job for transients or two week TADers but as my "home away from home" . . . no thanks.

1stLt C. P. Roberts

MCS, Quantico

A Friendly Game

► On page 2 of your July issue, headlined "On the Light Side of Greenlight" appears the statement "On D-1, guerrillas knocked off 7th Marines CP, 30 minutes later, umpires relented, resurrected regimental CO."

In defense of Sgt Kirthew J. Parrott, Jr., NCO in Charge of regimental headquarters security platoon and my safety when ensconced therein, I must take exception to the above. Our CP was never knocked off, out, backwards or sideways during GREENLIGHT nor was the regimental commander ever in a position requiring "resurrection," by umpires or even the powers that be.

You may be interested, however, in a more factual anecdote:

On D-3, our headquarters was attacked by a helicopter-borne force of some 80-90 people. Not germane to the anecdote but complimentary to our regimental headquarters Marines, and one rifle company of 3/7, is the fact that 50 aggressors were scooped up 30 minutes after the landing.

To get on with the anecdote: While aggressor forces were still attacking, they overran and captured our S-4. Subsequently the captors were captured and the major asked for his release.

"No, Sir," said the aggressor, "you're my prisoner."

"But you've been captured by the friendlies, Sergeant."

"Come on, Major, play the game. You're my prisoner until the umpires let you go."

And so off to the 1stMarDiv POW stockade went the aggressors and one rueful major, friendly type, caught up in the intricacies of POW handling in an amphibious exercise.

Col A. Arsenault

CO, 7th Marines
Campen, Calif.

Ed: It appears our Campen correspondent is operating out of Laguna Beach; obviously he sent us bum dope. But we're not sorry. How else could we have gotten the true facts, presented in such refreshing style? And for setting us straight, Col Arsenault gets something, too: \$\$.

Revised Edition

► Current MCI course on Communist Guerrilla Warfare is in need of revision. Textbook is concerned with Russian partisan activity in WWII against the Germans. Although the principles are still valid and the two supplementary texts, one by Mao and the other a collection of writings on the subject, are good, I believe we desperately need an up to date course concentrating on those areas where Marines are most likely to fight. This means SE Asia. Let's see

something written about "dung sticks" and nail "mine fields." How does a foreign force set up a reliable intelligence network? How did the Vietnamese organize that battalion size ambush that recently scored such a success? How do you deal with villagers that are friendly to the Communists yet are not actively bearing arms? How can loyal villagers be organized to defend themselves?

1stLt S. P. Dawkins, USMCR

7 Lincoln St.
Hawthorne, N. J.

► This comment on your April issue is a bit tardy. Like most mail here it arrived late, but above all it went into circulation before I could read it. It took several weeks to get it back.

The entire issue was to me more professional and less technical than the usual issue. Above all I wish to compliment you, and Col "Nomdeplume," for "Military Briefing on Laos." As you stated it was timely from a news sense. It was also factual.

It was refreshing to read in the professional U S military journal the thought that we could fight there if necessary. We have heard expressed too often the concept of avoiding "being bogged down in hopeless land warfare on the vast mass of Asia, etc., etc." We need more thinking along the lines that combat here could be a manifestation of mobile naval power. Why else are we here?

Among those here who were enthusiastic about the Laos article is a member of my staff, a veteran of the WWII Russian front and of the Indo-China war. He considers the article one of the best briefings in capsule form that he has ever read or heard on Laos.

Col T. F. Forrester, USMCR

Television Associates—USOM
APO 152, San Francisco

Wearing Armor

► In the event our country becomes involved in a shooting war, will the Marine infantryman wear the armored vest that was used during the latter part of the Korean War?

If the answer is "Yes" then why isn't it worn during all phases of training? I haven't been with the FMF since 1958, but when I was we never used the armored vest regardless of what type of training we conducted. Issued for combat duty only, it would be something like a track man training for a track meet in track shoes then find out he would have to run the race in combat boots.

MSgt H. H. Black

Wheeling, W. Va.

Next to First

► August GAZETTE—and several other recent Marine publications—stated that Capt W. W. McMillan, Jr., was first to win Lauchheimer Trophy. Sgt John M. Thomas, first Marine to receive the award, won it in 1921-22-23. Nevertheless, McMillan's feat is just as remarkable.

Col R. M. Wood

Head, Marksmanship Branch
G-3, HQMC

Question of the Month

Marines rate high in Dr. G. K. Tanham's "Something to Fight For," p. 22, but there's always room for improvement. Answer us this by 1Nov and win \$25: What can we do to make a better fighting man out of today's Pfc Marine?

Extension School CHALLENGE

BASIC

1 In the event that a riot breaks out at the main gate during the interval between guard mounting and the time the officers of the day report to the commanding officer, who assumes authority over the guard?

- a. The old officer of the day.
- b. The new officer of the day.
- c. The senior officer of the two officers of the day.
- d. The commander of the guard.

2 A rise of 55 feet over a horizontal distance of 950 meters is a (an)

- a. 1 degree slope.
- b. 3 degree slope.
- c. 11 degree slope.
- d. 17 degree slope.

3 When a mob cannot be dispersed except through the use of small arms, the troops equipped with firearms should be instructed to:

- a. Use blank cartridges.
- b. Aim low.
- c. Fire over the heads of the mob.
- d. Fire into the center of the mob.

JUNIOR

4 The unit intelligence officer is responsible for compiling intelligence data which is of value to the commander and other members of the staff. List five separate documents prepared by the intelligence officer that would contain data of interest to the unit communication officer.

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

5 As a nuclear weapons employment officer, you realize that _____ percent of all weapons fired, or bombs dropped, will fall within one CEP (circular error probable) of the aiming point.

- a. 25
- b. 50
- c. 75
- d. 99

6 The Intelligence Officer is required to support the other staff officers. In this connection, other staff officers should:

- a. Prepare essential elements of information (EEI) and list them by priority.
- b. Include their intelligence support requirements in the intelligence annex.
- c. Be specific as to what they need, when they need it, and in what form.
- d. Include their requirements in the intelligence officer's work sheet.

SENIOR

7 An artillery unit, assigned a tactical mission of reinforcing,

- a. Supplements the fires of another artillery unit.
- b. Reinforces the attack of an infantry unit.
- c. Is in direct support of a specific infantry unit.
- d. Supports the force as a whole.

8 An initiating directive to the amphibious task force commander and the landing force commander defines the objective area for purposes of:

- a. Target designation.
- b. Maneuver room.
- c. Preliminary planning.
- d. Command and control.

WHAT IS IT?



(Answers on page 64)



A captain suggests all officers and Staff NCOs . . .
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

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The "mission module" versatility of the Boeing-Vertol 107 means a high potential of all-around usefulness in operations. For example, pre-packaged, "plug-in" modules for anti-submarine warfare, minesweeping and rescue missions can be installed internally in a matter of minutes between flights. In addition, the same aircraft can tow, lift or carry heavy or bulky loads externally. Cargo of more than two tons can be speedily loaded or unloaded in the fuselage via the full-width rear ramp.

Along with its water landing capability and "mission module" versatility, the 107 offers the reliability of twin-turbine power. All in all, it is one of the most tactically and logistically useful aircraft available to the Armed Forces.



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This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.

The First Principle of War

By LtCol Emil V. B. Edmond, USA
Extracted from "Military Review," Feb '61

I believe the use of tactical nuclear weapons in ground combat has invalidated the doctrine of assigning critical terrain features as objectives. In other words, the tremendous destructive capability of nuclear weapons has ended the logic of assigning an objective, other than complete destruction of the enemy's forces, to any ground tactical unit. This is a drastic statement that requires some explanation.

Obsolete Doctrine

First, let us return to the current doctrine which allows the selection of critical terrain features as intermediate objectives for tactical units in ground combat operations. Can this doctrine be considered realistic when each opposing force possesses nuclear weapons in sufficient quantity to permit their use whenever desired? If this is the case, and one force captures a really critical terrain feature—one which is vitally important to the outcome of the operation—the second force can be expected to use its nuclear weapons to destroy the troops occupying this important area, or otherwise neutralize any advantage to the side holding this critical piece of terrain. Does it appear logical under such circumstances to conduct a tactical operation, with a critical terrain feature as its objective, when the advantage can be wiped out immediately by the use of a nuclear weapon?

Theoretical Examples

Assume that within the zone of action of an infantry division there is a piece of high ground which is critical to the control of the operational area. A battle group is assigned this critical terrain feature as an intermediate objective. Its attack succeeds and the dominant terrain is captured. If occupation of this critical terrain really hurts the enemy, he can restore the situation by firing a nuclear weapon on this area. So we are right

back where we started, and minus one battle group. Would it not have been better to have neutralized this high ground with a ground burst nuclear weapon, and to have given the battle group the objective of destroying the enemy forces located within its zone?

Here is another example. Assume that the capture of a certain bridge is considered critical to the success of a ground combat operation. Under present doctrine some unit is assigned the objective of capturing the bridge intact so that it can be used by our forces. If its attack succeeds and the enemy is really hurt by the loss of this bridge, he can be expected to use a nuclear weapon of sufficient magnitude to destroy the bridge as well as the unit in position to ensure its retention.

Discussion

It is not logical to assume that an enemy, placed at a disadvantage by our seizure of a critical terrain feature, will allow this condition to continue when it can be overcome by a nuclear weapon. Nor can he be expected to expend his ground forces to regain the balance when he has these powerful weapons at his disposal. We must not lose sight of the fact that the user can, in general, control the length of time during which the strike area remains unsafe for the movement of unprotected ground troops.

The basic question here is, "How critical is the terrain feature which is selected as the objective?" If it is not important enough to influence the outcome of the operation, it is not a suitable objective. And if it is important enough to influence the outcome, an enemy armed with nuclear weapons cannot be expected to allow us to reap the advantages of holding it.

I believe there is sufficient evidence to conclude that critical terrain features

are no longer suitable objectives for ground combat units in a nuclear war.

If this statement is true, what is a suitable objective for a ground combat unit? The answer is in the definition of the principle of the objective: "The destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight is the ultimate military objective of war."

Objective—Destroy Enemy

The objective of every ground combat unit, regardless of its size, should be destruction of all enemy forces within its assigned zone of action. Instead of conducting its operation to seize what might be considered critical terrain, the unit must seek out and destroy the enemy. The operation must be planned and executed toward this end, with critical terrain features incidental to the operations plan.

Applying this doctrine, the division commander would assign a battle group the objective of destroying all enemy within its zone of action, rather than capture of a specific terrain feature. Battle groups, companies, and platoons would be assigned similar objectives. Each unit would direct its efforts toward maximum destruction of the enemy. Terrain would be utilized to its best advantage, but would be a secondary consideration.

Conclusion

Instead of thinking in terms of terrain captured or successfully defended as the criterion for judging the success of a tactical operation, we must think of the number of enemy destroyed. Destruction of the enemy force (or its will to fight) must be accepted as the only suitable tactical objective for a ground combat unit, regardless of size. Units must be trained to locate and destroy the enemy. The battle order for all tactical ground units must be to move, destroy, and survive.

Bibliography on Guerrilla Warfare

By Col Virgil Ney, USA (Ret)

Reprinted from the fall, 1960 issue of "Military Affairs"

Introductory Note

This bibliography was compiled by Col Ney over a period of years during which he has been engaged in the study of Guerrilla Warfare.

Col Ney has recently completed his book, "Notes on Guerrilla War," which was published by Command Publications, Washington, D.C. It explains the principles of guerrilla war doctrine, and costs \$2.75.

Books

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PROBLEM

While house-clearing during fighting in built-up areas, houses are cleared from the top story downwards. This holds good for an individual house. What would be the drill for clearing a block of flats or houses joined by partition walls?

The Infantry Journal, India
 (Answer on page 17)

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Ed: For other references on Guerrilla and Anti-Guerrilla Warfare, see Professional Scrapbook, GAZETTE: May '61.

ANSWER

The drill still holds good, except that the clearing must continue through the top story of each house in the block before progressing downwards. If an attempt is made to clear one or more houses by the accepted drill the enemy may come back from the adjoining houses and reoccupy the upper stories of the cleared houses, using previously prepared holes in the partition walls.

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PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



A Better Way

To Have Accurate Rosters

By SSgt N. M. Radel

The accuracy of the muster, taken before a training period begins, is an important factor in crediting individuals who participate with the required hours of training. The roster must be taken before every period of instruction. In doing so, procedures have been found to be inaccurate. There have been instances where a person may attend the muster, but leave prior to commencement of class.

In many units section rosters and the "sign in please" theory are used. Section rosters tend to be inaccurate due to large turnover in personnel, and the "mystery challenger" method is both time consuming, and difficult to decipher.

A better way to insure accuracy of the training muster is to construct a box 3' X 1½' X 1', divide it into various compartments required to represent

each unit, and have it fitted with hinges and hasp to insure security. The lid has corresponding numbers of slots for each compartment, with the title of each unit clearly marked beside each slot. As each man files into class, he drops his ID card in the respective slot for his unit. After the class has started, the box is taken to the S-3 office, and an accurate roster is compiled.

The ID cards are returned to the various units at the completion of each school day via the NCOIC of the individual sections.

This system not only insures an accurate roster of persons attending class, but offers a dual feature as well. It is possible to insure serviceability of ID cards through a weekly check by the S-3 office.

H&S Co, Camp S. D. Butler
% FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Tricks of the Trade

Dress Shoes and Boots

... To get new shoes and/or boots squared away, apply a light coat of polish, and shine with a small amount of after shaving lotion until shine appears. Repeat shine, using regular method and cold water.

SSgt R. C. Rowland

Armed Services Police,
Honolulu, Hawaii

... Don't throw away non-woven fiber towels found in 5 in 1 rations. They are good for shining shoes and boots.

2dLt T. W. Branch

H&S Co, 2dBn, 5th Marines,
1stMarDiv, CampPen

Cap Visor

... To keep polish on brim and off cover, tie a piece of heavy string from one screw-post to the other. It acts as a bumper while you shine.

Cpl P. K. Van Riper

207 Edward Ave.,
Pittsburgh 16, Pa.

... If string doesn't work, use a piece of masking tape.

Sgt E. J. Thomas

31 Norris Dr.,
Midway Is., Va.

Field Scarf

... To achieve a "one-dimple look," pull big end of tie through knot, slip a mechanical pencil through the same place and hook pocket clip on knot. Center pencil and tighten knot. Remove pencil and make final adjustment. Result: a perfect dimple.

1stLt L. Cohan

1223 Steelton Ave.,
Baltimore, Md.

Ribbons

... If out on liberty and you lose a "clutch-clip" from your ribbon bar, replace it with eraser from a common pencil.

SSgt F. N. Pond

MCR&RD Sub-Station
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Kennewick, Wash.

Quote of the Month

"... The man who dedicates himself to a profession, who seeks to contribute to his society, who devotes himself to the service of his country, must sacrifice material rewards.

Yet we make a mistake when we identify dedication with sacrifice. For a truly dedicated man, a man who devotes his life to the highest values of his society, reaps great spiritual rewards. Such men find tremendous exhilaration in striving for an honored and honorable objective. Although the alternatives are tempting, they would much rather work hard for something they believe than enjoy complacent comfort."

Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret)

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
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MCG-9

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
Corps Calendar—September					1	2
					Franklin Wharton, 2d Commandant, died. 1818	Gen Wash-ington ap-pointed soldiers to serve aboard schooners Franklin and Lynch. Their title: Acting Marines. 1775
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Third issue of GAZETTE. 1916	Marine mus-ketry, direc-ted from rig-ging of American ship Raleigh, was deciding factor in defeat of British Druid 1777	Continental Con-gress prescribed first US Marine uniform. 1776	Marine ten-acity aboard privateer Congress enabled Americans to de-feat British sloop Savage. 1781	Marines landed at Beirut, Lebanon, to pro-tect American Consulate in wake of religious up-risings. 1903	Marines engaged in opening battle of Civil War—Ft. Sumter. 1863	First jet aircraft mission against enemy by Marine pilot. 1950
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Marines partici-pated in Battle of Lake Erie. 1813	Ten Marines were called upon to quell mutiny aboard Siamese man-of-war. 1853	T. Roosevelt selected Ma-rines to guard American Legation in China. 1905 Marines fought in Battle of San Mihiel. 1918	Battle of Chapulte-pec. 1847 Amphibious land-ing by Marines at Inchon, Korea 1950	Marines first to occupy Cuba. 1906 Marines spiked guns on Confederate ship Judah, while Union vessel de-stroyed her. 1861	Offensive on Peleliu began. 1944 Marine marksmen took all four top spots in National Rifle and Pistol Matches. 1928	A detach-ment of Ma-rines, and 70 men from the 44th Infantry, destroyed pirate stronghold at Barataria. 1814
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Last Marine unit left Dominican Republic after oc-cupation. 1924	Marines landed in Panama to protect American interests during period of unrest. 1902	Marines fought in Battles of Masaya, and Tel-paneca. Both took place in Nicaragua, in 1912, and 1927 respectively.	Congress, forced to seek tempo-rary quarters after capitol was de-stroyed by British, selected Marines to insure their pro-tection. 1814	Marine at work. 1775-1961	A Marine landing party was sent ashore to force ruler of Fiji Is. to make repara-tion for destruc-tion of American property. 1853	Marines val-iantly fought aboard Bon Homme Rich-ard, and were instrumental in defeat of British ship Serapis. 1779
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
The Atlan-tic Fleet Marine Detachment was on its way to Cuba only 5 hours after receipt of orders. 1906	Marines met, and dispers-ed, a super-lor number of Haitian Cacos at the Battle of Petit Riviere. 1915	Marines aboard USS St. Marys went ashore to protect the Ameri-can owned Panama Railroad during revolution. 1860	Marines burned village of Namula, Fiji Is., after outbreaks of violence. 1853	MajGen Comman-dant Bar-nett, wishing to see why Germans called his men "Devil Dogs," sailed for France. 1918	After near-ly 11 yrs of testing and analysis, the Corps completed a nuclear-age reor-ganization of the entire FMF. 1958	Keep up, so you can measure up—with the GAZETTE. 1961



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ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words
by the editors
about the magazine you
write

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Has Jock McFox been putting the arm on your personal GAZETTE? Is your copy being dogeared by non-paying types? We've got bad news for you. It's going to get worse.

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WRITER'S CORNER

• We're loaded . . .

. . . but the welcome mat is out for the right article. We don't have a rejection slip for Marines. But we do reject lots of manuscripts for one basic reason: organization. Too many writers use one of these two approaches:

• Just Grew Like Topsy. Writer thinks up a clever beginning and just wanders on from there. Reader reaction: what's he saying, and why?

• Back in the Dim, Red Dawn of Time. Writer begins with ancient history, gets nowhere fast.

There are other ways to organize a manuscript. Try these: "How-to-do-it-step-by-step;" "What-why-how;" "Most Important-Least Important;" "The whole thing-the parts-how it all works." Fit your organization to your material. Make sure that the organization emphasizes the important points. But do use an outline, it clarifies what you want to say. More important, it shows you what you should leave out to be clear and brief.

Writer Incentive Award this issue: LtCol Norman Ewers \$100 for Aviation Command. It begins on p. 30.

Annual Incentive Awards, FY 1961

Best article (\$500): Our Haughty Helicopters (Sep '60) by Col J. L. Winecoff.

Best Short subject (\$100): Reach for a Rifleman (Oct '60) by Capt P. R. Clapper.

Second prize, best article (\$250): Red China's Military Revolution (Apr '61) by Capt Conway J. Smith.



NORAD ON THE ALERT

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Something



What motivates men to fight and die in combat? For centuries, kings, presidents, generals, and sergeants have been probing for the answer.

Here's an analysis, in depth, of what's been learned over the years.

to Fight For

By Dr. George K. Tanham

"What are you fighting for?" the correspondent emotionally inquired of a tired Marine colonel on Guadalcanal. "\$563.12 a month," was the blunt reply.—Anon.

♣ In WWI MILLIONS OF CIVILIZED MEN ON BOTH SIDES died to gain a few yards of mud and slime. In WWII thousands of Marines sacrificed themselves to take tiny coral islands in the far-off Pacific; Nazi SS troops fanatically threw themselves at Allied machine guns; and ten times ten thousand Russian riflemen fell storming German gun replacements. More recently in Korea, Chinese communist masses struck UN lines in banzai-like fashion. In Indochina the Vietminh, strapped with dynamite charges, blew themselves and French forts sky-high. In Budapest, Hungarian Freedom Fighters, armed only with bottles of gasoline, fought powerful Soviet tanks and died. Why?


Ever since violence became organized into war, military leaders have wanted to know what made men fight most effectively. Sun Tzu, the great Chinese general-philosopher, worried about man's behavior in battle in 550 B.C. Twenty-five hundred years later, President Eisenhower, as Commander-in-Chief of America's armed forces, showed a very real concern. Prompted by the disaffection of American prisoners in Korea, he issued the famous "Code of Conduct for Members of American Forces." In the centuries between, kings, presidents, generals, and sergeants all have been concerned with "why men fight."

As armed forces are now large, so the reasons for fighting must appeal to large groups of men. The military leader of 1961 is not necessarily interested in the fact that history produces adventurers and crackpots, pirates and raiders, who have fought extremely well. The motivations of these few groups have been personal and have not been those which impel large groups of men to fight. Personal honor, though still a factor, does not incite men to combat as it did the knight in feudal times.

It is often said that men fight best in defense of their homes. There are too many cases when this was not so. In 1917 the Russian armies, though defending country and home, collapsed because of lack of arms and equipment and lack of belief in government. Again in 1940 the defending French armies bowed to the more fanatical and better organized invading German forces. In 1943, the Italians stopped fighting while defending their homes. The Germans fought more effectively defending Italy than had the Italians.

The reverse of the coin—that imperialistic soldiers do not fight well—is equally unreliable. One need only cite the Roman Imperial Legions, the crusading Arab armies of Mohammed, the successes of the French revolutionary armies and Napoleon, and the aggressions of our own century. In some of these cases the invaders were eventually defeated. The point is that the invading soldiers fought well.

A more accurate statement is that throughout history men have fought more willingly and more effectively for ideas and ideals than for other reasons. Certainly wars which were waged primarily over ideas have tended to be bloodier and more fiercely fought than those waged predominantly for economic reasons or prestige. History marks the relatively few casualties of the feudal period in contrast to the bitter and bloody battles of the 16th and 17th century religious wars. During the 18th century, the Age of Reason, mercenaries were used and the wars were largely maneuvers with infrequent battles. The French Revolution injected ideas—liberty, equality, fraternity—which plunged Europe into a 25-year blood bath. In the 20th century, democracy, fascism, and communism have motivated men to fight still bloodier wars. These have been the great motivations—religion, nationalism,



Men fight best for ideals, but history is full of examples in which leadership was critical factor

and, in the 20th century, democracy, fascism, communism—which have inspired larger and larger groups of men to fight and die.

Usually the newer ideas have been the most aggressive and have aroused the greatest degree of fanaticism and willingness to do battle. Certainly the crusading zeal of the French revolutionary armies was quite a different factor from the present spirit of Western armies. Here there is a quiet, perhaps more mature belief in democracy and freedom, but not the same missionary faith. The nationalism of Asia, Africa, and the Arabian countries, encouraged by communist Russia, is an emotional charge which does not wish to respect the influences of reason and logic and is, again, different from the older, more tested patriotism of our country and its older allies. However, both communism and Asian-African nationalism are dynamic ideas eagerly embraced by millions of men throughout the world.

Western Motivation vs. USSR's

Although our country and her older allies have evolved into mature and sophisticated governments, we sometimes appear to lack the fervor and fanaticism of communism and of the newer nationalism of Asia and Africa. While there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that America and the West will fight when the chips are down, there may be a number of occasions when the value of the chips is in question. There undoubtedly will be other Koreas, Indochinas, Berlins, and Lebanons which will not be considered by everyone to be all-out *casus belli*.

And if American society is not in the middle of an emotional or ideological surge, she nonetheless compares favorably to Russia *vis-à-vis* her average citizen's belief in country. The majority of Americans are loyal to the concept of democracy even while simultaneously invoking criticisms of the political party in power that

would make any dictator reach for his firing squad. At heart the thinking American realizes that his country has evolved the freest way of life for the individual in a highly organized society.

The Russian is also a deeply patriotic person, a lover of his land which he can defend fanatically as proven by some ten million Russian dead in WWII. But an authoritarian political structure is not an instrument that breeds trust. No matter how deep a patriotic feeling, *per se*, the individual's belief must be shaken by constant purges, meaningless elections, secret trials, long-term imprisonments, top leadership squabbles settled by the bullet rather than the ballot.

Still, Russia has the advantage of calling the plays, as much to her own people as to the world, while America and her allies are at the temporary disadvantage of having to dance to the aggressor's tune. The classic example is Korea, a war which many Americans felt did not call for an all-out effort. The morale problem in the 8th Army and in the prison camps reflected the confusion in the minds of many troops as to exactly what they were fighting for. Our national aims were not sufficiently clear to motivate our soldiers to do their best, nor did military discipline and spirit compensate for this lack.

The breakdown occurred primarily in the US Army, and the Army is to be greatly admired for facing up to the problem and putting it in part right where it belongs: in the laps of the American home, school, and church. An authoritative writer who, working with full Army cooperation, investigated our miserable record in Korean prison camps, states that "the roots of the explanation go deep into diverse aspects of our culture—home training of children, education, physical fitness, religious adherence, and the privilege of existing under the highest standard of living in the world. In the light of what happened in Korea, all of these facets of American life might profitably be re-examined

by our leaders in government, education, and religion." There is hardly a troop leader today who will not say, "Amen."

It remains to be seen whether these national leaders will instill new values in our nation's youth. Meanwhile brush-fire wars will probably come and go, a challenge that must be met with what we have at present. Can we continue to meet this challenge?

In our look back through history, we have seen that great ideological movements have motivated masses of men to fierce battle. We should also have observed two other factors, however, which stand out almost as brightly. These are personal leadership and *esprit de corps*. Because of these factors countries have organized effective and victorious military organizations at times when ideology was not all-important. Gustavus Adolphus led his small army of religiously inspired Swedes to great heights, but the same Swedes did little after his premature death. Cavour and Garibaldi led the long-downtrodden Italians to victory over the Austrians. King Frederick William and Frederick the Great were able to mold out of tiny Prussia mercenary armies which could successfully fight the rest of Europe at one time. Other military leaders, too numerous to cite but including Napoleon, Marlborough, Nelson, Hindenburg, and Lee, inspired troops to actions that other leaders could not duplicate. In WWI such names as Joffre, Foch, and Pershing still ring true, and what latter-day Marine fails to recognize "Howling Mad" Smith or "Chesty" Puller?

Military performance depends on tradition, leadership, and even economics in the sense of a soldier's material well-being and the quality and quantity of his equipment. And when the military forcefully combines and applies these factors, it automatically influences a recruit's pre-formed ideology. A good military organization not only can sustain or enlarge an already patriotic lad's belief, but it can even instill belief in a non-patriotic youth.

For this process elite organizations offer many advantages. It is not so much that larger armies cannot brag of tradition and leadership. Smaller organizations, however, can pinpoint and stress these qualities to an extent that the recruit can hardly fail to be impressed. Furthermore, the recruit can more easily acquire the feeling of "belonging" in a smaller outfit. It is no acci-

dent that nations throughout history have maintained elite forces no matter what their ideological climes. Nor is it a coincidence that the hallmark of such forces is excellent leadership combined with healthy tradition. The French failures in the Peninsular Wars and at Waterloo are not to be explained so much by poor French leadership—though this was true in part—as by the superb British leadership of Wellington. Similarly, the ability of the limited and ill-supplied Confederate forces to fight the prolonged Civil War was due largely to the inspired leadership of Lee and his lieutenants. On a smaller scale, the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal, outnumbered and outgunned, could not have won the campaign without its extraordinarily able professional leaders.

These qualities can lead to great achievements but they obviously cannot overcome all obstacles in all cases. In 1940 America's military leaders, no matter how able, could not produce sufficient arms, tanks, and vehicles for a conscript army. A national supply failure made it impossible to overcome the draftee's lack of respect for the task at hand—nor was this overcome until the Japanese supplied the patriotic motivation by bombing Pearl Harbor.

Rommel, certainly a great captain, could not supply the *Afrika Korps* with gasoline for its armor—again a national supply failure that spelled German withdrawal from North Africa.

Russia's 1939 Training Failure

In 1939 Russia not only failed to supply her northern army but also failed in its training, as witness the Finnish Marshal Mannerheim's description of the Red Army's early offensives at Lake Ladoga: "... Especially in the beginning, the Russians for this reason went in principally for mass attack, which often resulted in the attackers being mown down to the last man ... in spite of this, one attacking wave after another would follow, with a similar result. It happened in the initial fighting in December that the Russians would advance in close formation, singing, and even hand in hand, against the Finnish minefields, apparently indifferent to the explosions and the accurate fire of the defenders."

Failure of training, the success of which depends on leadership and *esprit*, or of supply, will often result in a man's disbelief not only in his country but in his military organization, with the ultimate disastrous result of disaffection. In 1814 Adm. Cochrane was forced to withdraw his victorious fleet from Chesapeake Bay, not because of Joshua Barney's threat but because his ill-paid, ill-fed, and ill-treated Royal Navy seamen were jumping overboard to swim to new lives in America. Disaffection broke Mussolini's armies entirely, and it proved in the end a threat to Hitler's forces.

To translate the significance of these factors to the military organizations of America and Russia is to find a vast difference. In the Western tradition, America tends to neglect her armed forces in peacetime, a failing not altogether overcome during these long years of cold war. While attempting to maintain an adequate force, yet one remaining within what national leadership feels is permissible budgetary bounds, America has created an urgent personnel problem, particularly at officer and senior NCO levels. At a time of national prosperity,



Dr Tanham has earned three degrees—AB, Princeton; AM and PhD, Stanford. During WWII he spent three years in Europe with the 7th Arm'd Div, and was awarded the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Air Medal, and Croix de Guerre with Silver Star. In '47, Dr Tanham began teaching at Cal Tech, Pasadena, and

has written many articles and books. His most recent book, to be published this fall by F. Praeger, Inc., is "Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indo-China." Dr Tanham is now the Asst to the President, Rand Corp.

with resultant high cost of living, many professionals deem their salaries inadequate, the more so because numerous earlier advantages have vanished. Promotion has slowed increasingly, and enforced retirement is not cushioned by adequate severance or retirement pay. Performance is hampered by a curious personnel procurement program, the draft, which supplies neither sufficient manpower nor sufficient time to let the military environment exert itself on those who are supplied.

The same situation, however, has offered and does offer a challenge which probably has increased the effectiveness of the regular establishment. Certainly the professional officer chooses and continues his career for other than material reasons. One of his main satisfactions in knowing that he is acting in the best interests of his country. No one is forcing him to the task. He is not even much encouraged to it. Yet he accepts his responsibilities and more often than not discharges them well. Professionally he has effected the difficult transition from conventional to conventional-atomic battlefield tactics, and if the nature of a future war is dubious, he at least has good reason to believe that he can give as much or more than he will have to take.

The Professional Elite

In such a cloudy zone of national preparedness, an elite organization such as the Marine Corps again holds a distinct advantage. By not having to rely on the draft and by refusing a recruit most everything but a chance to be the first to fight, the Marines not only attract an above-average recruit but often manage to hold him long enough to indoctrinate him into their ways. Sometimes he makes the Corps a career. Too, the tradition of first to fight, embodied rather more formally in current statutes, is an aid in overcoming the tedium of solitary combat tours and daily budgetary crises. A man is where he is because there is a good reason for it.

If we can believe defector reports and internal Soviet propaganda, Russia's armed forces are not similarly motivated. While the communist regime can write off Port Arthur and WWI as Czaristic failures, it can never explain the officer purges or the incredibly poor performance of the Red Army in the Russ-Finn War. The Czar's army broke in WWI when supply failed. One wonders what would have been the result in WWII if the West had not so generously supplied Stalin's forces—a question that apparently has worried the Russians if their attempts to disguise Western aid as the output of their own economy mean anything.

Members of the Russian Army, at least in the higher ranks, are preferred members of Soviet society—so long as they behave. For Russian standards, pay is excellent, privileges numerous. Presumably there is no manpower problem. And presumably the average Russian recruit is easier to deal with than his American opposite because he can be sent packing to long imprisonment in Siberia if he corks off.

Yet the professional's lot can scarcely be a pleasant one. Fear and distrust pervade his life, both within the organization and from the outside. When Soviet officers today make a group appearance, the inevitable watchdog, a political commissar, can be spotted as easily as a bad conscience. Russian units on post-WWII occu-

pation duty were almost hermetically sealed from contact with either indigenous populations or with Western armies.

This is made the more interesting because of a tactical thread running through Russian military behavior since the Finnish War. The mass psychology noted by Marshal Mannerheim was observed repeatedly by the Germans during WWII. If it is present today—and Russia has yet to fight her army since WWII—and if it is buttressed by omnipresent distrust, the result is particularly disadvantageous to the tactical challenge of atomic warfare. On such a battlefield decisions must be taken by small-unit commanders whose skill stems from effective training and whose discipline is marked by initiative unfettered by fear of superiors.

In ignoring the individual for the mass, Russia is in danger of neglecting man's innate desire to fight. Although examination of this subtle factor is hampered by lack of scientific knowledge of the human mind, there can be no question of its motivating force. Throughout history, certain men, regardless of race or nationality, have offered outstanding performances on the battlefield that only can be explained by their having an inner fire of compulsion.


The individual inspiration behind the great captains and great heroes of military history may have stemmed from the degree of belief in an idea or an ideal—be it nation, religion, or military unit. Certainly great patriots have sometimes proved to be great heroes, and in some cases elite military units have fought to the last man. The elite tradition, indeed, tends to attract persons who hold a kind of reckless mentality, the satisfaction of which depends on daring individual performance with attendant scorn of safety. So also, rigorous unit training can breed a physical hardness and a mental pride in the individual that may either forbid him to let down the unit in combat or inspire him to do more than his share towards victory.

A final factor of history now emerges: the impermanence of many ideological movements, particularly those basically founded on fear. In but 15 years we have seen Russian communism splintered into Tito communism and, more recently, into Chinese communism. Each movement has been fraught with danger and death to its original adherents. Each power shift has been but another step in internecine war that secretly continues. The true democracies, meanwhile, have struggled along, faithful to basic ideals no matter how dim these have sometimes seemed.

Perhaps the best solution for the West is patience—keeping a united front while these rampant forces swirl themselves to pieces or arrive at a common-sense solution. Inevitably this must be a slow process, and the West must take certain steps if it is to succeed. On a national level the citizen must be made to realize that the material success of his system has created a certain weakness as a by-product—a dimming of the very ideas and ideals on which his country was founded.

On a military level, wherever such a deficiency is found, it must be repaired insofar as possible with better leadership and training. We have already seen that the process is effected the more easily in an elite unit, which is one more reason why this concept must be maintained in the future.

USMC



If you're a career officer or SNCO, chances are you'll pull a tour of sea duty some day. Here's what to expect



ARTICLES HAVE APPEARED IN THE GAZETTE AND OTHER military magazines in recent years about the origin of the sea-going Marine, his training schools, and his ships. Little has been written, however, on the duty itself. This fact became clear to me several years ago. At that time I received orders to report to USS *Los Angeles* for duty as CO, Marine Detachment. When I tried to locate information on sea duty I found it hard to come by. As a result of this scarcity of information, many officers and NCOs rely on sea stories as their source of knowledge. Consequently, they are prone to avoid sea duty like the plague.

By definition Marine Detachments Afloat are components of the operating forces of the Marine Corps. They rank just below the FMF in both strength and importance. They are separate and distinct Marine Corps units, assigned to capital ships of the Navy for duty. As such they perform the same functions as infantry battalions, but on a smaller scale.

My purpose here is to describe the training, functions, and duties of the Marine Detachment Afloat. My hope is to help other company grade officers and Staff NCOs who are or will be assigned to sea duty.

Marine Detachments Afloat are assigned specific func-

tions by Navy Regulations. Paragraph 1047 says in part: "A Marine Detachment detailed to duty on board a ship of the Navy shall form a separate division thereof. Its functions shall be:

(1) To provide a unit organized, trained and equipped for operations ashore, as a part of the ship's landing force; or as a part of a landing force of marines from ships of the fleet or subdivision thereof; or as an independent force for limited operations.

(2) To provide gun crews.

(3) To provide for the internal security of the ship

(4) To provide for the proper rendering of military honors."

Based on these requirements, Marines are assigned to cruisers, carriers, and Polaris submarine tenders of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets for duty with Marine detachments.

Before assignment to a Marine detachment, each enlisted Marine must be trained in the basic requirements of duty afloat. Marines below staff sergeant are therefore assigned to one of the two Sea Schools maintained by the Marine Corps. Officers and Staff NCOs are assigned directly to detachments for duty. The two Sea Schools are located at the Marine Barracks, Norfolk

Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va., and at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, Calif. Portsmouth handles the Atlantic Fleet, San Diego the Pacific Fleet.

The mission of the Sea Schools, set forth by the Commandant, is to train selected personnel for duty with Marine Detachments Afloat. A basic Sea School syllabus, approved by CMC is followed in this training. The syllabus covers these general categories:

Personnel and Administration

- Clothing, cash sales, and alterations
- Military courtesy and discipline
- Honors and ceremonies
- Behavior in foreign lands
- Inspections
- Close order drill
- Physical conditioning
- Examinations

Naval Orientation

- Naval establishment
- Naval terminology
- Naval ranks and rates
- Ship's organization, compartmentation, and terminology
- Life aboard ship
- Internal security (guard duty afloat, the brig, special weapons security)
- Duties of the orderly
- Small arms
- Naval communications
- Recognition of ships and aircraft
- Atomic defense
- Emergency drills

Landing Party Training

- Small unit tactics
- Basic amphibious training

Naval Gunnery

- 5"/38 single or dual mount, operation and functioning
- 3"/50 twin, operation and functioning

Minor changes in this syllabus are authorized by CMC, mainly to conform to the particular requirements of a ship. Officers and NCOs assigned to Sea Schools as instructors have, for the most part, had tours of sea duty. Enlisted instructors normally have also had tours as DIs or are qualified in MOS 8511 (DI).

Training at Sea School is basic and serves to qualify a Marine for initial duties in a detachment. Responsibility for full and complete training of each Marine rests with the detachment commander. This is as true with sea duty as it is in any Marine Corps unit.

Organization

Marine Detachments Afloat are organized by TO as rifle platoons (—). The strengths of detachments vary according to the type of ship. Cruisers normally carry two officers and either 35 or 39 enlisted, depending upon whether the ship has a special weapon capability. Carriers have a complement of two officers and 46 or 55 enlisted Marines. Here again distinction is made as to whether the ship has a special weapon capability. Special weapons, naturally, require more men due to security problems.

Selection For Duty Afloat

The selection of personnel for duty afloat is often the subject of heated discussion between Sea School officers and detachment commanders. Mainly these discussions center around the caliber of Marines assigned to sea duty. Certain prerequisites are set forth by CMC to all commands assigning personnel to the Sea Duty Indoctrination courses and subsequent duty afloat. The latest requirements are:

- (1) Eligible for overseas duty
- (2) Qualified for re-enlistment in accordance with Marine Corps Order 1133.2C
- (3) Minimum height 68 inches, minimum weight 130 pounds
- (4) 24 months obligated service
- (5) Volunteers desired

Whether these prerequisites are strict enough to prevent assignment of substandard personnel to sea duty is not the subject of this article. However, it is the focal point of many arguments and discussions by many officers and Staff NCOs.

Shipboard Duties

The shipboard duties of a detachment are based on Navy Regulations as implemented by the ship's organization book. Normally, the Marine detachment is responsible for all internal security of the ship (to include operating the ship's brig and the security of the ship's special weapons spaces); honors and ceremonies; gunnery; and the thorough training of the ship's landing party.

Each detachment is a component of the gunnery department. As such it usually forms the 8th division of the department. It is under the gunnery officer for such training as is under his supervision. The Marine detachment commander is primarily responsible to the CO of the ship for the efficiency of his detachment. This applies not only for naval matters but also for military training and internal administration of the ship. The detachment commander is equally responsible to CMC for the readiness of his detachment—readiness in both routine matters and administration and in readiness for combat. The detachment commander is under the operational control of the CO of the ship, and under the administrative control of the Commandant. The Marine lieutenant assigned to the detachment is the executive officer of the detachment. He also functions as the platoon leader of the rifle platoon. He assists the detachment commander in the administration and training of the detachment. Both Marine officers are assigned several collateral duties aboard ship. These duties usually involve air spotting (cruisers), serving on courts and boards, and as officers of the deck in port.

The 1st Sergeant of Marines is the senior enlisted Marine aboard. He is the key man in the detachment. The detachment rotates around his office. He supervises the administration of the detachment and maintains the service records. The 1st Sergeant also has collateral duties. It is not uncommon to find him standing watch on the quarter-deck as Junior Officer of the Deck (in port). A good 1st sergeant is worth his weight in gold.

The platoon sergeant aboard ship is more familiarly known as the "gunny." He performs the duties expected of a company gunnery sergeant. His collateral duties usually consist of being brig warden, training NCO, and at times the senior enlisted member of the shore fire control party (if organized). A good gunnery sergeant develops a detachment into a smooth functioning unit.

The organization of a detachment along the lines of a rifle platoon is designed to facilitate carrying out one of its assigned missions—that of providing the trained nucleus of the landing party. However, day-to-day duties within the detachment normally require organizing the detachment into port and starboard duty sections. These two sections provide for the security, training, and housekeeping duties of the detachment. The organization of the detachment to provide for the internal security of the ship is based on this port and starboard duty section arrangement. Each section provides the following personnel:

- Sergeant of the Guard
- Corporals of the Guard
- Captain's orderly
- Executive Officer's orderly (if assigned)
- Brig sentries
- Special weapons sentries
- Bow or gangway sentries (if assigned)

Whether these posts are manned or not depends upon the ship's organization and the capabilities of the detachment.

In the normal arrangement, the off duty section of the detachment is engaged in training in military subjects, and/or training in those shipboard duties required by the ship.

Shipboard Training

Hand in hand with duties peculiar to a Marine Corps unit is training in duties required by the ship. Training in general military subjects required of all Marines, both in theory and in practice, is expected and on most ships required. In line with this fact, it has often been said that ship's commanding officers, executive officers, and gunnery officers are prone to deny detachments the opportunity to train in the field. The reason, it is said, is due to their feeling that the detachment is aboard ship for routine duties and that field training is not vital. My own experience was that detachment commanders usually can get their troops ashore for training. In Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Hawaii, Pacific Fleet detachments were always ashore training. Atlantic Fleet detachments made good use of the facilities at Little Creek, Dam Neck, and other areas.

Training in shipboard duties usually consists of many hours on the three-and five-inch loading machines, as well as on the guns themselves, to develop the timing and teamwork necessary to naval gunnery. The duties of the brig sentry are continually stressed in school sessions to insure the correct operation of the brig. Special weapons security classes are held to insure the safety of classified information. General quarters stations are covered in this training to insure that all Marines are fully competent in their assigned general quarters stations, for fighting or defending the ship.

The training of the landing party takes up much of the time of the off-duty section. The Marine detachment forms only the nucleus of the landing party. Therefore the training of sailors who make up the bulk of the landing party is vital. It is the responsibility of the CO of the detachment to see that all sailors are fully trained in the use of all weapons organic to the landing party. These weapons range from the .45 caliber pistol to the flamethrower. Further, the detachment commander must insure that all hands are proficient in small unit tactics. He utilizes Marines as instructors in these subjects.

Professionally, sea duty places relatively junior officers and Staff NCOs on their own. There is no battalion or regiment to bail them out when they run into trouble—or to do the work for them. The detachment commander is his own S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4. He is his own fiscal officer, training officer, and at times his own chaplain. Sea duty teaches how to command, if only from forcing you to do it yourself. But normally it is a duty in which an individual officer or Staff NCO can do just fair, good, or even badly. There will be no one to know how you did other than those who served with you.

There is one final benefit. Marines on sea duty learn how the Navy lives and works. They learn to see and understand the problems the Navy has to operate under. This will stand them in good stead when they return to the FMF.

Finally, when a Marine receives orders to duty afloat he has been selected for a duty as old as the Corps itself. He will have been selected to carry on the traditions set for the Corps so many years ago by other Marines. The ships upon which he will serve bear historic names of other ships of years gone by. Marines were afloat with John Paul Jones and have been ever since. The advent of nuclear-powered ships hasn't changed the requirement.

If you're fortunate enough to receive orders to duty afloat, accept them gratefully. This duty puts you on your mettle, where you can make or break yourself. A successful tour of duty afloat gives you a feeling of a job well done. However, you'll get no special commendation. As a Marine, you're expected to do the job well.

USMC



Capt Cryan was completely cold on seagoing when he got orders to report aboard USS Los Angeles in 1956. To make matters worse he couldn't find much information on the subject. Three years later he became OIC, Sea School, NNSY, Portsmouth, Va., and right away decided to help fill this apparent gap in Marine knowhow. His article combines practical experience "learned the hard way" with a summary of courses taught at Sea School. He was commissioned 7Sep51, via OCC, has had tours with 1st and 2d MarDivs.

To back up his position in this article, LtCol Ewers (he's CO, H&MS, MAG 26, 2dMAW) cites a survey of officers attending Quantico's Senior and Junior Schools. It showed NAs far behind ground officers in command experience. His conclusion:

Marine Aviation Needs M

By LtCol N. G. Ewers

9 JANUARY 1918 IS A MEMORABLE DAY IN MARINE aviation. That day Capt Francis T. Evans and the 145-man 1st Marine Aeronautic Company sailed from Philadelphia for Ponta Delgado, Azores, with 12 rickety R-6 and N-9 float planes. Destined to spend WWI patrolling convoy lanes, they were the first American flying unit of any service ever to go overseas completely equipped and trained.

By 1918 Evans was already somewhat of a celebrity around the Corps. In February of the year before he had been the first to successfully loop and spin a float plane, previously considered impossible. Nineteen years later he was to receive the Distinguished Flying Cross for his feat.

At the time of his trail-blazing Azores deployment Capt Evans was 31 years old. Commissioned a second lieutenant 6 January 1909, he had been designated Naval Aviator No. 26 on 9 March 1916.

Marine aviation everywhere those days was in pretty young hands. Thirty-six year old Maj Alfred A. Cunningham (Marine Aviator No. 1) was Director of Marine aviation (called Officer-in-Charge then). In July 1918 he too hung a "gone to war" sign reminiscent of an earlier day, leaving his Washington office in the charge of a lieutenant assistant. He sailed for France as commanding officer of the 756-man 1st Marine Aviation Force.

Squadron commanders under Cunningham in the 1st Marine Aviation Force included Capts W. M. McIlvain and Douglas Roben and Maj Roy Stanley Geiger. (Geiger was destined later to win fame as the WWII commander of the "Cactus Air Force" at Guadalcanal and commander of I and III Amphibious Corps. For three days in June 1945 he was the only Marine officer ever to command an Army). These three officers varied considerably in experience. Twenty-seven year old Roben had been commissioned five years earlier. Geiger, 33, had nine years commissioned service, but had been designed a naval aviator only the year before (1917). By today's standards officers so junior wouldn't be considered for such command responsibilities.

What, then, are today's command opportunities for

aviation officers? A recent survey of 89 naval aviators attending the Senior and Junior Schools at Quantico showed the following:

Of 26 lieutenant colonels with 16½ to 19½ years commissioned service, two had no command experience at all. Two had once commanded headquarters squadrons for short periods. Four had served as executive officers for total periods varying from six months to three years. Of the remaining 17 who had actually commanded Marine combat squadrons, seven had done so for less than a year. The fortunate high man, with four tactical billets behind him, had a total command experience of 4½ years out of 17½ years commissioned service.

Of 11 majors with 16 to 17½ years commissioned service, attending the same Senior School class, five had no command experience of any kind. Four had served as executive officers of tactical squadrons for periods varying from six months to one year. Two had commanded tactical squadrons for a year or less.

At Junior School during the same period, of 13 major naval aviators with 10 to 16½ years commissioned service, none had ever held tactical commands, although four had served as executive officers at one time or another. One had commanded a headquarters squadron.

Of 39 naval aviator captains attending Junior School with 7½ to 10½ years commissioned service, one had commanded a headquarters squadron for a brief period. Three had served as executive officers.

By comparison, almost all of the 170 other Marine officers attending the same Senior and Junior School courses had spent significant portions of their careers in command billets of one sort or another.

There are some fundamental differences between Marine Corps aviation and ground structures that make it impossible for lieutenant aviators to grow in command experience the same way their infantry or artillery contemporaries do. However, a system which withholds the opportunities and responsibilities of command from an officer until a relatively late period in his career does a disservice to both the individual and the

More Command Billets

Marine Corps. Longevity and attrition alone will one day thrust command responsibilities on some of these officers. The fact that they have been denied the opportunity to grow with command will make their tasks more difficult. Some who are unsuited to command will be promoted to senior rank, frustrating the ambitions and aspirations of others and denying the Marine Corps their special leadership abilities.

That the problem is not peculiar to Marine aviation is confirmed by material appearing in other professional magazines, the sense of which is applicable here. The following appeared in a recent article by Capt W. P. Mack, USN, in *Naval Institute Proceedings*:

"Our Navy is fortunate in having trained, over a long period of time, many senior officers to assume responsibility: we will not lack such officers for several years. When these officers retire, however, we will have to depend on the present generation of officers, now in the middle grades, to assume heavy responsibility. There may be doubt in the minds of these officers that they are being trained adequately to meet these responsibilities. *Such training must begin early and must become the central theme of the training program for our officer corps* (italics supplied). It must offer opportunity for full assumption of authority at early ages, and this authority must be exercised without the fetters of administrative regulation which limit it at the present time."

How can we upgrade properly weighed responsibility and authority opportunities for young Marine Aviators?

The Commandant, in his 4 January 1960 message to his staff at HQMC, had some particularly succinct observations to make in this respect: "Let's place properly weighted responsibilities and requisite accompanying authority where they belong. Make a corporal do

a corporal's job, and on up the line. World War II and Korea, plus the rapid expansion attendant thereto, led us to upgrade rank requirements for task to ensure that they were done properly. Let's reverse this trend *now!* Give the officers and enlisted men junior to you their heads—tell them what you want done, by when, then let them go to it. Let's make our mistakes while we're not shooting for record. I am convinced that with the quality of our officers and men today, everyone can handle a great deal more responsibility and the authority that goes with it. With a little dose of this thinking and action at all levels, the jobs will get done more efficiently and the prestige of all ranks will go up."

The first order of business for Marine aviation is to expand command opportunities below the rank of lieutenant colonel, where the younger officer can prove himself or stub his toe. Independent billets and Marine detachments afloat and ashore now commanded by general duty officers are areas in which such expansion can occur.

Reorganization of Marine tactical and support squadrons may also be in order. Squadron organization has remained essentially static for the past 20 years, during a period of dramatic tactical changes in which other combat organizations have changed and even disappeared entirely. Examination of this anomaly may indicate the squadron isn't what we need at all. Some sort of aviation battalion containing several companies may be far superior, not only for purposes discussed in this article, but also for tactical deployments and as a base for rapid wartime expansion.

Every Marine aviator worth his salt dreams of his own command. At present command opportunities are too few and far between—both for the good of the aviator and for the good of the Corps.

USMC



Meanwhile, Back at the Headhouse

This article came off the typewriter months ago. Since then HQMC has done something about the problem. NA Capts are now being assigned to all Marine Detachments at NASs. So are Ground Capts. Senior becomes CO, the other XO.

"Uncovering the riddle of enemy and terrain has been the Commander's problem since the first recorded military battle. Reconnaissance and surveillance are his weapons in this constant struggle. With the advent of the airplane, military men have added a new dimension to the techniques of reconnaissance, and aerial observation has developed into an invaluable means to solve the riddle."



Eyes Aloft

By Maj. J. A. Schimmenti

☛ BREATHES THERE A COMMANDER WHO WILL DISPUTE the above excerpt from the Air Observer Handbook of the 2dMarDiv? You will find those, however, who have not yet learned to appreciate the weapon called Aerial Observation.

In 331 BC it was a relatively simple matter for Alexander the Great to mount his best steed and venture forth to reconnoiter the Persian positions. This shrewd General immediately observed the carefully levelled field over which the Persians planned to maneuver their scythe-bearing chariots. The day was saved when Alexander echeloned the cleared area and rendered the lumbering chariots useless.

In 1974 AD the battalion commander mounting his rotorcycle (in its reincarnation) will find he can't do the job alone. Instead he must rely on an effective organization of the entire reconnaissance effort to lend valuable assistance. Unfortunately, the existing aerial reconnaissance and observation organization leaves much to be desired.

My cause here is to revitalize this whole business by proposing some long-needed changes:

- In order to provide some semblance of order the employment of observers, pilots, and airplanes must be categorized. General terms (and I will propose three), to indicate *primary mission*, should be utilized to clear up the mystery and confusion.
- The categorized missions then must be related to the aerial observation organization. This will simplify employment while increasing efficiency of operation.
- With primary missions related to an effective or-

ganization it becomes necessary to provide the requisite control and coordination.

- In order to sustain the first three propositions a garrison organization which facilitates training and proficiency must be accepted.


Categorization

Basically, the present situation involves a loose arrangement of G-2 Air Observers and Artillery Air Observers (incidentally, they should be called Aerial Observers). As humans are wont to do the G-2 and the Division Artillery Officer begin to feel these are their own little agencies to over-control, over-direct, and otherwise misuse. Most operations orders direct the VMO squadron to provide aircraft for (1) aerial reconnaissance, and (2) artillery/naval gunfire air spot. The air schedule then schedules aircraft, usually on a unilateral, first-come, first-served, basis. The entire effort is thrown on a treadmill and only the individual initiative of most (not all) Air Observers is the saving grace.

All of this seems inconsistent with weapons employment as we know it within the FMF. Such employment has always been on a general/direct support basis. *Why then do we not apply the same criteria to the aerial observation weapons?* We should—as follows:

Marine Expeditionary Force level: Force Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (FAO)—General support of the force.

Marine Division level: Division Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (DAO)—General support of the



Our FMF aerial reconnaissance and observation setup doesn't work right because it isn't organized right, the author says—and proposes changes

Division. Target Acquisition and Adjustment of fires (TAAO)—Direct support of the Infantry Regiment. Specific Aerial Observation mission (SAO)—Direct support of the requesting command or staff agency.

Let's take these categories apart, but remember, we have categorized in terms of *primary missions*.

FAO—Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance in general support of the Force is at present non-existent and not practiced. Attempts have been made in major exercises to accomplish this but have been meaningless. So with a clear fairway we can go out on a limb. This will be the Force Commander's reconnaissance and surveillance weapon. Additionally, it will supplement (and I hope someday replace) what is now called Tactical Aerial Observation at the Force level.

DAO—Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance in general support of the Marine Division is essentially what G-2 air observers are presently doing. The relating to general support of the Division has two effects: First, it eliminates duplication of effort by keeping the G/S observers out of the D/S zones. Second, it diminishes the over-exaggerated emphasis on this being an exclusive G-2 problem to control and coordinate (G-2 gets the "dope" but other agencies assist in getting the "dope-seekers" out there). Operations in general support need not be arbitrarily limited in range and direction. The determining factors will be plane, pilot, and observer capabilities and limitations. These are then applied to the old triumvirate—enemy, terrain, and weather.


TAAO—Target acquisition and adjustment of fires in

direct support of the Infantry Regiment has no analogous counterpart today. The innovations are: (1) This is acquisition of targets upon which firepower within the capability of the Division can be brought to bear; (2) The pilot-observer team works for the Infantry Regiment and their efforts are coordinated at the FSCC; (3) The inefficient use of this team as an exclusive tool of the Artillery Regiment will finally be halted; (4) As is obvious from the category title this becomes an intelligence agency as well as a gunnery adjustment method; (5) It clearly defines the method of control and coordination by placing it in the *direct support* business, just as the Artillery Battalion, destroyer, etc. are in the close support role.

SAO—Specific Aerial Observation mission in direct support of the requesting command and/or staff agency. This covers the many tasks within the capability of this versatile weapon. (If you don't know them, ask the nearest Air Observer.) The significant feature is that we have separated a mission such as, "Recon and photograph the area S and SE of Duck Creek to determine useability as a Logistic Support Area," from the scheduled DAO and TAAO. Further, the log-jam in requesting such service will be simplified.

Organization

The organization of the aerial observation effort requires planes, pilots, and observers. This is notwithstanding the small army of mechanics, clerks, communicators, and others involved. We are primarily in-



One big trouble is lack of proper aircraft. Both the OE and HOK are obsolete. There's talk of adopting the Army's Mohawk (above) from time to time—but so far only talk. Another need: a good two-place jet

terested in the pilot-observer team and the vehicle to get them where they must go.

Once again a loose arrangement exists wherein the observers (G-2 and Arty) "go down" to the VMO location. There they gather into separate groups to the chagrin of the VMO command. *The only obvious solution is to relate the organization to the primary mission.*

For FAO the creation of an aerial observation section or sub-section would be required. The size, rank structure, etc. is academic at this stage. Planes are most important. A two-place jet aircraft is the bird for the job at the Force level!

A trained pilot-observer team can provide that which is lacking in present-day TAO at the Task Force/Landing Force level. Two sets of eyes are better than one, axiomatically. The pilot is free to hold the reins of the fire-eating monster he's strapped to and the observer can handle the radio, maps, and note-taking. This team has range and sufficient endurance. High speed is not a hindrance in that movement and large size typify the intelligence data they are seeking.

Within the Division it would become standard to relate today's G-2 Air Observers with DAO and the observers of the Artillery Regiment with TAAO. This relationship is stated for identification only. (The G-2 observers should be taken out of the G-2 section for reasons to be discussed later.)

At any rate, let's start with an organization of pilots and observers. The major criterion is that this organization is for operational purposes and the observers are not two-hatted or three-hatted. They should be under the exclusive command of the VMO squadron commander. So take the administrative steps necessary to put them there. Eliminate once and for all the "going-down" to the strip.

In keeping with the relating theme I propose organizing pilot-observer teams into a General Support

Flight, a Direct Support Flight, and a Stand-by Flight. Give the Squadron CO a free hand. He will likely use Division AO's for general support, Artillery AO's for direct support, and both types for SAO (Stand-by flight). That does it for the pilots and observers.

We can't minimize the role of the aircraft. It just doesn't appear that one type of aircraft is equal to the situation at this time.

General support flights require a high performance airplane with higher power output for radios, speed balanced by reduced power ability, and high altitude ability also balanced by a capability for descending and remaining at 200-500 feet.

Direct support flights require a low performance aircraft, multi-channel radios with good power-output, reasonable speeds, good on-station time, and high availability.

Stand-by flights may well require both of the above-mentioned as well as an observation helicopter.

Unfortunately, this now becomes a sad tale. Today's OE is obsolete in its present form, primarily because the proper radios (as authorized) have never been placed in it. Anyway, the funeral arrangements have already been made. The HOK is in a similar position. The OF (Mohawk) program comes alive sporadically, but the present trend is to think of armed reconnaissance as over-riding the observation aspects. The AD5, an excellent observation aircraft, has gone the way of the faithful old Corsair.

Regardless, the line-up looks like this:

Mission	Flight	Pilot-Observer	Aircraft
FAO	G/S	MAW/Force AO	Two-place jet
DAO	G/S	VMO/Div AO	High perform. Two-place
TAAO	D/S	VMO/Arty AO	OE type
SAO	Stand-by	VMO/AO	OE or HOK type

Control and Tactical Direction

In the classic Marine Corps Schools description we must now provide the brain and nervous system for the tentacles and body we have created.

Control of the aerial observation organization has long been confused. *Tactical direction* rather than *control* is the keynote. The question is: Who provides the necessary planning and coordination of the tactical direction? Further, can we provide the necessary communications?

Today's air-observers are controlled by FSCC's, FDC's, Division Artillery Officers, G-2's, and whomever else has a fancy to. Communication means are strictly jury-rig. If UHF equipment is utilized the Division TACP "loans" the use of one side of the AN/MRC 35.

Planning and coordination of the tactical direction effort should be the responsibility of a single agency. Aircraft and pilot-observer teams are supporting the entire Division. This agency should be headed by a Division Chief Air (Aerial) Observer or Division Aerial Reconnaissance Officer. The name is irrelevant but the need is important. The only logical place for this officer is as an assistant to the Division Air Officer. He needs an assistant anyway.

The main issue is that this agency or agent plans the proposed employment and coordinates the use of the entire Division effort.

The communications angle is a technical one. I will rest my case by simply asking for recognition of the fact that the FM settings are barely satisfactory and that use of UHF and possibly single side-band requires reappraisal of the whole equipment picture.

Garrison Organization

The garrison organization is required to provide for the proficiency training and unit readiness of the aerial observers and pilots. If we are to have pilot-observer teams they should train as teams!

The M-Series TO placed Air Observers in the G-2 section as well as in the Artillery Regiment. The justification for this was recognition of their vital importance as an intelligence gathering agency. This was all fine except that operational units have no business in a staff section.



Maj Schimmenti, a graduate of Tufts College, is the Administrative Officer, MCLFDC, MCS, Quantico. A tour at AO school, '52, and as Chief AO, 2dMarDiv, '58-'60, furnished background material for his article. During the Korean conflict, '50-'51, he served on the Staff, 1stMarBrig, and as a PltLdr, 5thMar. In '54, prior to commencing a three year tour with the NROTC Unit, University of Rochester, he attended Junior School at Quantico. Maj Schimmenti was commissioned in 1946 via the V-12 program.

For administrative and training purposes I contend that this section (G-2 Air-Observation Sub-Section) should be in either the VMO squadron or the Division Reconnaissance Battalion. Since in all probability the personnel people would fight putting them in VMO let's settle for the Reconnaissance Battalion. Why? Primarily because we now have an operational group in a command. We have always insisted on *Command* regulating training and proficiency, haven't we? Leave the Artillery Observers where they are.

Set the new Recon Battalion section up in some workable manner and include trained Staff NCOs as full-fledged observers. Preferably, head the section with a Captain 0302/0805 and have three teams each with four Lts/SNCOs. The inclusion of SNCOs has long been warranted. Selected SNCOs have repeatedly proven their capability at the Airborne Terrain Appreciation classes conducted by Marine Divisions.

Recapitulation

What does this give our present-day Marine Division? Primarily, an aerial observation capability related in organization and employment.

The General Support Flight with VMO pilots and air observers performs aerial reconnaissance and surveillance in general support of the Division. Today G/S aerial observation teams will fly the OE with a cherished hope that somehow the need for a high performance observation aircraft will be realized. This team is the Division commander's weapon.

The Air Observers of the Artillery Regiment, flying with other VMO pilots, will now perform target acquisition and aerial adjustment of fires in direct support of the Infantry Regiment. Their link to the Regiment will be through the Regimental FSCC. They become the Regimental commander's eyes aloft and incidentally gather the vital target data needed by the G-2. The OE is still the airplane but the possibility of a better OE with better radios and digital message generators should not be dismissed.

The SAO Flight, using whatever aircraft is available and looking towards a helioplane or new utility helicopter, works in direct support of a requesting command or staff agency.

This whole organization and employment is the planning responsibility of the Division staff. The prime planner is the Division Air Officer and his new assistant, the Division Aerial Reconnaissance Officer.

Conclusion

All of this has created many modification to TOs and TEs and I see little hope for the near future. However, recognition of the aerial observation effort as a supporting weapon can be achieved immediately. It then can be employed effectively, efficiently, and in a concerted effort to support the whole Division.

As a final note the reorganization is mandatory if we are to be prepared for dispersion tactics and electronic sensory devices. Eyes aloft, integrated with the introduction of sensory devices and digital data systems, must have a platform. The entire aerial observation effort must be a whole being. Jury-rigs, "helter-skelter," and little if any recognition have to be buried with the past.

USMC

COMBINED FIRE

Small unit weapons and combat tactics in:

By Jac Weller

PROGRESS IS OFTEN BASED ON COMBINATIONS OF THE best from different sources. A uniting of the German area fire concept with the British emphasis on aimed fire might produce small arms tactics more effective than either alone.

Belgium is the first army in the world to be completely mechanized. Their Intervention Force in West Germany is provided with armored vehicles for everyone. Their army is fully integrated into NATO. Their small unit tactics are, however, their own. They have steered a course in this midway between more powerful allies. Each Belgian mechanized infantry company has some men who are armed and trained to deliver area fire and others prepared to deliver aimed fire.

The French experience in WWII was most unsatisfactory. Their prestige and pride in 1939 was high; their total defeat came quickly. Obviously, there was something wrong with French organization or tactics. This was probably true even within infantry companies. The French have made changes; they are still having troubles. But their concerted effort to improve their individual marksmanship led to two successive Le Clerc Combat Small Arms Championships recently (1956 and 1957). They defeated the best teams from all NATO countries, including the United States. However, the French concept of the entire company delivering team fire is stressed along with individual marksmanship. Some units seem to favor one, some the other.

Portugal has no national experience in modern war. It's a small country without great economic strength, and is naturally impressed by what its larger, more experienced allies do. Portuguese association with the British army in the time of Napoleon and in WWI was close. They prefer the British method of instruction to that used by the US. But they have respect for the


German army also. Many Portuguese field officers were observers with them in WWII. They saw the way German small units fought. When the Portuguese began to strengthen their army in the early 1950s, they compromised in connection with their infantry tactics, particularly the type of fire they would deliver.

In a previous article, we discussed three of our NATO allies who place their confidence in area fire. Next month we'll cover three who rely mainly on aimed fire. We will now consider three nations whose small arms tactics can be best described as a combination of these two.

Small Arms

Belgium lost her old family of small arms early in WWII. Towards the end of that conflict, much of the machinery from her arms producing plants was destroyed or taken into Germany. The Belgian army in 1945 had British, US, and German infantry weapons. However, the ability to produce arms depends more on skills and training of personnel than on factories and machine tools. The Belgians who fought in Korea had an efficient post-war semi-automatic rifle of FN (Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre) design. This concern is privately owned; its main plant is situated outside Liege and is the largest in the Free World. FN is of tremendous importance to NATO, not only in producing but also in designing small arms.

The first post-war FN rifle was chambered for the .30-'06 cartridge. With the formation of NATO, the one-weapon, one-ammunition idea for all infantry had such obvious advantages that changes were inevitable. Both the new Belgian rifle and the .30-'06 cartridge were doomed. But FN personnel took important parts in the discussions which led to adoption of the 7.62 NATO



BELGIUM



Two teams firing heavy-barrelled, bipod-mounted, AR version of the FN rifle. It weighs 14 pounds ➡



◀ Belgian Vigneron SMG. It weighs 8.74 pounds, has a cyclic rate of 600 rpm, is 24 inches long. Magazine: 32 rounds




All Belgian infantrymen are trained in field firing of rocket launchers ▲

➡ Blindfold training with the Falo, Belgian version of Browning AR. It weighs 23 lbs



Another view of automatic version of the FN rifle ➡



A closer look at the Belgian edition of our familiar BAR. It's made in the FN factory ▲

round. A new FN rifle, quite different from the first post-war model, was adopted by West Germany, Great Britain, and Canada.

Belgium also adopted the new model and abandoned both its semi-automatic rifle and the .30-'06 cartridge. The rifle made obsolete was undoubtedly the best infantry arm ever given up by any nation at any time. There can be no question, however, that the new FN is superior. We have already discussed the basic FN rifle. Every German FN has a switch that allows either single shots or bursts; all British FNs deliver single shots only. In each Belgian infantry squad, there are now seven FN rifles. Four can fire single shots only, but three can deliver either type of fire. All rifles are the same, save for a single component. An armorer can convert one to the other in about two minutes. It's nearly impossible, however, for an individual soldier with a rifle to get a single-shot FN to deliver bursts.

When the Belgian army adopted the FN rifle, they experimented with a slightly heavier model equipped with a heavier barrel, a bipod, and sometimes a hooked butt plate. This weapon was to replace the AR in the Belgian infantry squad. It was pounds lighter than the FN-produced BAR which is similar to, but not the same as, the US BAR. But the 23-pound Belgian BAR, redesigned since WWII and converted to the 7.62 NATO round, can outshoot the 14-pound FNs. The lighter AR was better, however, in certain situations. It was handier in and out of armored vehicles; it fired faster, though less accurately. Have you guessed the answer? The Belgian army has both.

Belgium has officially adopted the Vigneron SMG. This weapon is perfectly standard and reliable. It's one of the few weapons produced in Belgium that was not designed at the FN plant. The Vigneron firm of Liege is responsible. There are several other SMGs in use in the Belgian army, including the recently FN-produced Uzi's. All fire 9 mm Luger ammo.

The French small arms situation in 1945 was similar to the Belgian. They had British, US, German, and some old French weapons. They developed, however, a new post-war family of small arms. If the economic and political situation in France had been better, the new models might have been universal in the French army by this time. This isn't the case. US materiel still predominates in the army as a whole. The Foreign Legion is still partially equipped with captured German small arms. Some French units in and around Paris are armed with French weapons firing the 8mm Lebel cartridge. Complete mobilization would require more than a dozen small arms ammunitions for issue to infantry units.

On the brighter side, the French MAS-1949 rifle chambered for the 7.5 French cartridge is modern and efficient. It was re-designed in 1956 and is now chambered for the 7.62 NATO. It fires semi-automatic only, after the British style, and is well liked in combat. It can fire either anti-tank or anti-personnel grenades without the use of a special attachment. The French are convinced that this feature is going to be of increasing importance in the future.

The French did not try to make an AR out of their MAS-49-56 merely by attaching a bipod and using a heavier barrel. Their many different ARs presently in

service are being replaced by the lightest version of their new general purpose MG, the Model 1952. This weapon has no equal in versatility; three different barrels and a variety of mounts are available. It's belt fed, but has an arrangement by which an 80-round "magazine" can be attached to the AR version of the weapon. A clever added feature is that it's only necessary to change the barrel and ammunition to convert from the 7.5 French to the 7.62 NATO cartridge.

When I fired this weapon with the lightest barrel and the bipod as an AR, I found it similar to the German MG-42-59. The cyclic rate was said to be only 700 rounds per minute, but it seemed higher. Attaching the intermediate weight barrel improved accuracy somewhat. A reduction in the cyclic rate would help even more.

The French MAT 1949 is a simple, reliable SMG and uses 9mm Luger ammo. It's particularly easy to carry. But there are many other SMGs requiring at least three ammunitions either in use or in immediate reserve. I was given to understand, however, that France is reasonably close to replacing all other SMGs with the MAT 1949.

The new French small arms are entirely acceptable. The basic problem isn't the weapons themselves, but how soon they can replace the variety of rifles, ARs, and SMGs in actual use, or in armories ready for emergency issue. My questions as to whether French expenditures to provide their army with an atomic potential had curtailed their small arms replacement program, or their conversion of the MAS 1949 rifle to the NATO round, were left unanswered.

The Portuguese infantry is armed with weapons designed before WWII. They could have obtained, like our other NATO allies, US small arms. They have accepted our supporting weapons gladly, but have preferred their old infantry favorites. They believe that they are better for use in Portugal, with Portuguese tactics.

The Portuguese have a short bolt action Mauser rifle frequently called the Model 98-37. It's chambered for the 7.92 Mauser cartridge and is almost identical with the Spanish bolt rifle. Portuguese officers at their Infantry School at Mafra fear that the semi-automatic feature of the US M-1 would cause individual riflemen to take less careful aim.


On the other hand, they expect the real fighting of infantry platoons to be done by the squad ARs; these are German Dreyse Model 1937. Like the British Bren, it appears clumsy and awkward. It weighs a full 24 pounds with no ammunition. It can deliver extremely accurate burst fire in the manner of the Bren, and also fast single shots better than any other AR in the world. This latter capability is based on two unusual design features. The trigger has a hinged arrangement so that a skilled man can press slightly in one direction for short bursts and slightly in another for single shots. The weapon fires both single shots and bursts from a closed bolt. Your aim is not disarranged by a heavy bolt flying forward after the trigger is pulled, but before the weapon goes off.

Portugal has a comparatively well developed arms industry. Even though their rifles and ARs were originally German-designed, they are now produced local-


FRANCE



▲ M-1949-56 rifle weighs 10 pounds, fires single shot. Magazine holds 10 rounds



▲ French M-1949-56 rifle with two different types of AT grenades



▲ The French SMG, MAT 1949, is 18.3 inches long and weighs 9.41 pounds. It has a cyclic rate of 600 rpm and magazine capacity of 32 rounds



▲ M-1952 AR disassembled. With barrel change, it can fire either NATO 7.62 round or French 7.5

French M-1952 general purpose machine gun and automatic rifle version of same basic weapon ▼



▼ Test firing rocket launcher



ly. The Portuguese SMG was also designed there. It's sound in every way and important to their company fighting potential because of their bolt rifles.

Pistols are more important in Belgium, France, and Portugal than in some other NATO armies. This may be due to the spirit of compromise. Pistols are obviously lethal firearms. Yet many nations say they are not militarily effective. If there is a chance that pistols can be valuable in combat, why not issue them? They don't cost much and do give individual soldiers confidence. Belgium uses the fine FN-made 1935 Browning semi-automatic. France has an array of different handguns, but the Model 1950 is said to be replacing all the others. Portugal prefers the Model 1908 Luger and is currently supplying these weapons to all its services.

Organization and Support Weapons

All three company organizations call for heavy weapons platoons. Details are classified in France. However, if you watch a Bastille Day parade, you know the exact story. A Belgian company has two 81mm mortars, three 60mm mortars, six MMGs, and several 3.5-inch rocket launchers. Because of the fully mechanized condition of the Belgian army, there are additional support weapons carried in platoon vehicles. These usually consist of at least one 3.5-inch rocket launcher, two 30 cal MMGs, and one 60mm mortar. Belgian MMGs are in part FN-made Brownings chambered for the .30-'06 cartridge and in part the new FN general purpose MG chambered for the 7.62 NATO round. The older cartridge will be entirely eliminated in active service by the summer of 1961.

The Portuguese companies have the largest heavy weapons platoon in NATO. There are 58 men in it out of a total company strength of 185. This is in part to make up for less direct support from higher levels. Each HW platoon has three sections armed respectively with three MMGs, three 60mm mortars, and three 57-mm recoilless rifles. Company headquarters has two US .50 cal HMGs; 3.5-inch rocket launchers are spread around after the usual NATO fashion. The MMGs are German MG-34s, slightly modified. They are issued with heavy tripods.

Weapons Training

All three armies start out to do a thorough job of training recruits to shoot their rifles accurately. The programs have been carefully planned. Training aids are entirely adequate. The attitude of instructors to recruits is fine. But they just don't fire enough. If a rifleman doesn't score well, his instructors shrug their shoulders and say that perhaps they can use him in connection with other weapons. In each nation, however, some soldiers in regular line organizations, not detached snipers, learn to shoot very well indeed.

All Belgian recruits receive training with the FN rifle and both ARs. This instruction is limited in time, length of ranges, and ammo expended. However, about one rifleman in eight receives a scope-sighted rifle and additional preparation. These elite soldiers fire a large number of rounds under careful supervision at ranges up to 500 meters. They can be called snipers, but are placed one in each rifle squad and not de-

tached for special duty outside it.

The quality and amount of marksmanship training in the French army varies considerably from unit to unit. In some, the individual instruction for aimed fire must be good, for the teams from these units score well in bull's-eye competitions. Again, this good shooting is done by line soldiers, not detached snipers, even though there is a plan afoot to train snipers.

Even more important in French companies are the combat-type firing exercises. In these, they strive to produce a team fire delivered by every man in the entire company. These exercises are quite different from the British type in which one squad competes with another. They are really company live fire field problems.

The Portuguese endeavor to produce some expert riflemen. For young men who have natural ability, their program of firing is not too limited. They emphasize, however, the training of their AR gunners. Because of the unusual capabilities of their weapon, they stress fast single shots. A team of two, one firing and the other loading magazines entering the action from the side, can deliver a great deal of accurate long range fire.

Belgian Company Tactics

The Belgian infantry prides itself on being what they call light. Because of their APCs, they have considerable strategic and tactical mobility. Even when they leave their vehicles, they can travel fast because they are not weighed down with heavy equipment. This is particularly important in offensive situations.

If a Belgian company should attack alone, they would endeavor to hit the enemy before it was set in its defensive pattern. Their heavy support weapons are adequate, but their sudden push potentiality is dependent upon a coordination of aimed and area small arms fire. Their BARs and one-seventh of their FN rifles deliver the former. The rest of the platoon lays down the latter. The burst-firing FNs, the light ARs, and the SMG found in every squad are predominately squirt guns. The extra AR per squad (total of two) and the SMG are unusual in an army which has automatic infantry rifles.

Defensively, a Belgian company will endeavor to deliver an integrated pattern of fire from all its arms, including its supporting weapons. The diversity and variety of these, however, may lead to complications. Infantry companies are usually composed of young men. The Belgian army appears to try to do so many different things that the mastering of specialized techniques and then controlling the different weapons in combat may be difficult. If all arms are perfectly combined, a Belgian company will present an extremely tough defense. There is always the chance, however, for confusion.

French Company Tactics

French professional soldiers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, are very good indeed. Their Infantry School at St. Maxient is one of the best in the world. Their major infantry aim since WWII appears to be the developing of small unit *esprit de corps* and the ability to react immediately to any local situation

PORTUGAL



▲ Portuguese prefer their single-shot, bolt Mauser M-98-3 rifle. It's 43.5 inches long, weighs 9.3 lbs. Magazine: 5 rounds



▲ The Breda heavy machine gun

MG-34 with tripod mounting.
Its popular name is Borsig ▼



▲ A Portuguese FBP (48) SMG with bayonet. It has a cyclic rate of 500 rpm, magazine capacity of 32 rounds, and weighs 8.9 pounds

Dreyse (38) AR is recoil-operated, weighs 24 pounds, is 47 inches long. It shoots 7.92 ammo at a cyclic rate of 750 rpm ▼



with positive, well directed action. Early in WWII, French units not faced with immediate destruction often did nothing. Today, they want every infantryman to be confident in his ability with his personal arm and anxious to use it. Diverse weapons may create supply problems, but don't affect combat efficiency immediately. If a French company CO can employ what he happens to have actively and imaginatively, all will be well.

In recent years, the French have had a lot of small unit combat. The fighting in Indo-China and Algeria has been frequent, bloody, and often unfavorable to the French. It would appear that some companies have been efficient and courageous and have been anxious to meet their enemies face to face, aim at them, and kill them.

On the other hand, the French have taken company-size beatings. They have been ripe for defeat even before they fired a shot. Once the action started, they sat down in the best fortifications available and started to squirt bullets and throw shells in the general direction of their enemies. This tendency has contributed to the survival of the Algerian opposition. Entire French companies have sometimes voluntarily given up the hours of darkness to the enemy and have been, as a group, more interested in the expiration of their time of service than in going out and finding the enemy.

This is not by any means universal even among French-born units. The heroism and self-sacrifice of the Foreign Legion is well known. But it would appear that where French units are good in combat, or in preparation for combat, the emphasis in those individual units has been on aimed fire. Other French units still have a kind of Maginot line complex; they want to stay in comparative security and devastate areas where the enemy might be. Armored cars, sand bag emplacements, bomb proof shelters, automatic weapons, and mortars by the dozen can be of great aid, but they can't replace tough, bloody, infantry willing to meet the enemy.

Portuguese Infantry Tactics

Portugal is a small nation; their army is deficient in armor, heavy artillery, and tactical air support. They are destitute of sophisticated weapons. Their officers are realists, however, and are not preparing to fight Soviet heavy divisions on the plains of North Germany. Instead, they are ready for combat in European Portugal, or in their overseas provinces. A Russian heavy division in Portugal during the fall rains would be drowned.

Since the end of WWII, there have been two types of armies. First, there is the highly efficient, expensively armed, modern force which functions best in a large, open theatre. Second, there are the much simpler armies which rely on older, cheaper, and usually more reliable weapons. The first type of army has seen

little service as originally constituted. Korea, Indo-Chinas, Malayas, and Algerias are fought better with the second type. Portugal is in the second category. They are endeavoring, therefore, to perfect the very best Korea-type army possible.

The Portuguese stress individual combat effectiveness. A recruit taught to shoot and fight; he is also prepared to live and remain effective in primitive conditions. He receives the most rigorous and dangerous training in NATO. Every soldier habitually carries not only a bayonet or knife, but some form of tool such as pick, shovel, wirecutters, or small ax. In addition, pistols are widely issued.

Offensively, at platoon level, the Portuguese will deliver aimed fire from their three ARs and many bolt Mausers where circumstances permit. In a final attack, the nine SMGs would also be effective. Portuguese tactics call for closing with the enemy and fighting at the shortest possible range. This is particularly valuable in primitive areas.

Defensively, a Portuguese company will function in a normal manner where possible. On the terrain of most of Western Europe, they will use supporting weapons in well thought out patterns and fill in with ARs, rifles, and SMGs. But the same company is also ready to fight outside Europe in rough, wet, and tropical country where they will be opposed by more men, but less materiel. They want aimed fire, but they want firepower too. Even defensively, the Portuguese would endeavor to get maximum benefit from small patrol actions of an offensive nature. They are eternally practicing these and are developing their tactical thinking to include lots of them.

Conclusions

It's easy to criticize a combination; it's neither one thing nor the other. You may decide that the Belgians would be wise to choose all, or no, burst-firing FN's. Or either the heavy or light AR, but not both. Similarly, the French perhaps should use the same weapons-thinking, internal discipline, and type of personnel throughout their entire army. One may think that since Portugal is a member of NATO, they should prepare to fight exclusively on European lines.

On the other hand, these nations know what they are doing. The US officers assigned to their MAAG groups soon come to support strongly the thinking of the country they are helping. Each of the three armies is doing the very best it can under its own circumstances.

The combining of aimed fire with area fire for small unit combat effectiveness is, of course, not limited to these three. All infantry companies, everywhere, would do this in varying proportion in action. But these three nations, more than others, plan for it ahead of time. So have many US infantry and armored cavalry units which did good jobs in WWII and Korea. US MC



Deadlined

☛ The lieutenant colonel reported into division and was discussing assignment with one of the staff. After deciding to assign him to the Motor Transport Battalion the staff officer casually remarked, "John, you're just the man to put the division back on its feet."

\$15.00 to LtCol W. F. Frank (Ret)



Soviet Comments on Vertical Envelopment

By Maj Richard F. Staar, USMCR

✦ DESPITE THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE OF VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT, unclassified Russian military journals have published very little about it. A survey of the literature appearing in the last few years turned up only three articles. One deals with the offensive use of helicopters for the attainment of tactical objectives; the other two treat the problem of defense against an air assault by an enemy force.

An article dealing with landing operations from helicopters by a Col F. Sverdlov appeared recently in the central organ of the USSR Defense Ministry, *Krasnaya Zvezda*. It was based on tactical experience gained from maneuvers. The author considered the subject from the standpoint of increasing the tempo of attack by dropping motorized infantry behind enemy lines from helicopters. Success he said, depends on careful preparation of the flight and debarkation, cover from the ground by artillery fire, and air protection by accompanying planes.

The Soviet maneuvers covered by Col Sverdlov had as their objective to land in the enemy rear, occupy, hold a tactically important target, and secure access to the area for troops attacking along the front. It was found that four or five signals, transmitted either by radio or rocket, were enough to keep commanders at all levels informed. The three most important were: "Our troops here!" "Start artillery fire!" "Stop fire!"

First, during the preparatory phase, information about the enemy and his reserves was studied, as was the terrain to be occupied. It was planned to cut a highway for the purpose of stopping enemy tanks in their approach from the north. Another group would cut a highway leading south. The remainder of the force, including mortars, was to remain in the center of the landing as reserves. No attempt would be made to defend a perimeter. Rather the force would organize

to defend the two main directions from which an attack could be anticipated. The reserve in the middle would be moved quickly to either side in event of an emergency.

An Air Force representative supervised the order in which men, weapons, mortars, and truck tractors (prime movers) were loaded into the helicopters. The units divided up in such a manner that the men would be closest to their targets upon landing. Briefings indicated what to expect, and dry runs were held. Each helicopter commander became acquainted with the officer in charge of the landing unit. Assuming the force would have to operate in areas affected by radioactivity, the entire group was put through rigid exercises and training in self-defense measures.

A Non-critical Critique

Col Sverdlov claims the maneuvers went off well despite their complexity. He says the greatest contribution was performed by Communist Party and *Komsomol* (or Red Youth League) members. They saw to it that each soldier knew his responsibility and performed it. Following the first exercise, a *Komsomol* meeting was devoted to the landing. The *Komsomol* leaders organized "competition" between units and teams.

The actual landing was scheduled to take place where there were no enemy troops, according to intelligence reports. However, when approaching the area of debarkation, separate groups of infantry and machine gun emplacements were observed from the air. Hence, the landing troops opened fire against these targets with automatic weapons from the helicopters.

The unloading took place rapidly and, upon completion, this was reported by radio to the commander. Infantry, chemical warfare troops, and engineers quickly

Not much has been published in the Russian press on vertical assault. What has been printed, though, reveals the Reds have a keen interest in the technique—both theirs and ours. This is an analysis of three articles appearing in Soviet periodicals

occupied combat intelligence outposts. They were followed by the bulk of the landing group, which fanned out into combat formations. Brief radio orders from the commander added more precision to the tasks of the units.

The lessons Col Sverdlov learned from these maneuvers are interesting. He says commanders participating in such an exercise should always act boldly and on their own initiative, not waiting for orders from their superior officers. "Circumstances demand this" he states, "because conditions change very rapidly." This may indicate that Russian commanders tend to rely upon orders from above and are confused when they have no directives and must use their own wits. For example, one of the participants in the exercise was praised because he fired at approaching tanks on his own initiative "without waiting for orders."

In these particular maneuvers, it was concluded that if all assigned tasks had been executed properly (and they were not), the landing would have speeded up substantially the advance of the main forces. When the latter approached, three red rockets were fired as the agreed signal for "our troops here!" An identical reply was received. Tanks were shown the best routes across the occupied region. After allowing the advance forces to pass through, the landing party held the area until the arrival of the main forces. Then it was taken out of combat. In other words, the force had functioned in the capacity of shock troops.

Another interesting article by Col I. Lisov, entitled *Air Developments and Combatting Them*, appeared in *Voennye Znaniya*. The author explains that an enemy landing group expects to be attacked from all directions and immediately sets up a circular-type defense, cutting off all roads leading to the area of debarkation. Col Lisov leaves no doubt who the "enemy" is. His

piece is illustrated with a drawing of two American planes, both clearly marked "USAF" and having other US insignia. He warns that the tactics of attack may vary, since air space is not related tactically to anything.


Hence, he says, the rear should be prepared for any eventuality. The enemy may use night operations, which are especially dangerous, even though they may also be more complex for the "aggressor forces." He cautions that the elements of surprise and military deception will be used to confuse the Russian defense. The danger of these attacks exists whether war actually has broken out or even if it is only being prepared. Thus, the Russian defenders must always be alert, always ready for the unexpected in order to anticipate possible variations of attack and assume the appropriate countermeasures.

Preparing the Defense

Lack of preparation, Col Lisov opines, may cause not only material and morale disruption but also great strategic damage. He cites with approval the planning and preparations made in Britain during WWII, when that country feared a German air invasion. He quotes the *New York Times* (1940) to the effect that the English countryside "fields were cut by deep canals, obstacles were placed on roads, and a network of local defense forces" existed. Some 30,000 motorcyclists had been mobilized to watch over areas with sparse populations. Also the so-called "British Legion," i.e. veterans of WWI, comprised a total of 100,000 snipers. The *Swiss Journal de Geneve* is given as the source for the figure of 400,000 volunteers recruited by England to fight the expected German assault from the air.


In addition, Col Lisov writes, a large part of the regular British army was designated for this defense effort, with higher staffs to coordinate all levels. Hundreds of defense points were constructed in areas threatened the most. In order to confuse the Germans, names of places and signs were taken off the highways. All of this is cited with approval by the Russian author. He presents this description (also explaining German preparations for defense against Allied vertical envelopment), in order to point up what the Soviet Union must do.

First, he says that at present the danger of enemy air assault exists "for all areas of the USSR." This requires advance planning for defense, not only with armed forces but also with local organizations. Of special importance is the protection of more important government establishments, centers of the economy, and other



USSR hasn't neglected 'copter development. This turbo-prop Mi-6, for example, carries 70 soldiers

SCHEMATIC PLAN FOR ANNIHILATION OF AN AMERICAN LANDING BEHIND SOVIET ARMY LINES



targets. Col Lisov admits that the destruction of enemy troops, which have landed and grouped themselves for battle, required combat ready forces.

However, according to the Colonel, individual Soviet units, covering detachments, and various local formations (like police) cannot be dispensed with in view of the commando type enemy operation. Smaller intelligence-diversionary forces can be destroyed by using minor forces that are brought into battle at the same time. The author says it is impossible to maintain a continuous guard by combat ready defense troops at all points which could be the target of air assaults

The Colonel's Solution

What is the solution? He suggests the only feasible one is to prepare in good time sufficiently strong local mobile reserves which could be thrown rapidly to the area where a landing has taken place "Only immediate and resolute action by these reserves," Col Lisov writes, "can guarantee success in the destruction of the enemy."

Col Lisov expects that very often these local Russian armed formations will be compelled to enter combat under unequal conditions, i.e. against a stronger enemy. Their aim will then be to contain the vertical envelopment force until the necessary reserves will have arrived. Surprise achieved by an unexpected and rapid Russian attack, even with smaller forces, can decide the success or failure of the enemy landing.

Col Lisov proposes the necessity "still in peacetime"

of establishing self-defense groups in large industrial enterprises—electric power centers, railroad terminals, water transportation points, state farms, and collective farms. These units must have the support and active participation of DOSAAF (the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy) as well as the trade unions, Communist Youth League, and other organizations. It is interesting to note that apparently the average citizen is not to be trusted with weapons—only the Red-controlled organizations.

The Soviet military writer suggests that these local self-defense groups assume responsibility not restricted to direct protection of their own individual factory, mine, electric power station, state farm, or population center. They should be prepared always, he says, to aid an adjacent area at a moment's notice in combatting an enemy air assault. The defense groups must have cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other means of communication at their disposal in case of an emergency.

Finally, Col Lisov emphasizes the importance of preparing Russian citizens through educational institutions, clubs, and DOSAAF units to defend their city, enterprise, collective farm. The most important question, that of arming such defense units, will be decided in each individual case, he says, by local civil and military authorities. This could be the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system—lack of confidence in the people on the part of the Communist regime.

If this plan is adopted, these "reserves should not

have to call for troops from the front." Most important is said to be the establishment of a reliable and centralized administration over all counterlanding units within the area of a region (*raion*) and a district (*oblast*). From here units can be thrown into combat for the purpose of annihilating large enemy forces.

The monthly journal of the USSR National Defense Ministry, *Voennyi Vestnik*, carried an article by Col P. Shemanskii entitled *Preparation of a Unit Smaller than a Regiment for Defense Against Air Assault*. The author anticipates wide-spread enemy use of helicopters to transfer small tactical forces to the rear of Russian armies, as well as intelligence-diversionary groups and single parachutists. Under such conditions, he advises that military units unceasingly watch the sky; receive signals and immediately pass them on when the enemy is sighted; destroy low flying air targets.

Defensive Training

Training for such defensive operations, the Colonel says, should use a maximum of visual aids: drawings, silhouettes, photographs, tables with tactical and technical data. If such sessions correspond with training flights of Soviet helicopters, he suggests that use be made of this time to explain the distinguishing characteristics of modern means for air assault, together with practical demonstrations of firing at targets in the air.

Col Shemanskii argues that it is not enough merely to teach principles. It should be emphasized constantly that visual observation supplements radar, especially for the sighting of low-flying helicopters and air landings. A rapid alert is important, and signals should be transmitted by audio as well as visual means. Fire from infantry weapons can be effective, only if it is conducted with the employment of massed means.

It is also necessary to protect the positions from which fire will emanate. Troops should know the difference between shooting at targets in the air and those situated on the ground. The author indicates that automatic weapons (submachine or machine guns) must be placed on the knees, when inside a trench or in a standing position.

The command to shoot of necessity must be brief, since the target will remain for only a short time within firing range. The example Col Shemanskii provides is as follows: "Helicopter above first slope—fire!" Dispersal, camouflage, outfitting and utilization of cover during attacks from the air are all important elements in this type of training which differs in attack, on the defensive, during a march, and under combat conditions. These problems should be taken up in connection



Maj Staar, author and educator, served with CIA from '49-'50. He spent four years, '51-'54, as an intelligence research specialist on USSR and Eastern Europe for the State Dept. Maj Staar, who speaks seven languages, held the position of Chief, Program Analysis Sect, Radio Free Europe, in '58. He has attended the Univ of London ('45); Dickinson College (AB-'48); Yale (AM-'49); and the Univ of Michigan (PhD-'54). Now teaching at Emory Univ, Atlanta, Ga, the Major is an active member of VTU 6-4, USMCR.

tion with other tactical questions and not in isolation, according to Col Shemanskii.

For example, when planning the defense of a motorized infantry battalion, he says the commander must take into consideration the direction and most probable time of attack by an enemy flying at low altitude. The basis for his plans is information from the regimental staff and intermediate levels. He must also be familiar with the tactics used by enemy helicopters and their troops in occupying various targets throughout the rear, with terrain and with the battle positions occupied by the battalion.

The battalion commander must issue brief instructions on the tasks of the artillery unit, observation of the air space, dispatch of signals when the enemy appears, sequence of firing at low-flying helicopters with infantry weapons, supplying of troops with armor-piercing incendiary and tracer bullets.

In addition to the first position, two reserve positions are prepared at distances of 400 meters and 1.5 kilometers in case of a landing in the rear. The watch at the observation point (flash and sound ranging) is strengthened when the message is received from the regimental staff that the enemy is approaching by air. It is permissible to limit the use of personnel for observation during the initial phase, and also to divide the watch between the ground and the sky. Radio communications are used for the air approach as well as visual and/or audio signals (flags and striking against shell cases).

Firing is restricted to those units along whose lines the helicopters are flying. Other units remain camouflaged and in hiding. This provides good concealment from the enemy of battle positions and fire systems. If actual combat is in progress, then all units not involved in the basic combat task, and within range, shoot at the enemy helicopters.

US J MC



Pardon Me

☛ ONE SUNNY AFTERNOON in Virginia, . . . after a hot, long day in Basic School, my lovely young bride and I decided to go over to meet the family moving in next door. After introducing ourselves, she asked our neighbors where last they were stationed. The Marine, a captain, said Camp LeJeune. My wife piped, "Really! What job did you have there?" "Well," he replied, steeling himself for a subject dear to his heart, "I had my own company." She eagerly replied, "Oh, what kind of company? Insurance?"

\$15.00 to 1stLt Jerome G. Cooper

1st Marine Aircraft Wing



The 1st MAW's last report appeared in these pages in July 1960. Since then a lot has happened on the aviation side of our Far East division/wing team. Here's what.

By Maj Walter E. Sullivan, Jr.

FROM FUJI TO THE PHILIPPINES THE 1ST MARINE Aircraft Wing keeps watch over one of the vital sectors of the Far East. Swept wing Crusaders stand strip alert on the outskirts of Tokyo. Deadly and arrogant Skyhawks wait poised on the catapults of attack carriers in the China Seas. Swarms of helicopters hover near the steaming jungles of the South ready to disgorge Marines and weapons.

The northernmost of these Marines and weapons are located at the foot of Fujiyama. Here is the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan. Here Col Perry Shuman commands Marine Aircraft Group 11. It is composed of two all-weather F4D squadrons, an F8U squadron, and an air control squadron in addition to regularly assigned support units. Since the last report there have been many changes in the units assigned. LtCol Buck Hemstad brought out his F4D squadron VMF (AW)-115 from the East Coast. LtCol Al Dellamano, skipper of VMF (AW)-314, arrived from El Toro with his F4D's. Maj Dick Rosh, skipper of Crusader squadron VMF-312, relieved LtCol Albert Clark's squadron VMF-251. More recently Maj R. D. Green's MACS-7 took over from LtCol Gene Winchester and MACS-8.

These tactical units, all of them relatively recent arrivals, have bounced from Atsugi to carriers and other bases in the Far East like handballs in a four wall court. Since last July VMF (AW)-115 has deployed 11 times, including carrier, GCI controller training, and SEATO demonstrations. Since November the VMF (AW)-314 Black Knights have made five major deployments and, in spite of all the moving, broke existing flight records

for an all-weather squadron in MAG 11 by flying a total of 914 hours in March.

The most recent arrival, VMF-312, found that readiness and mobility are hard facts, not high-sounding concepts. Since its relief of VMF-251, the new squadron was assigned, in addition to its primary mission, a secondary role while based at NAS Atsugi. This was to assist in the Air Defense of Japan. The secondary mission requires that a specified number of aircraft maintain a ready capability for becoming airborne within minutes after notification. Since then, the squadron has deployed for carrier qualification, weapons demonstrations, and routine operational requirements. In the latter part of March VMF-312 was ordered to deploy. Within three days they were operating out of NAS Cubi Point in the Philippines, 1600 miles away. On the fourth day they were flying combat air patrol missions off USS *Midway* in southern waters.

Unglamorous but Ready

Forty thousand feet below are the less glamorous, hard-working personnel of Marine Air Base Squadron-11. When the first wave of fighters arrived at Ping Tung, Taiwan, it was MABS-11 MOREST gear that was already set up to trap them. When the Quad radar was set up at the distant base less than three hours later the Tacan was in place and ready. The MABS-11 Marines from Atsugi have been a busy but unheralded outfit.

The mobility and readiness of these squadrons and the squadrons they relieved are unquestioned. It is



MajGen John P. Condon, CG

enough to say that at no time in the past have the groups of the Wing been in better condition to carry out their missions. This is due in part to the 2d and 3d Marine Aircraft Wings, which were responsible for the training phases of these squadrons before they arrived.

Visiting other units of the Wing is as easy as catching the daily commuter train. LtCol John Shoden's VMR-253 runs a daily mail plane from Iwakuni to Atsugi and back. Approximately 414 miles down the coast is the headquarters of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. In addition to Wing headquarters, two groups are normally located here: Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1, Marine Wing Service Group 17, and Marine Aircraft Group 12.

From 1 February to 1 June of this year MAG-12 was deployed to the Philippine Islands and stationed at NAS Cubi Point, a little more than 1,300 miles south of Iwakuni. During this period the runway at Iwakuni was under repair and all tactical units were deployed. Iwakuni-based staff pilots journeyed to nearby Itazuke to fly the R4D-8 and the F9F-Ts. The runway was finished in May and the squadrons returned 1 June when normal field operations were resumed.

The Headquarters Group, commanded by Col Charles Dobson, consists of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron (which contains the wing headquarters), Marine Air Control Squadron 9 (MACS-9), and Marine Air Support Squadron Two (MASS-2). These units provide command, air control, administrative, and camp facilities for 1st Wing headquarters, as specified in their assigned missions.



BGen Roy L. Kline, AWC


Not far from the Headquarters Group is Marine Air Group 12 commanded by Col Charles Kunz, who arrived out here in January to take command and then left immediately on the deployment to Cubi Point. Col Kunz found his group was scattered all over the Far East. Two A4D squadrons, VMA-324 and 311, are located aboard a carrier. The latter squadron, a recent arrival, replaced LtCol William Traynor's VMA-121, which won CMC's Aviation Efficiency Trophy for FY 1960 just two months after receiving the Chief of Naval Operations Safety Award. The presentation was made by MajGen Avery R. Kier, then Wing Commander. VMA-121 is the first jet attack squadron to receive Naval Aviation's two most coveted awards in one year.

VMA 212 Reports Aboard

In addition to two attack A4D squadrons, the group also had assigned to it (TAD from MAG-13 in Hawaii) Marine Attack Squadron 212. This squadron arrived in the area on 4 October 1960 with 20 FJ-4B aboard *USS Coral Sea* and departed in mid-May for their parent group. While much of their activity is classified, there were some incidents worthy of mention.

While the squadron was doing carrier qualifications aboard *USS Oriskany* (CVA-34), 1stLt Charles K. Conley flew the squadron's 13,000th consecutive accident-free hour. A message of commendation was sent to LtCol Morrison, the skipper, from Adm J. C. Clifton, USN, for the "outstanding flight record."

Shortly after arrival at Iwakuni, Capt James Ryan, Jr., while airborne on a routine test flight, intercepted



Marine in a hurry—that's typical of 1st Wing activity during past year. He's going out to meet F4D after touchdown on the Corps' first operational SATS, set up on Taiwan during Operation BLUE STAR

two USAF F-100 aircraft who were lost and had broadcast a request for assistance. He led them to Marine Corps Air Facility, Iwakuni.

Another example of assistance rendered by VMA-212 occurred on 5 December 1960. That day A4Ds of VMA-324 were landing at Iwakuni under adverse cross-wind conditions. Lt Hugh Anderson was the last pilot to touch down. On the roll out his brakes failed and he gave it the gun and took it around. Listening in the MAG-12 ready room to the transmissions was Capt Gerald W. Keyes of 212. Hearing Anderson report critically low fuel, he immediately called the flight line to ready an FJ-4 buddy tanker. Within six minutes he was launched on his way to give the thirsty A4D its needed fuel. Anderson plugged in and refueled. Capt Keyes then proceeded to Itazuke AFB with his buddy from VMA-324 on his wing murmuring something about "a friend in need."

The fourth tactical unit of MAG-12 is Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 whose F8U-1Ps and F3D-1Qs, under the command of Maj J. R. Gill, are scattered throughout the area. It is the rule rather than the exception for VMCJ-1 to be simultaneously supporting activities out of Atsugi, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Their mission is to provide air support of FMF operations by performing aerial photographic reconnaissance, airborne electronic and communications countermeasures, and electronic reconnaissance. From 1 November 1960 to 31 March 1961 the squadron flew over 1,800 hours. This included carrier qualifications, photo, and ECM flights.

Far less glamorous than the tactical units, but just as important, are the supporting elements, Marine Air Base Squadron 12 and Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12.

Another major supporting unit is Marine Wing

Service Group 17, which has perhaps one of the most unusual assignments in the Corps. In addition to rendering the support expected from a Service Group, it has the additional assignment of operating the Marine Corps Air Facility, Iwakuni. This is the largest Bureau of Weapons supported facility in the Far East. It is the only facility (to the knowledge of this writer) where Marines are responsible for running seadrome and harbor facilities. The one staff wears two hats. Personnel are utilized in dual billets and cross assignments. Col A. C. Lowell is the group commander and the CO of the Air Facility. The Service Group has supported all operations in which the Marine Corps has participated in the Far East.

Service Group Activities

The Service Group is composed of MARS-17, H&HS-17, and VMR-253. MARS provides a wing level maintenance and repair activity in support of the 1st Wing. In addition to the primary mission, MARS has a secondary mission of operating the Wing Flight Section, which has almost as many aircraft as a tactical squadron (MARS had 17). The average monthly flight time for approximately 100 Wing aviators is 1,000 hours.

The Class "B" Maintenance Section, the largest section of MARS, has undertaken and completed many assignments above normal "B" level maintenance. These assignments have ranged from installation of JATO and the re-sealing of internal fuel cells in 39 A4Ds to the design, construction, and installation of an airborne command post in an R5D. A single Side Band (TRCA 75), ARC 27 (VHF), ARR-41 (HF Receiver), ARC 44 (FM) plus crypto gear give the aircraft very broad capabilities.

The one flying squadron of the Service Group, VMR-253, supports the 1st Wing and the Seventh Fleet with



MARS-17 Marines kept 'em flying, navigating, communicating. This is A4D-2 navigation gear

its 10 R5Ds and 10 R4Qs by averaging over 12,000 flight hours a month. Since April 1960, VMR-253, commanded by LtCol John Shoden, has flown 37,000 passengers, 23 million passenger miles, and has airlifted over 10 million pounds of cargo and delivered a million pounds of mail. The pilots are as familiar with the airways from Atsugi to Southeast Asia as they are with the course from their quarters to the ready room.

Approximately 525 miles south of Iwakuni lies Okinawa, the home of Marine Air Group 16 commanded by Col R. W. Wyczawski. MAG-16 has been located at the Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema, since 1 May 1960. The group is close to the 3d Marine Division. This gives it ample opportunity to carry out its mission with a minimum of lost motion and a maximum of training. The group's mission is to be prepared to conduct vertical envelopment assault operations in support of the FMF and such other air operations as may be directed by higher authority.

At the beginning of the period covered by this report, MAG-12, HMR (L)-261, HMR (L)-362 and VMO-2, supported by H&MS-16 and MABS-16, were participating in PacPhibLex 31-60 (BLUE STAR) in Taiwan.

BLUE STAR was a major US amphibious exercise conducted on a division-wing scale with the cooperation of the Republic of China. The purpose of BLUE STAR was to provide training in Navy-Marine Corps doctrine and techniques of amphibious operations and to promote a close working relationship and understanding between the forces involved. There hasn't been a period since then when some or all units of MAG-16 weren't either preparing for, or participating in, an operation or exercise.

Exercise SEA HAWK took place in Korea in and around Pohang. HMR (L)-162 participated from the LPH-5 (*USS Princeton*) in support of the 9th Marines. Task-organized with RLT-9 was a ROK KMC battalion. In spite of the language barrier vertical assault tactics again proved successful. Lessons learned indicated that closer liaison with infantry units in cross training was necessary to acquaint them with helicopter capabilities and operations.

The exercise was sparked by an all-out helicopter air lift, giving the ROK Marines their first taste of vertical envelopment. They used MAG-16 choppers flying off *USS Princeton*. The exercise was also highlighted by a night helicopter assault against a mythical airfield prior to the amphibious assault the next day.

When not deployed or afloat, the MAG-16 units at Futema continually emphasize in their training program future deployments of the Marine Air Groups, cross training of air and ground personnel, night operations, and combat and service support. The training program bore fruit in recent operations—PACKBOARD in Northern Okinawa and PONY EXPRESS, a SEATO exercise in Northern Borneo in which Wing helicopter and transport aircraft participated.

PONY EXPRESS was the 19th and largest SEATO mock war exercise held to date. The six-nation amphibious task force formed for the mock defense of a member country that had been attacked without provocation. The landing forces consisted of about 6,000 troops of the 3d Marine Division, 42 Royal Marines, and "W" Company of the Australian Infantry.

The combat exercises and operations concluded in conjunction with the 7th Fleet and our SEATO Allies have honed the keen edge of readiness of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

This readiness is best summed up in the words of LtGen Thomas W. Wornham when he was Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific: "The potent Marine air-ground team in the Far East represents the finest, the most efficacious fighting aggregation ever fielded by the 7th Fleet." US MC



Genial Crouch

☛ DURING A USUAL WEEKLY "Captain's Inspection" one ancient and patient First Class Signalman seemed to have found one way at least to amuse himself during the formalities. The Captain approached him with the ice-breaker—"How's the chow, Flags," and received for an answer, "Just fine, Captain, what there is of it."

Minutes later, as the end of the inspection party filed by, the signalman was asked, quite coincidentally (by a lesser personage), if he was getting enough to eat. The answer, thoughtful and serious, "Plenty, sir, such as it is."

\$15.00 to Capt P. A. Wickwire



The keystone of the
system is prevention

✦ ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTIONS AND responsibilities of command is the supervision, care, and maintenance of equipment.

Many officers, brought up in the wartime days of lavish supply during WWII or Korea, have been relatively unimpressed by the cost of our equipment and the importance of its care. Each year now we see new, more complex, and more expensive equipment coming into our systems. The initial cost, the cost of maintenance and related maintenance skills, are rising at an alarming rate. There is no assurance of a parallel increase in appropriated funds to pay for these growing expenses. In fact equipment costs may soon price us out of the manpower and materiel markets. One hedge against this trend—a safeguard against the overwhelming expenses of equipment—is to take better care of what we do get. This is the function of material maintenance policies, programs, and procedures. It is a growing responsibility of *all hands*.

Military Maintenance

Maintenance of military equipment is the action taken by Marines to keep their individual or organizational equipment in a serviceable condition—or to restore it to satisfactory condition when necessary. It is the care and work done to keep an item of equipment in good condition.

The maintenance of our equipment involves inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing and rebuilding, or reclaiming, as necessary.

Maintenance Principles

In addition to the commander's responsibility for maintenance of his assigned equipment, the keystone of the Marine Corps maintenance system is *preventive maintenance*.

Combat

By Col James A. Donovan, Jr.

The unit commander's primary maintenance tool, in peace and war, is the doctrine of preventive maintenance. This involves maintaining equipment and facilities in satisfactory condition by means of systematic inspection, detection, and correction of possible deficiencies before they occur or before they develop into major defects. Preventive maintenance also includes teaching the proper care and use of equipment.

Current logistic doctrine provides that in combat repairs are made as far forward in the combat zone as the tactical situation permits. When possible, repair personnel move to the equipment rather than equipment to personnel. Maintenance installations are located for maximum support efficiency as well as security.

Authorized amounts of repair parts, as well as calculated reserves of maintenance equipment, should be kept on hand at each level of maintenance. Reasonable mobility and austerity will provide criteria guidance. Marine maintenance units work on their own class of equipment, but also on other classes if it's within their capabilities. In emergency, any maintenance unit works on equipment of any type or service. Interservice maintenance support can be expected in prolonged or combined operations.

Systems of Maintenance

With the objective of maximum flexibility and efficiency in the support of amphibious troops, maintenance throughout the Marine Corps is based upon the organization of categories and echelons. The categories are: organizational, field, and depot maintenance. The echelons of maintenance number from first echelon through fifth. US Army maintenance doctrine and system is similar.

The Marine Corps combat maintenance system is

t Maintenance

The cost of combat gear is going up. One hedge against inflation is better maintenance. We've got a system. Here's how it works

concerned mainly with the categories of organizational and field maintenance and the first three echelons of maintenance. In these areas we find the responsibilities affecting most Marines and the constant requirement for training and development of modern mobile systems and doctrine compatible with our most advanced tactical concepts.

The Echelons

Organizational maintenance is work and repair done on unit equipment by unit personnel. Within the companies, batteries, and battalions this is the maintenance performed by drivers and users of equipment and by such specially trained technicians as armorers, electronic repairmen, or mechanics assigned to the unit. Organizational maintenance includes first and second echelon work.

First echelon maintenance is performed by the operator, wearer, or user of equipment. It includes proper care, cleaning, minor repair, and lubricating within the capability of the skill and tools of the user. Examples are the care of individual weapons, the cleaning of web equipment, washing vehicles, tire and battery checks, and minor mending of clothing.


Second echelon maintenance is performed by specially trained personnel in the unit, such as armorers and mechanics. Examples: parts repair or replacement in weapons, replacement of spark plugs or oil filters in vehicles.

In the Marine division the Maintenance Platoon, Light Support Company, of the Division Service Battalion does second echelon maintenance of motor transport, ordnance, and electronic equipment. The company can provide relatively mobile and light maintenance support of an RLT or brigade size force for 15

to 20 days before it needs augmentation from higher echelon Force support units.

Field Maintenance, or third echelon, is maintenance authorized and performed by a designated maintenance agency in direct support of a using organization. In the Marine division, the Medium Support Company of the Service Battalion performs limited field or third echelon maintenance for units of the division. After 15 to 20 days of extended operations its maintenance capability should be reinforced by elements of the Force Service Regiment.

Third echelon maintenance consists of repair or replacement of damaged or worn equipment. The Medium Support Company performs maintenance beyond the capabilities of the tools, spare parts or test



When the user can't do the job, the system takes over. This is third echelon maintenance in Korea

equipment of the Light Support Companies. Usually items handled in third echelon maintenance are returned to the using units. Third echelon units also support lower echelons through technical assistance, mobile repair crews, and repair parts.

These are the primary echelons and sources of combat maintenance in support of a Marine division.

Fourth echelon maintenance is performed by units organized as semi-fixed or permanent shops to serve organizations within a geographical area. In the FMF, third and fourth echelon work is done by the Materiel Supply and Maintenance Battalion of the Force Service Regiment.

Depot or fifth echelon maintenance involves the major overhaul or complete rebuilding of material. It involves evacuation to rear area depots. Fourth and fifth echelon maintenance are not considered here to be "combat maintenance" of concern to division combat troops.

Modern Maintenance Concepts

Regardless of any future changes in the organization of the Marine division's Service Battalion or the Force Service Regiment, the modern maintenance system needed to support amphibious troops should include certain characteristics and advanced concepts.

Combat maintenance facilities in the objective area should be kept down to a bare minimum. Materiel maintenance will be accomplished chiefly by replacement of items of equipment, or, when this is impractical, by replacement of major components. The repairs then made by the using units and the Support Companies are limited to those requiring minimum skills, parts, and equipment.

Modern maintenance concepts also require that we must take seldom used spare parts out of the system and mount out with only austere quantities of spare parts and components.

For example, each repair echelon should stock only those parts for which usage history has shown at least three demands in six months. In battle we must fill requirements for seldom used parts by local cannibalization and by aerial delivery direct from supporting ships or depots. Forward area combat transport aircraft and helicopters provide means for such a system.

Combat maintenance service in the MEF should consist of third echelon and only selective fourth echelon maintenance support in the objective area.

Direct support maintenance of MEF elements will be provided by organic or attached mobile support elements of higher Force service support commands.

Maintenance units are deployed into the objective area only when a need for their services is anticipated. Maintenance units should be deployed into the objec-

tive area after D+7 in follow-up shipping. They will be established in the logistic support area. Mobile maintenance units then move out in direct support of combat units when feasible.

The Force Service Group commander is responsible for organizing and dispatching parts supply and contact service teams to maintenance areas of the supported units to repair equipment on site. This requires adequate transportation for mobile repair teams.

These contact teams are organized on a composite basis with technical skills supplied in accordance with the nature of the work load encountered. This reduces the amount of equipment that must be evacuated to the Service Group maintenance area for repair.

Current maintenance echelons may be modified by the imposition of time limits for repair at each echelon. For example: Division and Force Troop units notify the Service Group of equipment which they cannot repair within one day. The Force Service Group maintenance team either evacuates the item, repairs it on site, or cannibalizes the item to obtain needed repair parts.

At the maintenance areas of the Material and Supply Maintenance Battalion of the FSR, maintenance and repair are limited to adjustment or replacement of assemblies which can be completed in three days or less. Materiel which cannot be repaired in that time is evacuated from the objective area or combat zone to rear depots.

Finally, we must recognize and plan for maximum interservice logistic support in joint operations under unified commanders. Guidance for joint logistic systems is set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine for unified action. Interservice support policies have also been clearly established by the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, it is evident that in Joint operations the systems, procedures and doctrine for combat maintenance in Army components and Marine ground components must be well coordinated and similar.

The continued trends towards greater standardization of materiel, common cataloguing of parts, single service procurement responsibility, and single managership of many of the major equipments—all indicate that there will have to be greater standardization of military maintenance systems.

Conclusion

In addition to being a basic responsibility of each commander, combat maintenance of increasingly expensive and complex equipment is fundamental to sustained combat power. In order to move, shoot, and communicate during extended operations under varied conditions, the Marine amphibious force must understand and employ the most modern combat maintenance system.

USMC



An Easy Question

☛ THE BATTALION COMMANDER had limited his questions to the troops during Saturday morning inspection at Camp Lejeune to queries on tactical situations. He was taken aback however, when he reached the mortar platoon and promptly asked a section leader what he did with his guns at night (meaning what deflection and elevation). The Corporal promptly replied; "Sir, we lock them up in the police shed."

\$15.00 to Capt R. G. Brown



On July 7th at Warminster, a large audience of NATO Military observers and press correspondents saw Vigilant:

- Score 12 hits in 13 shots.
- Successfully engage moving tanks at ranges out to 1350 yards.
- Hit 4 oncoming tanks in 48 seconds, the attack being spread over a 40 degree arc.

On May 12th 'somewhere in Europe' other Military observers saw Vigilant:

- Score 11 hits out of 13 shots.
- Hit 'crossing' tanks moving at 25 mph.
- Hit a tank at less than 200 yards.
- Hit tanks making snap appearances of 15 and 20 seconds.

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
BTW3

The British Aircraft Corporation (U.S.A.) Inc.

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FMF 1965

Proposed Organization and Major Equipment



GENERAL SUPPORT ARTILLERY BATTERY

CONCEPT—Consists of a battery headquarters and a firing battery of eight towed 155mm howitzers organized into two platoons (four each). Platoons can operate independently for limited periods of time, require augmentation for extended operations: at least one more officer, more fire control, survey and comm Marines, more service support, a bulldozer.

MISSION—Same as G/S Artillery Bn, GAZETTE: Jul '61.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Command is exercised through small command group in Btry HQ, ExO in firing battery, platoon commanders in Plt Hq.

COMMUNICATIONS—Normally wire (radio if platoons are widely separated, remote from Btry Hq).

INTELLIGENCE—Target acquisition via LNO/FO, also normal artillery intelligence channels.

FIRE DIRECTION—Platoons can set up own FDC; when centralized battery fire control is desired, Btry Hq can set up FDC.

FIREPOWER—Eight 155mm How have minimum high angle range of 2,900 meters, maximum range of 14,800 meters. Infantry weapons are provided for security patrols and perimeter defense.


MOBILITY—Organic vehicles can move battery in one echelon.

LOGISTICS—Planned, supervised and coordinated by Btry CO using organic technicians/supply Marines.

ADMINISTRATION—Self-administration; in combat helps man battalion administration center.

SUPPLY—Organic supply functions. All classes of supply maintained at minimum essential for prescribed continuous operation. Unit distribution except for Class V.

MESSING—Battery can operate own mess when augmented with three Marines (Cooks) from Bn mess section.



EDITOR'S NOTE—Third in a series of articles designed to keep Marines up on proposed changes in FMF structure. These are recommendations by MCLFDC as a result of Troop Tests; HQMC has made no decision yet. Next Month: Force Artillery and Communications Battalion.

Readers with a sharp eye for detail will note that GAZETTE makes no mention of Headquarters Battery, Artillery Regiment. Reason: this unit was not studied and/or tested under Troop Test program. Recommendations, however, were received from the field. A significant one: Include a flash ranging section in Regimental Headquarters. But until new, improved equipment is available MCLFDC recommended that plans for a flash ranging section be shelved along with FMF recommended increases in staff sections for Regimental Headquarters.

HQ BATTERY G/S ARTILLERY BN

CONCEPT—Consists of battalion headquarters which directs/coordinates tactical and at times technical operations of organic batteries, combat support units attached; a comm platoon and battery headquarters. Battery CO acts as headquarters commandant, is responsible for operating facilities of battalion CP. Operations platoon, comm platoon and other service support units function in operational roles with entire battalion.

MISSION—Same as H&S Co, Inf Bn, GAZETTE: Aug. '61.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Same as Hq Co, Inf Regt, GAZETTE: Aug '61.

COMMUNICATIONS—Comm platoon provides required external communications for battalion CO. Internal communications primarily by wire; battalion communications primarily radio.

INTELLIGENCE—Intelligence requirements are met by Bn S-2 of operations platoon.

FIREPOWER—Infantry weapons provide for security patrols, local perimeter defense.

MOBILITY—Primarily by organic vehicles; forward CP unit can be organized for heli-lift.



LOGISTICS—Performed by small battery headquarters section, augmented when necessary by cognizant staff section in Bn Hq.

ADMINISTRATION—Same as H&S Co, Inf Bn, GAZETTE: Aug '61.



SUPPLY—Bn Hq supply section gets supplies from division service units, provides for battalion distribution. Btry Hq distributes supplies for internal support of Hq Btry.

MEDICAL—Battalion medical officer controls/coordinates corpsmen assigned batteries for emergency treatment, and the preparation for evacuation of all battalion casualties requiring hospitalization.

MESSING—Bn Hq mess section operates mess for entire battalion. When required, mess section furnishes cooks and equipment to howitzer batteries for operating battery messes.



FMF 1965



DIRECT SUPPORT ARTILLERY BATTERY

CONCEPT—Consists of a battery headquarters and a firing battery of eight towed 105mm howitzers organized into two platoons (four each). Battery normally operates as an integral unit, with two-platoon system permitting flexibility of employment depending on tactical or terrain situation. Platoons can operate independently for limited periods of time, require augmentation for extended operations: at least one more officer, more fire control, survey and comm Marines, more service support, a bulldozer.

Gun crews and fire control Marines are dual trained with 105mmHow and HowTar. Battery will be armed with HowTar when assigned to battalion task groupment for VTOL operations.

MISSION—Same as D/S Artillery Bn, GAZETTE: July '61.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Command is exercised through small command group in Btry Hq, ExO in firing battery, platoon commanders in Plt Hq.

COMMUNICATIONS—Normally wire (radio if platoons are widely separated, remote from Btry Hq).

INTELLIGENCE—Target acquisition via four organic FO sections. Observer sections normally operate with companies of supported infantry battalion.

FIRE DIRECTION—Normally centralized fire control but platoons can set up own FDC.

FIREPOWER—Eight 105mmHow have minimum high angle range of 1,600 meters, maximum range of 11,200 meters. Infantry weapons are provided for security patrols, local position defense including anti-tank defense.

MOBILITY—Organic vehicles can move battery in one echelon.

LOGISTICS—Planned, supervised and coordinated by Btry CO using organic technicians/supply Marines.

ADMINISTRATION—Self-administration; in combat helps man battalion administration center.

SUPPLY—Organic supply functions. All classes of supply maintained at minimum essential for prescribed continuous operation. Unit distribution except for Class V.

MAINTENANCE—1st echelon maintenance of all T/E, 2d echelon maintenance of ordnance (less fire control) and motor transport. 2d echelon maintenance of comm gear available in battalion Hq Btry as reinforcement of howitzer battery capability.

MESSING—Battery can operate own mess when provided limited galley facilities and Marines (cooks) by Bn.

HQ BATTERY D/S ARTILLERY BN

CONCEPT—Consists of battalion headquarters which directs/coordinates actions of entire battalion, attached or reinforcing units; a comm platoon; fire direction units, naval gunfire, liaison and fire control units; service support units; battery headquarters. Battery CO acts as headquarters commandant, is responsible for operating facilities of battalion CP.

MISSION—Same as H&S Co, Inf Bn, GAZETTE: Aug '61.

COMMAND AND STAFF—Same as Hq Co, Inf Regt, GAZETTE: Aug '61.

COMMUNICATIONS—Comm platoon provides required external communications for battalion CO. Internal communications limited to wire/messenger service.

INTELLIGENCE—Intelligence requirements are met by Bn S-2.

FIREPOWER—Eight organic HowTars w/prime movers under Bn Hq section for use of firing battery when supporting a unit in VTOL operation. Infantry weapons for security patrols, local perimeter defense.

LOGISTICS—Performed by small battery headquarters section, augmented when necessary by cognizant staff section in Bn Hq.

MOBILITY—Primarily by organic vehicles; forward CP unit can be organized for heli-lift.

ADMINISTRATION—Same as H&S Co, Inf Bn, GAZETTE: Aug '61.



TRANSPORTATION—Pool of GP vehicles provide transportation for command, staff and liaison Marines, comm gear, survey teams, limited emergency medical evacuation, and supply distribution within Bn Hq and to firing batteries; also prime movers for organic HowTars.

SUPPLY—Bn Hq supply section gets supplies (less Class V) from division service units, provides for battalion distribution. Btry Hq distributes supplies for Hq Btry.

MEDICAL—Battery medical technician provides emergency treatment, prepares for evacuation all battery casualties requiring hospitalization. A small field dispensary is operated for treatment of minor illnesses and injuries.

MAINTENANCE—Elements of battery are capable of providing 1st and 2d echelon maintenance on all equipment assigned battery. Comm platoon provides 2d echelon maintenance on all battalion comm equipment.

MESSING—Bn Hq mess section operates mess for entire battalion. When required, mess section furnishes cooks and equipment to howitzer batteries for operating battery messes.





OBSERVATION POST



This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment: \$30.

A Priority for Physical Training

By Capt G. E. Ottott

PICTURE, IF YOU WILL, A BATTALION bulletin calling for a review of all subjects in preparation for the annual IG inspection. Bulletin lists 65 specific training subjects and programs. In these subjects all personnel are required to be proficient or to have received periodic training safety. Instruction ranges anywhere from continuous to once a year. The last sentence of the bulletin might well read: "Everything Has Priority."

Those final words contain more truth than jest as many a beleaguered commander (and his troops) well know. Training has become far more diversified than ever before. We all agree that a Marine must be able to efficiently perform his duties under a greater variety of circumstances than any other service man in our armed forces today. Training objectives have multiplied. So have a myriad of other programs which, though necessary, consume their share of the available "24 hours a day."

When time began, our Supreme Commander decreed that a day would contain only 24 hours, and to this date no one has been able to alter that order! Alternative? Neglect some things in favor of others, even though we know that "all things have priority."

What do we neglect? Too often it is *physical training*. The *one* training objective that should have *more* priority than most others. Some units (yes, even infantry types) will go for weeks with little, if any, physical training. When we really stop to think of it, when we adjust our perspective to include the *whole* forest of trees we are continually bumping into, what good are all the other programs on the training schedule. if we are not physically capable of carrying them out?

A few years ago at one of the Recruit Depots I actually observed a recruit who did not possess the strength to pull back the bolt on his M1 rifle. This is the extreme example of course, but it does point out a fact that we too often ignore in the scramble to fulfill our training requirements: What good is a knowledge

of marksmanship, what good is technique of fire, what good even the rifle itself if an individual hasn't the strength to use it? What earthly good is it to know map reading well enough to reach an objective if we haven't the stamina to get there fast enough, nor the strength to fight for it when we do?

As Marines we must be physically prepared for *instant combat* under a variety of situations. Failure to be so prepared could well result in *instant death* not only for ourselves, but those unfortunate enough to be relying on our *every* ability. This is why we *must* place a priority on physical training.

Do you think I'm trying to over-emphasize the problem? If you do then reflect for a minute on the fact that initial success of some units trying for the *minimum requirement* in our new Physical

Readiness Test has run as *high* as 65% *failure!* These are FMF units, ready for instant combat. Physical fitness of the type we require takes weeks. There is nothing *instant* about it. Reflect on that a minute, too!

Unless all the men in a particular outfit possess extraordinary physical abilities, a *regular* and *vigorous* PT program is a necessity. If all training must have a "priority" then a "priority of priorities" must be established with PT at the top. If something must be neglected don't let it be physical training. Marines can always get another pack, another rifle, even another tank, but they can never replace their body or their health!

USMC

1251 Tylee St.
Vista, Calif.

MOS+MCI=G-2

By Maj J. J. Kelly

IN THE COURSE OF MANY INSPECTIONS, I have asked countless questions of Marines, covering a multitude of subjects. One "need to know" answer which is seldom forthcoming is to the question, "Do you know what the MOS manual specifies you should know for your MOS and rank?" A corollary to this is whether or not the man knows the requirements set forth in the MOS manual for the next higher rank in his field, in order to help him prepare for promotion.

The average Marine has rarely, if ever, heard of an MOS manual. Usually, it's not available to the troops anyway because it's tucked away in some bookcase behind the administrative chief's desk. I'll offer an easy solution to this situation. First, make a sign—plain, fancy, what have you—according to your tastes and whether or not you have a TAL to help you. Let it read, "Do you know the requirements of the MOS manual for your rank? If not, check this manual." Then put the sign and the manual

in a conspicuous place in the company office where the men can use it and the Ad chief can watch that it doesn't disappear. After that, stress the point throughout the command so that the men get in the habit of using the manual.

We've been doing this locally and upon showing it to one of the inspectors (Capt John Aldridge) during our past IG, he hit on a fine suggestion for tying in the manual with off-duty education.

Based on this suggestion, our education NCO prepared a list of MCI courses by occupational field and inserted them in the appropriate place in the manual. Now our Marines can not only look in the book to see what they are required to know, but they can also see what courses are available to help them achieve this. It's starting to work here; maybe it will work for you.

USMC

SerCo, H&SBn
MCRD, PI, S.C.

No Leaks, No Bumps--No Lift


By Capt F. H. Mitchell, Jr.

I WONDER IF WE'RE HIDING OUR COLLECTIVE heads in the sand and not realizing it? I contend that too much emphasis is being placed on water proof hulls, rear loading ramps, increased seating, and many other nice-to-have items, as we blithely surge ahead, completely overlooking the most basic requirement of a helicopter: I speak of lift!

I further contend that little or no consideration is being given to operations at other than SEA LEVEL. My question is: "Has our thinking been restricted to developing a flying LCVP?" Are we considering the fact that the Marine Corps may one day be called upon to execute a battalion or company helilift at altitudes in excess of four thousand feet? It is an operation such as this that renders the finery of sealed hulls and scores of seats useless.

I have had the privilege of operating in Hawaii with the First Marine Brigade for over three years. Experiences encountered in Hawaii with altitude gradi-

ents of sea level to five thousand feet (not at all an unreasonable Marine requirement in an amphibious operation) have proven that the book value load carrying capacity goes out the window.



and hours are spent helilifting a company; three and four men at a time.

I saw an Army gas turbine-powered helicopter not many weeks ago, that

doesn't begin to cut its teeth until altitudes of eight to ten thousand feet are reached. I'll venture a guess that the mere mention of eight thousand feet to a Marine helicopter pilot, and the crew chief will be lucky to have one infantry Marine riding with him.

All the pretty airframes in the world, all the elaborate rear doors, and all the water proof hulls will be worthless the day we steam to an enemy shore in an LPH and have to execute a vertical envelopment of a plain inland—at say an altitude of 7000 feet.

We of the infantry, at least from what this observer has seen, have witnessed too much stagnation on one hand and exotic dreaming on the other; and not enough soul searching evaluation in between. Let's get down to brass tacks, put first things, first, and get a helicopter that will lift—then perhaps we won't need a water proof hull. **USMC**

E/2/4 1stMarBrig
FPO, San Francisco

PROTECTION

for 82 Years

OFFICERS OF THE NAVY,
MARINE CORPS, and
COAST GUARD HAVE FURNISHED
THEIR FAMILIES THE PROTECTION OF

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Anyone for Squirrels?

By SgtMaj Elzy Kees, Jr.

☛ WE HAVE ALL AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER asked ourselves the question, "How do I fight or patrol in the jungle?" No book written can tell us everything; the most it can tell us is probabilities.

Fighting takes so many forms that the most we can do is to liken it to squirrel hunting.

1) We locate the area we are going to hunt.

2) Before entering the area, we provision ourselves for our maximum stay.

3) You check the old shotgun.

Now that everything is shipshape, how do you go about looking for a squirrel? We must consider the weather, time of day, type of trees and underbrush. Is the ground wet or dry; which way is the wind blowing? We must even think about the month of the year. From this information a method of hunting can be developed that will be successful.

All of these points will apply in the fight for life. Let's take them one by one and see how we can apply them:

• Weather: Should we pick a wet or dry day to hunt? A wet day would deaden the sound of a nut shell dropped by the squirrel, or the movement of the enemy. Then, also, it would help us to approach a tree or point of observation without being heard. How about the dry day? We know that on a hot dry day sound comes better. Also our own sound of movement would carry much further. It would seem, then, to use both the wet and dry we should combine the early morning dew, the midday dry, and the evening dampness we all know. To do this we should use the early morning to move into an area, use the midday to observe and listen and the early evening to move back.

The wind affects us in several ways. If we let the enemy, or squirrel, get downwind, he can hear us better, as wind carries sound. He can smell us, as scent is also carried by the wind. On the other hand, if we move into the wind, all these sounds and scents are carried to us. How would rain help or hinder us? It would cut visibility but would allow us to move faster by masking our sound; or it could slow us but would also freshen us on a hot, sultry day. It would hinder eating but would

drive the enemy to shelter. Then we ask how would we plan from this? I would say a light steady rain would be an aid, as a hard, intermittent rain would be a hindrance.

• Time of day: Would we pick early morning? What would the squirrel or the enemy be doing at this time? I think we can find a basic parallel; the squirrel will first occupy himself with finding food and water. This being paramount in his mind, he tends to let his guard down. The same basic thing takes place in enemy troops. Food must be prepared and eaten; normal morning toilet must be made; guards changed.

How about midday? Should we pick this time to venture forth? The squirrel has eaten and is sleeping flat on a high limb: hard to see but easily awak-



ened. The enemy at this time also takes post high in a tree but he is not sleeping.

Would we find evening a good time to patrol or hunt? We find the squirrel back trying to find enough to eat and moving about prior to settling down for the night. Then enemy's attention would also be centered about the task of evening meal, the shelter for the night, and again posting guards.

How about a night hunt? Surely this must be the time. We can't be seen; but on the other hand we can't see either. If the squirrel is in a hole, how do we find the hole? If he just lies quietly, how do we tell he is about?

From this we find early morning and late evenings seem to be the best times. We can see more movement; and chances of being seen are less, because of the squirrel's or the enemy's preoccupation with morning and evening meals. Also, the normal camp noises and move-

ment of the other birds and squirrels would mask our movement.

• Terrain: Are the trees tall and slender, do they have foliage? Do they have heavy root masses? Are they evergreen or the shedding type? If the underbrush thick and heavy or thin and easy to see through? The squirrel would pick his home from the standpoint of food and shelter. How would one plan a patrol by the type of trees? We know tall slender trees are forced into this form of growth by the fact they grow so close and are forced to search for the sun; e.g., the Redwoods and Douglas Fir of the Northwest. They also tend to be evergreen. This thickness, in itself, would prevent us from using large units. Trees with heavy root mass and large and heavy foliage would let us move larger units; but if the trees are of the shedding type, observations by the enemy would be more likely. The underbrush would do more to control our direction of movement than larger trees.

The month of the year is about the only thing that doesn't offer a parallel between squirrel hunting and patrolling. However, it will tell us much we need to know. The squirrel would be most easy to find in October or November because of the rutting or mating season. This not being the case with the enemy, we must check the month of the year for other reasons. Some of the things we would look for are the months of heavy or no rain; when do we have heavy ground fog or the month of storms. All of these would confine or encourage movement.

As a final comparison, to hunt squirrels we pick an area that we have hunted before. So, we know the time of day to hunt, the provisions we need, the time of day we should start and our route.

To patrol an unknown area we look to means other than past experiences in the area. Because we have none, we must use our map, aerial photos, intelligence reports, reports from OPs and other patrol reports. After we have studied all this, we must blend with equal parts horse sense, an aggressive determination for the mission, and above all, confidence in the men about us.

USMC

1/3, 3dMarDiv
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

Tact

By 1stLt R. J. O'Brien

✿ OFTEN MENTIONED AMONG THE TRAITS of the leaders is tact. We all recognize this quality as desirable, but what is it? Tact is courteous, cooperative, considerate, cheerful and charitable; it is a balm in the hand of him who would use it.

Tact makes the difficult easier. When used properly it helps say and do what must be said and done with dignity and deference.

There is a proverb to the effect that honey catches more flies than vinegar. Tact is like honey as it is sweet. Often it provides for saving of face either by the user or the recipient.

The opposite of tact is bluntness. The difference: one is thoughtful, the other thoughtless. Both can do the job but bluntness often leaves wounds with slow healing scars. Tact is considerate and diplomatic. What must be done must be done. The tactful man does his job, though unpleasant, more quietly and less conspicuously and with fewer ruffled feathers than the blunt man.

Tactful correction may intensify a subordinate's loyalty, dedication and drive. Unmerciful criticism will discourage his will to do a good job.

Often tact involves indirectness. It is not always necessary to "lay it on the line" for a trooper to get the message. One doesn't have to boresight an artillery piece in order to hit the target. The target will get the 'message.'

The axiom "praise in public—censure in private" is applicable to life everywhere. Confidence and respect built up over a period of time may be lost in a moment over public censure. Yes, the errant subordinate gets the word, but at the cost of embarrassment and humiliation to him in front of his comrades-in-arms. Worse yet is the criticism of a man in the presence of his juniors. The axiom properly applied is tact working for you.

Tact and courtesy are allies. When one of your Marines comes to you with a personal problem he is showing confidence in you. He rates privacy and your complete attention. He rates being heard. Sometimes just listening and allowing him to get it off his chest solves the problem. Perhaps he will suggest the solution himself or you may suggest one. This is tact and courtesy. In problems involving shame or embarrassment these traits will help you find the solution and you will have a happier Marine.

A lack of tact can cause resentment. While all enlisted men may be referred to by their last names, the tactful officer in formation says "Corporal Jones"

instead of "Jones." Corporal Jones has earned his title and as an NCO commands respect. In giving so we receive.


Tact is most useful in broaching disagreements with superiors. You may be 100% right and the CO dead wrong. FDR said if he could be right 75% of the time he would be a very happy man. People of whatever title and rank are subject to human imperfections. Recognize this and cater to it! If you have been gracious and tactful with your superior he will find it easier to yield to you. On the other hand, if you have

been tactless, human nature what it is, he may agree to himself that you are right, but not change his way because of your clumsiness with his pride.

Tact will not weaken you but will make you stronger. It is not daintiness, it is not sweet talk, it is not a game to be played for its own sake. Tact will get the job done better and with more satisfying results than the absence of it.

USMC

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...Around

the

Clock



THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 12)

Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precip), SM (Supplementary Material, and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.

BASIC

1 c. Reference: MCS 1-19, "Enforcement of Military Law and Order," paragraph 8b(2). The actual tour of duty for the officer of the day begins when he receives the instructions of the commanding officer and ceases when he has been relieved by the same authority. The officer of the day is generally detailed daily. In case of an emergency during the interval between guard mounting and reporting to the commanding officer, the officer of the day senior in rank assumes authority over both guards.

2 a. Reference: FM 21-26, paragraph 72b(3). Vertical distance/Horizontal distance $\times 57.3 =$ slope in degree. The 57.3 value varies as the angle grows larger, but a reasonably accurate degree-of-slope answer can be obtained for slopes under 20 degrees through the use of the formula given above. The value varies because it represents the arc distance instead of the true vertical distance.

3 b. Reference: MCS 1-19, "Enforcement of Military Law and Order," paragraph 41c(4). When small arms fire is necessary, troops should be instructed to aim low to prevent shots going over the heads of the mob and injuring innocent persons not members of the mob. Threats, such as firing over their heads, should not be used against a mob.

JUNIOR

4 a. Studies of the weather and terrain.
b. Helicopter Landing Area Studies.
c. Road and Trail Studies.
d. Analysis of Enemy Communications including their ECM Capabilities.
e. Intelligence Estimate.
f. ISUM's.
g. Periodic Intelligence Reports.
h. Special Studies as required. Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 807, Section 7.

5 b. Reference: DA Pamphlet 39-1, paragraph 6.17. By definition, one CEP represents the radius of a circle which will contain 50 percent

of all weapons fired or dropped, or within which one weapon has a 50 percent probability of detonating.

6 c. Reference: LFM-3, paragraph 304d. The staff is apprised as to what intelligence is readily available in order to prepare individual staff estimates. At that time immediate requirements of the staff for additional intelligence should be ascertained so that the intelligence officer may make appropriate requests to higher headquarters and collecting agencies for the information needed and when.

SENIOR

7 a. Reference: TIP (ARM)2, 30d(4). A reinforcing mission requires the reinforcing unit to respond directly to requests for fires from the reinforced artillery unit. Reinforcing artillery remains under the command of the higher artillery commander, but receives its zone of fire and all except emergency fire missions from the reinforced artillery unit.

8 d. Reference: LFM 00, 200b(4). An amphibious objective area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control. The directive which initiates an amphibious operation must positively define the objective area and prescribe authority within it.

WHAT IT IS

This aerial photograph clearly points out the beginning of a strong point located at (1.) A belt of anti-personnel mines is probably located at (2.) Recently emplaced anti-personnel mine belts are indicated by light toned lanes, less distinct than foot trails. The anti-tank ditch (3.) is rimmed with what appears to be a belt of anti-tank mines (4.) Anti-tank mines are designated by the regular pattern of small dots near the lip of the ditch. Another anti-tank ditch is under construction at point (5.)

(The WHAT IS IT section is not originated by Extension School. Questions pertaining to this section should be directed to the Managing Editor, Marine Corps Gazette.)

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Charles E. Cheever
Colonel, USA—Ret.
President



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If the automobile is customarily used in driving to or from work, how many road miles is the car driven one way? _____

How many male operators (including applicant) are under age of 25? _____

Age of each: _____ Relationship _____

Are any of the male operators under 25 owners, or principal operators, of the automobile? _____

Are all male operators under 25 married? _____

Is your automobile equipped with an air conditioner? _____

Name _____ Rank _____ Serial No. _____

Military Address _____

If car not at above address, give location of car _____

☐ Active-Regular ☐ Retired-Regular ☐ Retired-Reserve† ☐ Extended active duty
☐ Inactive, but retaining commission† ☐ Widow of eligible officer

† Membership must have been established while on extended active duty.

Schools for Marines

Sure sign of autumn: School bells.

At Quantico they summon not only children, but dad. MCS, Quantico's school year (its 41st) rang in 28 Aug with a student welcome by CMC. (For the kids, school started 31 Aug.) Answering the call were students for Junior, Senior, Basic Schools, Comm Officers Course, Ordnance School. An assortment of other courses convene later, others started earlier, are going on right now. Altogether, in next 12 months about 3,000 officers, 650 enlisted will enter one of Quantico's ivied halls. A breakdown of FY '62 classes.

- Senior Course—106 Marines, 12 Army/Navy, 2 Air Force, 8 Allied
- Junior Course—175 Marines, 9 Army/Navy, 16 Allied
- Comm Officers Course—69 Marines, 23 Allied (two classes)
- Comm Officers Orientation Course (COOC)—156 Marines
- Artillery Officers Orientation Course (AOOC)—223 Marines
- Ordnance Officers Course (OOC)—20 Marines
- Basic Course—1,470 Marines
- Marine Warrant Officer Basic Course (MW)—150 Marines
- Special Indoctrination Course (SIC) 45 Naval Aviators (Marine Capts and Lts who bypassed BasSch, went directly to flight training.
- Nuclear Weapons Employment Course (NVEC)—40 Marines (selected from current crop of Junior/Senior School grads, 20 each.)
- Women Officer Training Course (WOTC)—300 Marines
- Women Officer Indoctrination Course (WOIC)—100 Marines

MCS Quantico's 650 enlisted students mostly are slated for Ordnance School. Exception is 27 WM (Woman Marines) Sgts and above who will come from posts and stations throughout CONUS to attend Corps' only NCO Leadership School for Young Ladies.

Seventy-five percent of Ordnance School enrollment is made up of Marines fresh from bootcamp and ICT (Individual Combat Training), divided among Ammo Technician, Artillery Weapons Repair, and Infantry Weapons Armor courses. Sgts and above take advanced courses of same, plus Optical Instrument Repair and Repair Shop Machinist courses.

About 5,000 officers, 15,000 enlisted attend some kind of school, somewhere, every year. This doesn't include officer candidates nor recruits.

On next page is a special report about a special school for officers. It's US Naval Post Graduate School at Monterey, Calif. At press time HQMC was readying an invitation to qualified officers to apply for PG School. Some changes are expected in this year's invitation. A big one: Reserve officers to be eligible.

Entrance requirements are stiff, quotas low. Officers are picked for PG work to fill a specific billet after graduation. Only 32 Marines were picked for Monterey last year, 11 others for PG work at Stanford, George Washington, Rensselaer PolyTech.

Special board, usually sitting in December, screens applications, takes a close look at transcript of college credits.

G-3 planners are currently taking a long look at the PG School program.

This study may result in certain changes: revised quotas, increase or decrease in curricula, adding new subjects, dropping some old ones. Some revision is sure to come although planners admit there's still a lot of slack between proposals and a firm new stand. One area apparently immune to change is policy of encouraging officers with a lot of mileage left to apply for PG School. Object: educate junior officers to fill Gens and Cols billets rather than executive suites in private industry.

Delete SDO (Supply Duty Only)

As requested by the Marine Corps, Congress passed bill eliminating the SDO category. As Public Law 87-123, it says that redesignated SDOs shall have "at least the same promotion opportunity" as unrestricted officers.

At press time, a proposed MCBul was still being staffed. It's expected, though, that shortly all former SDOs will be sent a copy of the law for information.

MARCH Fog(g)

It isn't in the book but . . .

HMX (Marine Experimental Helicopter Squadron)-1 at MCAS, Quantico, hasn't dropped a heli-lift since MSgt D. L. Fogg started rigging cargo hooks "backwards."

The book (Helicopter Maintenance Manual) tells how to install MARCH (Marine Automatic Release Cargo Hook). Line Chief Fogg who's been working with hooks for a decade doesn't go by the book.

His reasoning:

MARCH is designed to automatically release cargo when load touches down. With weight off, floating hinge end of hook makes contact with electrical relay button, hook unlocks, drops open. Load is released.

Trouble is, too often hook drops open in mid-air. Why? MSgt Fogg figures it's because hooks rigged according to the book are backwards. In other words forward movement of helicopter shifts load to rear putting pressure on open end of hook. Turn hook around and when load shifts it's putting pressure where it belongs: over the hinge, keeping it from making contact with relay button.

After 200 dropless lifts with a Fogg-rigged hook, MCEB (Marine Corps Equipment Board), nearly convinced, will run more tests before recommending change to manual.

LAAM & SAM

1st and 2d LAAM Bn now training with AN/TSQ-39, first helicopter-carried air defense control system. System coordinates firing of SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) (LOOKING AHEAD: Apr '61). Two more AN/TSQ-3 are slated for fall delivery, one for 1st MAAM Bn (Terrier).

Scrapped

Reenlisting first term Marines and recruits began taking new Aptitude-Area Classification Test 1 Sep. Old GCT joins green cushion-sole socks on Corps trash heap. Unlike GCT which measured a Marines capacity to learn anything, AA Test shows up his potential to fill a particular billet.

Scratched

Marine shooters pulled out of Camp Perry a day early, passing up chance to fire National Trophy Team Rifle Match for first time since National Rifle and Pistol Matches were established by Act of Congress in 1903. Reason: Difference of opinion on rules.

PGS, Monterey

Special Report

United States Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California, combines a fine university with typical Navy shore station, retains best features of both. Set up at Annapolis, Maryland, in 1909, it moved to Monterey in 1951.

PG School itself consists of three schools: General Line and Naval Science School, Engineering School and Management School. Marine officers with a baccalaureate degree can attend latter two. Students wear civilian clothes to all classes; faculty is both civilian and military. School year consists of four ten-week terms.

The Engineering School

In interest of brevity and since all but five of sixty-or-so Marines assigned PGS are Engineering School students this report highlights only engineering courses. For more detailed information on all three schools see PGS, Monterey catalog sent yearly to all Navy and Marine activities considered likely to have applicants.

Engineering School has all of the equipment, facilities and staff required to offer graduate level technical courses including a complete electronic computer.

Certain curricula offer both Bachelor's and Master's degrees. Selection for a particular degree program generally depends on quality of work done during the first year of study. There are usually about 20 class hours a week, and the student must spend at least two to three hours of outside preparation for each hour spent in class.

Electronics and Communications Engineering: Basic objective of ECE course is to educate officers in the scientific and engineering fields of modern day electronics as related to the art of warfare.

Two-year course leads to Bachelor of Science degree in electronics or communications engineering. Some students attend a third year leading to Master of Science degree in electronic engineering.

Major topics of study include mathematics through orthogonal functions, applied physics and electric and electronic circuit theory. Last two terms include electives in specialized subjects.

Basic prerequisite is a well rounded background in mathematics through differential and integral calculus.

This course is of particular value to officers concerned with development, procurement and maintenance of electronic gadgetry required by modern warfare.

Aeronautical Engineering/Avionics: Aeronautical curriculum provides aviation officers advanced training in aeronautical engineering. Two and three-year courses lead respectively to Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in aeronautical engineering. Classes are comprised of naval aviators.

The first year, common to both two-year and three-year courses, includes advanced mathematics and mechanics, aerodynamics and structures. Second year permits a degree of specialization in the fields of propulsion, flight testing and evaluation and avionics in the two-year program and aerospace dynamics propulsion, structures and avionics in the three-year program. The third year of study is usually taken at a civilian university. Desired prerequisites include a working knowledge of mathematics through integral calculus and college physics and chemistry.

Operations Analysis: Operations analysis seeks optimum or best course of action for an organization through mathematical formulation and simulation.

Two-year operations analysis course which leads to a Master of Science degree is intended to provide officers with

some of the tools and techniques which aid in the carrying out of the optimization process including ability to program and utilize electronic computers. Course of study is divided almost equally among physics, statistics, mathematics and studies of case histories which demonstrate how techniques are applied in practice. A six-week tour with an operations research group at some industrial concern gives students practical work in the field. Minimum prerequisites for the course are a thorough familiarity with calculus and a good general mathematics background upon which to build advanced work. Operations analysts can fill billets in tactics and techniques, in the operation of guided missiles and in war gaming.

Meteorology: Prepares officers to become qualified meteorologists with a working knowledge of oceanography as applied to naval operations. The degrees Bachelor of Science and Master of Science are offered. Both degree programs are two years in length. Because of importance of mathematics and physics to modern meteorology, a prerequisite of one year of college physics and mathematics through calculus is required.

Some courses offered are vector analysis and mechanics, dynamic meteorology, statistics, numerical methods for digital computers, ocean wave and sea ice forecasting and meteorological thermodynamics. Classroom work is supplemented by laboratory periods in which theory is put into practice.

Ordnance (Weapons): Advent of modern, complex weapons systems, machines, and communications demands a technical knowledge that can't be met by orientation schooling. In order to make sound military decisions the troop commander of the future must possess or have immediately available to him technical and scientific knowledge. The objective of the ordnance engineering curriculum is to provide officers with an advanced technical education based on a broad foundation encompassing the basic scientific and engineering principles underlying the field of weapons.

Weapons course offers both the Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in a two-year program respectively. The Bachelor's degree is in electrical engineering while the Master's degree is in electrical engineering, physics or chemistry.

A good mathematics background through differential and integral calculus is a necessity. Some of the topics studied are advanced mathematics, chemistry, physics, thermodynamics, electronics, electrical engineering, guided missiles, propellants, explosives, servo-mechanisms, mine warfare and underwater acoustics.

Ordnance (Nuclear): The curriculum in Nuclear Engineering Effects is sponsored by the joint-service course by the Defense Atomic Support Agency. Objective is to educate officers in portions of the fundamental sciences which will furnish an advanced technical understanding in atomic weapons effects.

Both Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees are offered in a two-year program. First year is designed to provide a solid background in advanced mathematics, electronics and atomic physics. Second year courses consist primarily of graduate-level subjects directly related to atomic weapons effects in the fields of physics, biology, chemistry and blast and shock effects. Prerequisites are mathematics through integral calculus and one year of college physics. It should be emphasized that the over-all approach is not aimed at the laboratory level of atomic weapons effects, but rather it stresses theoretical aspects behind tables in weapons effects handbooks.

★ General Officers ★

Transfers

Masters, J. M. 9903
Fr HQMC
To CG, 1stMarDiv By31Jul

Permanent Promotions

Mangrum, R. C. (MajGen) Jul
Chapman, L. F., Jr. (BGen) Jul

Selected for MajGen

Condon, J. P. AUG
Cushman, R. E., Jr. AUG
Weede, R. G. AUG
Chapman, L. F., Jr. AUG
Buse, H. W., Jr. AUG
Nickerson, H., Jr. AUG

Temp. Promotions MajGen

Condon, J. P. AUG
Cushman, R. E., Jr. AUG
Weede, R. G. AUG

Selected for BGen

Youngdale, C. A. AUG
Simpson, O. R. AUG
Bouker, J. G. AUG
Anderson, N. J. AUG
McCutcheon, K. B. AUG
Van Stockum, R. R. AUG

Temporary Promotions BGen

Youngdale, C. A. AUG

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Leek, F. E., AsstDivCdr, 1stMarDiv
Riley, T. F., IG, HQMC
Butcher, J. O., Asst QMG, HQMC
Youngdale, C. A., ACoS, G-2, HQMC

The GAZETTE announces with regret the death 31Jul of General Randolph McCall Fite, USMC (Ret), 21st Commandant of the Marine Corps. Commissioned in 1921, General Fite served in Santo Domingo, China, WWII, and Korea. He also served as Associate Editor of the GAZETTE, later as a member of the Editorial Board, and finally as President of the Marine Corps Association.

Colonels

Transfers

Farrelly, R. B. 9908
Fr 2dMAW
To 1stMAW By16Oct
Ridge, T. L. 9906
Fr SanJuan PR
To AmerEmb Bogota By1Sep
Siegel, E. A. 9906
Fr SAFLANT
To FMFLant WDAug

Temporary Promotion

Lund, A. A. July61

Retired

Miller, W. M. 9906
HQMC 31Jul
Rovetta, C. A. 9906
MCRD SDiego 31Jul

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Ashley, P. H., Dir, JunSchl, MCS, Quant
Berkeley, R. C., Jr., Asst G-2, HQMC
Crockett, H. H., CofS, MCLFDC, MCS, Quant
Dill, J. K., CO, MCAF, Iwakuni
English, L. E., Office, AsstSecDef
Fisher, A. W., Jr., CofS, 2dMAW, MCAS CherPt

Freeley, J. A., Asst CofS, G-3, MCAS, CherPt
Gomez, A. D., Chief, Air Combat Sect, MCLFDC, MCS, Quant
Gottschalk, V. J., Asst CofS, G-2, MCAS, CherPt
Howard, J. D., Dir, Joint Staff, JCS
Humbred, W. C., CO, MCAF, MCB, CamLej
Hutchinson, H. G., Jr., Avn Plans & Readiness Br, DivAvn, HQMC
Jones, J. H., Special Services Off, MCB, CamLej
Jones, W. K., Joint Staff, JCS
Junghans, W. H., Jr., CO, H&SBn, MCB CamLej
Kennedy, D. R., CO, H&SBn, MCRD, PI
Lundin, W. M., CO, MAG-32, MCAS, Beaufort
Lucas, A. F., CO, 3d Marines, 3dMarDiv
Marshall, D. E., Opns Br, G-3, HQMC
Mee, F. J., CO, T&T Regt, MCS, Quant
McCulley, L. H., CofS, MCAS, CherPt
McDonough, R. C., CO, Basic Schl, MCS, Quant
McNichol, P. B., Asst CofS, G-4, MCRD, SDiego
Mills, J. E., Director of Information, HQMC
Neefus, J. L., AsstWgCdr, 2dMAW, CherPt
Poggemeyer, L. E., CO, 1stFAG, MCB, 29 Palms
Prowell, J. P., Dep CofS, MCB, 29 Palms
Quillie, C. L., CO, WpsTrngBn, Camp Mathews, MCRD, SDiego
Rhoads, J. R., Asst CofS, G-2, MCRD, SDiego
Rigaud, C. A., Inspector, 3dMarDiv
Robertson, D. J., CofS, MCS, Quant
Roise, H. S., CO, 1stSerBn, MCB, CamPen
Sabatier, H. S., Avn Plans & Readiness Br, DivAvn, HQMC
Seaton, J. B., CEO, 2dMAW, MCAS, CherPt
Seeley, H. W., Jr., Dir, MtdDiv, MCSC, Albany, Ga.
Silvey, D. W., Dep CofS, 3dMarDiv
Smart, H. J., Data Processing Off, HQMC
Thomas, G. B., CofS, ForTrps, MCB, 29 Palms
Warren C. E., CO, 5th Marines, 1stMarDiv
Warren, J. L., CO, MAG-11, Atsugi, Japan
Webster, G. D., Hd, Plans & Coordination Br, G-2, HQMC
Wisner, R., Chief of Logistics, T&T Bd, MCLFDC, MCS, Quant
Woessner, H. J., XO, RTE, MCRD, SDiego
Wren E. A., Inspection Div, HQMC

Death, Retired

Kelly, W. P. 0503
USHN SDiego Calif 26Jul

★ Lieutenant Colonels ★

Transfers

Adams, A. L. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCB CamPen WDSep
Armstead, R. C. 7333
Fr 1stMAW
To MARTD MARTC WDSep
Barney, I. J. 7335
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of Omaha WDSep
Beasley, C. B. 7307
Fr NAFEC Atlantic C
To 2dMAW WDAug
Bohn, R. D. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To Joint Ser Stf Col By9Oct
Boutwell, T. R. 7331
Fr 3dMarDiv
To 2dMAW WDSep
Broertjes, V. H. 0302
Fr COMUSFOR Japan
To FMFLant WDSep
Burnam, T. J. 7332
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW WDSep
Case, W. N. 7331
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Md WDSep

Clampa, E. R., Jr. 7307
Fr 3dMAW
To Chapman Col WDSep
Codispotti, G. S. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCS Quant WDSep
Creamer, J. A. 0302
Fr Ofc SecNav
To 2dMarDiv WDJul
Crownover, J. B. 1803
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv WDSep
Cummings, D. L. 7333
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Okla WDSep
Dees, H. C. 7302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMAW WDSep
Finn, H. J. 7307
Fr Ofc CNO
To HQMC WDAug
Finn, J., Jr. 0302
Fr MAAG Korea
To ForTrps FMFLant WDSep
Haehl, R. J. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To 1stMarDiv WDSep
Haxton, F. C. 7305
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW WDSep
Hemstead, R. S. 7305
Fr 1stMAW
To Univ of Omaha WDSep
Higgins, W. B. 7333
Fr Stanford Univ
To Pt Mugu Calif WDSep
Hogan, J. K. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To FMFLant WDSep
Hunter, O. D. 7331
Fr Second Flt
To Okla State Univ WDSep
Johnson, J. K. 7307
Fr FMFLant
To Ofc JCS By20Jul
Kohler, W. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv
To 1stMarBrig WDSep
Kruszewski, M. J. 6602
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW WDSep
Lewis, W. B. 3002
Fr MCSC Barstow
To 1stMAW By16Oct
Lobell, W. R. 0302
Fr Bucks England
To CincUSNavEur WDSep
Lundrigan, J. C. 0302
Fr MAAG Taiwan
To 1stMarDiv WDSep
McNeil, J. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To US Forces Japan WDSep
Risner, A. H. 3002
Fr MCSA Phila
To 3dMarDiv By16Oct
Semb, A. R. 7302
Fr COMFAIRWESTPAC
To Univ of Md WDSep
Smith, J. T., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCB CamPen WDSep
Smith, J. D., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To US Force Japan WDSep
Spanjer, R. H. 7333
Fr HQMC
To G Washington Univ WDSep
Ward, D. L. 7333
Fr 9thMCRD
To Univ of Md WDSep
Whitaker, J. L. 7304
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMAW WDSep
Williams, G. C., Jr. 1302
Fr CRUDESFORPACFLT WDSep
Williams, G. L. 2002
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCSC Albany Ga WDSep
Worlund, J. E. 7332
Fr MCAS El Toro WDSep

Temporary Promotion

Clary, M. A., Jr. Jul61

Temporary Promotion, Reserve

Harvey, R. F. Jul61
Scaramuzzo, R. C. Jul61

Retired

Allen, R. V. 0302
Univ of Va 30Sep
Braun, R. L. 7335
MCAS El Toro 31Jul

Bryan, E. W. 0302
1stMarDiv 31Jul
Burton, T. M. 0302
MCB CamPen 31Jul
Caldwell, R. M. 0301
3dMAW 31Jul
Coynne, R. G. 0195
MB NS SFRan 31Aug
Crawford, P. L. 7333
MCAS El Toro 31Aug
Hartman, A. 0302
1stMarDiv 31Jul
Lear, W. R. 0301
MCAF Santa Ana 31Aug
Lee, C. C. 7331
Dobbins AFB 31Aug
Lifsey, R. Q. 0130
1stMarDiv 31Aug
Man, T. H., Jr. 7331
2dMAW 31Jul
O'Bryan, N. 7333
MCAS CherPt 31Aug
Pankhurst, P. L. 7335
MAD NATTC MFS 30Sep
Polgrean, E. R. 0301
MB NS SFRan 31Aug
Rickert, G. A. 3002
MCRD SDiego 31Jul
Shoop, W. G. 0302
HqBn HQMC 31Aug
Smith, R. C. 1802
ForTrps FMFLant 31Jul

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Allen, P. L., Office, SecDef
Browning, R. C., CO, VMA-225, MCAS, CherPt
Carrington, G. W., Jr., TrngBn, G-3, HQMC
Cronin, J. T., Plans Br, G-3 Div
Decher, J. E., Jr., Chief MarCor Sect, USA Command and General Staff College
Douglas, G. V., Dir, ComScol, MCS, Quant
Dodson, F. G., Defense Communications Agency, DOD
Doxey, D. T., CofS, G-1, MCRD, PI
Davis, C. H., Jr., Asst Hd, Plans & Coordination Br, G-2, HQMC
Elliott, R. B., CO, H&S-1, MCAS, Iwakuni
Farish, G. B., CO, H&S-14, MCAS, CherPt
Harris, D. R., Jr., Avn Plans and Readiness Br, DivAvn, HQMC
Harney, J. B., CO, 3dAmTracBn, MCB, CamPen
Hay, H., XO, MAG-14, MCAS, CherPt
Horner, R. D., CO, 1stTkBn, 1stMarDiv, MCB, CamPen
Janson, R. L., CO, MAG-13, MCAS, Kaneohe Bay
Jones, J. R., AsstDir, MtdDiv, MCSC, Albany
MacCormick, W. H., 2dMTBn, MCB, CamLej
McArdle, P. H., Asst CofS, G-1, 1stMarBrig
Mentzer, J. F., 2dPionBn, MCB, CamLej
Ostby, J. L., Office, Judge Advocate General, Navy Dept
Parker, R. J., Jr., Dir, AdminDiv, MCSC, Albany
Penn, L. S., CO, MACS-5, MCAS, Beaufort
Pond, D. B., EngrOff, 1stMAW, MCAF, Iwakuni
Reed, H. C., Dir, Comptroller Div, MCSC, Albany
Reese, P. H., CO, 3dBn, 4th Marines, 1stMarBrig
Stevens, J. R., CO, 1stBn, 4th Marines, 1stMarBrig
Stockwell, T. D., Jr., Plans & Opns Br, G-4, HQMC
Tatro, L. F., CO, MWHG, MCAS, CherPt
Thobe, B. G., Depot Exchange Off, MCRD, SDiego
Waller, C. T., Dir, ServDiv, MCSC, Albany
Wasson, G. E., CO, MARS-17, 1st MAW
Weiland, C. P., XO, MCAS, Beaufort
Wilson, R., ComSect, G-4, HQMC

Death, Retired

Sullivan, P. 7Jul
USNH Bethesda Md

Majors

Transfers

Aldworth, J. 7333
Fr MARTC NAS Dal
To Okla State Univ
WD Sep

Ambrosia, E. J. 0302
Fr NAND Seal Beach
To MCRD SDiego
WD Sep

Austin, M. S. 7333
Fr Ofc SecNav
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Baar, S. P., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMAW
To MAAG Taiwan
By1 Oct

Bendell, L. R. 0302
Fr 3dMAW
To CincLantFit
By1 Sept

Bloomer, D. M. 7304
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Md
WD Sep

Boll, J. L. 3002
Fr MCSC Albany Ga
To 1stMAW
By16 Oct

Bryant, W. W. 7307
Fr MCS Quant
To Okla St Univ
WD Sept

Buchanan, R. K. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To NAS Lemoore Calif
By1 Sept

Burns, E. A. 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCAS El Toro
WD Sep

Christopher, W. N. 1302
Fr Camp S D Butler
To 1stMarDiv
WD Sep

Corley, R. H., Jr. 7335
Fr MCS Quant
To Okla St Univ
WD Sep

Crew, E. B. 7305
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW
WD Sep

Culp, W. E. 7335
Fr 1stMAW
To N Tex St College
WD Sep

Damm, R. C. 1302
Fr AmEmb Vietnam
To 1stMarDiv
WD Sep

Davis, R. R. 7335
Fr MCAS Beaufort
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Defenbaugh, N. F. 7304
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Elias, G. H. 7333
Fr MCAF Santa Ana
To 1stMAW
By25 Oct

Engelhardt, L. J. 7335
Fr MCS Quant
To Okla State Univ
WD Sep

Ferguson, H., Jr. 7333
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of S Calif
WD Sep

Fisher, S. 7333
Fr AirFMFPac
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Flood, J. H. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCRD SDiego
WD Sep

Hall, C. L. 7333
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMAW
WD Sep

Hallameyer, D. J. 7304
Fr MARTC NAS Glen
To 1stMAW
WD Sep

Hunt, R. G. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To OIC MCRS St Louis
By1 Oct

Joens, R. N. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCRD PI SC
WD Sep

John, E. S. 6602
Fr 1stMAW
To 3dMAW
WD Sep

Jones, E. M. 7302
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Kilefoth, G. C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCS Quant
WD Sep

Leite, R. J., Jr. 0302
Fr 6th MCRD
To 3dMarDiv
WD Sep

Longfellow, W. J. 7304
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of Md
WD Sep

March, R. B. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCS Quant
By30 Oct

May, W. L., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCRD PI SC
WD Sep

Melancon, B. J. 0302
Fr NAG Korea
To MCS Quant
WD Sep

Misura, E. M. 3002
Fr 2dMAW
To MCSA Phila
WD Sep

Moore, J. T. 7302
Fr AirFMFPac
To LBeach St Col
WD Sep

Mulford, R. L. 1302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To 2dMarDiv
WD Sep

Odenthal, J. T. 0302
Fr FMFLant
To 1stMAW
WD Sep

Owens, O. L. 7333
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Okla
WD Sep

Parker, G. W. 7304
Fr MCS Quant
To Univ of Okla
WD Sep

Phillips, A. L. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To Univ of Md
WD Sep

Ridderhoff, D. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCRD SDiego
WD Sep

Rigby, E. J. 7333
Fr AirFMFPac
To Univ of Okla
WD Sep

Ritter, L. C. 7335
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 2dMAW
WDAug

Sadowski, J. L. 7335
Fr 1stMAW
To MCRD PI SC
By15 Sep

Schoen, J. R. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCS Quant
WD Sept

Slennig, B. N. 7307
Fr MCS Quant
To St. Paul Min
WD Sep

Stamps, C. H. 6602
Fr 3dMAW
To FMFLant NorVa
By15 Sep

Sullivan, J. W. 7304
Fr MARTC NAS Mpls
To St. Paul Min
WD Sep

Svenson, O. I. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv
To ForTrps FMFPac
WD Sep

Tweed, M. D. 7335
Fr 2dMAW
To Univ of Md
WD Sep

Uffelman, P. R. 0302
Fr NAG Korea
To 1st MCRD
WD Sep

Usher, E. G., Jr. 0802
Fr 9th MCRD
To 3dMarDiv
WD Sep

Volney, F. Jr. 7304
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAS CherPt
WD Sep

Von Horn, C. S. 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv FMF
To 2dMAW FMFLant
WD Sep

Wahrer, M. S. 0130
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv
By30 Oct

Walker, W. L. 7333
Fr LFTULant
To Univ of Okla
WD Sept

Wall, T. R. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCRD PI SC
WD Sep

Weaver, J. R. 7302
Fr HQMC
To Univ of Md
WD Sep

Westphall, H. A. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv
To ForTrps FMFPac
WD Sep

Wineberger, G. L. 7307
Fr 3dMAW
To Chapman Col
WD Sep

Yerger, W. P. 1302
Fr MCB 29 Palms
To NAG Korea
WD Sep

Zielinski, R. L. 6602
Fr 1stMAW
To 3dMAW AirFMFPac
WD Sep

Temporary Promotions

Howard, D. E. Jul61
Manning, P. A. Jul61
Niesen, P. W. Jul61

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Denobriga, F. H. Jul61
Kanett, O. J. Jul61

Retired

Elliott, T. M. 7333
21stRdCo USMCR
31Jul

Ford, T. F. 1502
MCSC Barstow
31Jul

Frew, J. C. 2502
MCS Quant
31Jul

Hayden, D. L. 7335
3dMAW
31Aug

Herlihy, G. B. 7305
MCAS El Toro
31Aug

Johnson, B., Jr. 3030
MCSAcy Phila
31Jul

C. J. O'Malley 7307
2dMAW
31Jul

Ratliffe, E. N. 6402
MCAS CherPt
31Aug

Rynerson, R. W. 3502
MCSC Barstow
31Aug

Smith, L. K. 0302
MCB 29 Palms
31Jul

Squires, G. R. 7304
NavHosp Bethesda
31Jul

Stiles, C. R. 0302
MCS Quant
31Aug

Wyatt, J. R., Jr. 3502
Auto Comd Detroit
31Aug

Barclay, J. M., Exchange Off, MCRD, PI

Burnett, R. H., CO, MABS-13, MCAS, Kaneohe Bay

Bushnell, R. H., Planning & Opns Off, SupDept, HQMC

Buss, K. M., MTOff, ForTrps, MCB, 29 Palms

Cooney, O. D., DisbOff, MCAF, Iwakuni

Emma, C. J., CO, 1stMTBn, MCB, Campen

Foltz, W. R., XO, MACS-5, MCAS, Beaufort

Fuller, G. E., Office of Quartermaster General, Army

Gibney, J. L., OpnsBr, G-3, HQMC

Harrington, J. C., Inspector, 2d MAW, MCAS, CherPt

Hoereth, W. H., Facilities Mangt Br, SupDept, HQMC

Johnson, T. D., Facilities Mangt Br, SupDept, HQMC

Johnson, W. R., Inventory Mangt Office, SupDept, HQMC

Mathews, L. B., XO, VMF-251, MCAS, Beaufort

Menzies, H. D., Plans and Trng Off, G-3, MAG-14, MCAS, CherPt

Nelson, H. A., CO, VMO-1, MCB, CherPt

Oster, M. E., StaffSect, 1stMAW, MCAF, Iwakuni

Parcell, W. K., OC Unit, PersDept, HQMC

Patton, W. B., BUWEPS, Navy Dept

Rice, K. M., CO, HqCo, H&SBn, MCRD, SDiego

Robertson, R. S., Office, SecNav

Ruvo, V. A., Planning Office, Sup Dept, HQMC

Simms, C. W., Jr., XO, VMO-1, MCB, CamLej

Smith, A. C., OpnsOff, StkMangBr, SupDept, HQMC

Stuart, V. R., GC Unit, PersDept, HQMC

Sturzel, C. B., SupClSect, Pers Dept, HQMC

Sullivan, C. H., TrngBr, G-3, HQMC

Sullivan, R. E., Plans & Opns Br, G-4, HQMC

Sullivan, W. E., ISO, 1stMAW, MCAF, Iwakuni

Thomas, J. C., CO, 4thBn, 11th Marines, 1stMarDiv

Waller, L. W. T., II, XO, 3dRTBn, MCRD, SDiego

Whitehill, W., XO, H&MS-14, MCAS, CherPt

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Death, Retired

Estes, J. T. 21Jun
Ancora St Hosp NJ

Captains

Transfers

Allen, A. N. 7333
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla
To 1stMarDiv
By10 Oct

Bailey, E. W. 0802
Fr MCB 29 Palms
To 3dMarDiv
By30 Oct

Bannigan, A. J., III 7335
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 2dMAW
WD Sep

Baylor, J. D. 3502
Fr 1stMAW
To ForTrps FMFLant
WD Sep

Becker, T. J. 0302
Fr 8thInfBn USMCR
To 1stMarDiv
WDAug

Belth, R. H. 3060
Fr FMFLant
To MB NS Sfran
By20 Nov

Bengele, C. M., Jr. 7333
Fr 3dMarDiv
To NAAS Meridian Miss
WD Sep

Benn, D. T. 6720
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW
WD Sep

Beno, J. P. 7335
Fr 1stMarBrig
To 2dMAW
WD Sep

Berrey, C. H. 7335
Fr 3dMAW
To NAS LosAlm LBeach By20Aug

Bitner, D. S. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCS Quant
WD Sep

Boudreaux, R. M. 6502
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAS Beaufort
WD Sep

Bowen, D. P. 7302
Fr 3dMAW
To NavAirCen Pax Riv
By30 Oct

Bowser, J. R., Jr. 0802
Fr DASA SandiaB
To 3dMarDiv
WD Sep

Brewster, A. E., Jr. 7302
Fr 1stMAW
To 2dMAW
WD Sep

Brown, E. E. 7302
Fr NAATC NAS CorpC
To 1st ANGLICO
WD Sep

Brown, R. H. 7331
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla
To 3dMAW
WD Sep

Bustin, J. C. 3510
Fr Camp S D Butler
To 3dMAW
WD Sep

Cain, T. L. 0302
Fr MCAS Kaneohe Bay
To 1stMarDiv
By1 Nov

Caldwell, R. C. 1803
Fr 2dMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv
By3 Nov

Campo, G. H. 7335
Fr 1stMAW
To Univ Okla Stillwater
WD Sep

Carman, W. J. 2502
Fr FMFPac
To MCRD SDiego
WD Sep

Cawthron, J. C. 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To Dreux AB France
WDAug

Chisnell, T. C., Jr. 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To 1stMarDiv
WDAug

Comer, A. G. 0302
Fr 9th MCRD
To 1stMarBrig
WD Sep

Corbett, R. G. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 12th MCRD
WD Sep

Cunningham, W. 7335
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMAW
WD Sep

Cunningham, E. C. 7307
Fr 1stMarDiv
To NABTC Pncla
WD Sep

Duff, J. C. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To PHIBRON-3
By10 Oct

Dupont, J. A. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MB Brem Wash
WD Sep

Eckman, R. P. 7307
Fr 2dMarDiv
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Edmunds, M. S. 2002
Fr 3dMarDiv
To 1stMarDiv
WD Sep

Edwards, R. R. 6602
Fr 1stMAW
To DASA Sandia Base
WD Sep

Fancher, C. C. 3502
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv
WDAug

Ferrell, B. B. 0185
Fr MCAS El Toro
To 3dMarDiv
By30 Oct

Fischer, R. W. 0702
Fr PHIBGRU-2
To ForTrps FMFPac
WD Sep

Fithian, J. E., Jr. 7333
Fr Ft Holabird Md
To 3dMAW
WDAug

Fitzgerald, N. P. 6708
Fr 1stMCRD
To 1stMAW
By22 Oct

Floyd, J. C. 1310
Fr 3dMarDiv
To MCB Campen
WD Sep

Frey, F. X. 0302
Fr NAS Lakehurst NJ
To 2dMarDiv
WD Sep

Gallant, R. L. 6402
Fr 1stMAW
To 3dMAW AirFMFPac
WD Sep

Garrison, M. T., Jr. 7302
Fr AirFMFPac
To Univ of Omaha
WD Sep

Gerard, L. E., Jr. 3302
Fr MCB 29 Palms
To 2dMAW FMFLant
By25 Oct

Ghiselli, R. F. 0130
Fr 1stMAW
To MB NS Sfran
WD Sep

Gillick, R. O. 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv
By30 Oct

Gott, M. J. 0302
Fr MAAG Vietnam
To 1stMarDiv
WD Sep

Green, J. D. 0130
Fr 1stMAW
To MCAAS Yuma Ariz
WD Sep

Greene, J. C., Jr. 1802
Fr MB NB Phila
To MCS Quant
WD Sep

Griffin, T. L. Jr. 7302
Fr 2dMAW
To USNA Ann
By10 Aug

Gustafson, O. D. 3302
Fr MCAS Kaneohe Bay
To 3dMarDiv
WD Sep

MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION NEWSLETTER

Howard, Jr., W. L.
Hunt, Jr., J. C.
Janke, M. D.
Johnson, G. E., III
Johnson, Jr., R. F.
Johnson, J. L.
Jones, P. D.
Jorgenson, J. D.
Keane, J. F.
Kidston, R. G.
Kilcarr, A. J.
Kinghorn, J. R.
Kirkpatrick, K.
Kizer, J. P.
Knox, B. E.
Labonte, J., Jr.
Larkins, R. T.
Lawson, H. F., Jr.
Levy, J. L.
Lewis, Jr., R. E.
Lewis, R. G.
Light, P. C.
Livingston, H. S.
Loucks, W. E.
Lund, A. K.
Mankawich, J. D.
Marshall, J. T.
Marvel, J. W.
Maxwell, R. H.
McCarty, J. J.
McCowan, R.
McEwen, A. I.
McLaughlin, D. V.
Meason, R. D.
Meeker, G. D.
Meyers, Jr., G. F.
Milburn, H. E.
Misfeldt, C. E.
Moakley, F. X.
Moore, J. R.
Moore, R. E.
Morgan, R. M.
Morley, R. J.
Morris, N.
Mullen, Jr., F. C.
Mullins, Jr., S. F.
Murray, M. R.
Neumann, R. E.
Noel, L.
O'Connell, J. J.
O'Donnell, R. A.
O'Hanlon, T. W.
O'Hara, J. J.
O'Leary, T. H.
Olson, C. W.
Pardue, H. E.
Parker, W. K.
Parker, C. N.
Pate, K. L.
Pattison, J. W.
Penland, R. K.
Peterson, R. P.
Phelan, M. J.
Pillsbury, M. R.
Poche, A. J., Jr.
Porter, L. E.
Powers, R. F.
Pratt, D. T.
Prescott, Jr., S. F.
Pringle, B. L.
Proescholdt, R. S.
Purvis, W. R.
Reasoner, J. J.
Redfield, D. W.
Reeves, R. S.
Reilly, M. J.
Rice, J. R.
Richards, T. R.
Risoli, A. C.
Rittenhouse, P. J.
Rogers, B.
Roman, J. J.
Rose, Jr., W. W.
Rose, M. R.
Ross, D. M.
Salvatore, Jr., R. J.
Scarborough, W. E.
Schaffer, W. A.
Silrie, C. P.
Simmons, G. A.
Siskowic, S. W.
Skates, R. L.
Smith, P. L.
Smith, E. G.
Spear, J. B.
Spiars, E. W.
Stapf, E. L., Jr.
Stark, D. E.
St. Denis, J. H.
Steins, C. H.
Stennis, H. R.
Stewart, A. G.
Stewart, J. E.
Stolp, J. A.
Stone, R. L.
Strong, J.
Stroud, L. R.
Stuppin, J. B.
Swint, J. M., Jr.
Terrell, Jr., R. S.
Testa, P. E.
Thomas, Jr., G. A.
Thomas, W. R.
Thompson, R. L.
Tinius, R. E.

Jul True, L. W.
Jul Vandever, J. H.
Jul Vanvolkenburg, H. P.
Aug Vickers, W. O.
Jun Voulgaris, T. J.
Jul Wahl, R. D.
Aug Wagener, P. H.
Jul Walsh, J. F.
Jul Warren, R. E.
Aug Watkins, W. C.
Jul Weld, W. C.
Jul Wentworth, R. A.
Jul Whittemore, E. P.
Jul Willard, G. W.
Jun Willford, E. H.
Aug Wilson, J. R.
Jul Younger, A. M.
Jul Zilka, L. J.

Retired

Bouvy, J. W. 2715
MCS Quant 31Aug
Branson, W. B. 7302
MCRD SDiego 31Jul
Brothers, W. Q., Jr. 7302
MCS Quant 31Jul
Eccles, R. E. 3015
MB NS SFRan 31Jul
Roobian, L. L. 3102
MCS 29 Palms 31Jul
Stevens, J. A. 3502
MB NS SFRan 31Aug
Thyrring, A. J. 3025
MCS CampPen 31Aug
Tullis, N. C. 0130
1stMarBrig 31Aug
Westmoreland, R. H. 4602
HQMC 31Jul
Wilson, W. T. 0130
12th EngrCo Tucson 31Jul

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Buckley, J. D., Jr., Classified Files
Sect, AdminDiv, HQMC
Camper, R. M., CO, D Co, 7thEngr
Bn, MCB, 29 Palms
Chrisinger, E. L., Adj, MWSG-17,
MCAS, Iwakuni
Henry, E. C., Asst PMO, MCAF,
Iwakuni
Ingrando, R. B., CO, HqCo, For-
Trps, MCB, CamLej
Mindell, W. L., PMO, MCSC, Al-
bany
McCormick, J. G., I&I, 2dReconCo,
Albuquerque, NM
Olsen, H. F., Procurement Br, Opns
Ofc, SupDept, HQMC
Reville, J. T., PersDept, Corre-
spondence Sect, HQMC
Schlavone, R. L., OIC, Exchange
Activities, MCB, 29 Palms
Stanton, D. R., HQMC Flight Sect,
NAS, Anacostia
Suwalsky, A. L., Jr., Claims Sect,
PersDept, HQMC
Wrenn, J., Office, Dir of Women
Marines

Deaths

Doherty, J. P. 0130
Santa Ana Calif 14Jul
Lutzenburg, T. 0130
Camp Courtney Okinawa 11Jul

1st Lieutenants

Transfers

Abshire, R. M. 3402
Fr 3dMAW
To 3dMarDiv By23Oct
Anderson, J. F. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
Barton, D. A. 2502
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
Booma, S. C. 1803
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To LFTUPac SDiego
Brown, O. G. 7399
Fr 2dMAW
To NABTC NAS Pncla By27Sep
Burleson, E. B., Jr. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv
To USS Little Rock By1Oct
Bush, C. A. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDAug
To MCRD PI
Byrne, T. E. 3033
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCS Quant
Carr, D. S. 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To CNAVANTRA CorpC
Coker, C. F. 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv By1Sep
To USS Long Beach

Crabtree, R. G. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Creal, D. S., Jr. 6709
Fr 2dMAW WDSep
To 1stMAW MACS-4
Cronkrite, C. L. 7333
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDSep
To 2dANGlico
Davis, L. N. 3010
Fr 2dMarDiv By21Aug
To 3dMarDiv
Di Marco, A. 3095
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCS Quant
Donegan, D. H. 7399
Fr MCAF New River
To NABTC NAS Pncla By18Oct
Ekholm, W. H. 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv By1Oct
To 1stMAW
Elgaard, R. J. 0302
Fr MB Pearl WDSep
To USS Tulare
Falzarano, V. L. 7302
Fr 2dMAW By15Aug
To MCRD PI
Flynn, J. G. 7399
Fr FMFLant By18Oct
To NABTC NAS Pncla
Foulger, S. R. 7302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDSep
To Univ of Omaha
Furtado, R. A. 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDSep
To USS Bexar
Gentry, H. R. 1802
Fr 6th MCRD WDSep
To I&I 1st TK Co
Griffay, D. M. 7302
Fr 2dMAW WDSep
To 2dANGlico
Hall, D. F. 1302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDAug
To MCRD PI
Hart, J. G., III 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To LFTUPac SDiego
Hatfield, C. D. 7302
Fr NATTC NAS CorpC WDSep
To 1stANGlico
Hoffman, R. C. 7302
Fr NADVTRACOM CorpC WDSep
To 2dANGlico
Hughes, L. M. 0302
Fr MCB CamLej By22Aug
To MCS Quant
Inglee, P. S. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDAug
To NAD Earle NJ
Johannes, E. R. 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv WDSep
To 2dMAW
Kemp, G. G. 7302
Fr 1stANGlico WDSep
To 1stMarBrig
Kiely, D. J., Jr. 7398
Fr Beeville Tex WDSep
To 3dMAW
Kreashmar, E. T. 0702
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDAug
To AirFMFPac
Leary, III, D. F. 0302
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla By22Aug
To MCS Quant
Loney, E. H. 7307
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Mahoney, D. A. 3025
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Mahoney, J. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCAS Beaufort
Malorine, T. G. 0202
Fr 2dMAW WDSep
To 1stMAW
McManus, W. J. 0302
Fr MB Pearl By1Nov
To USS Kearsage
McClain, B. L. 1802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
McCormick, R. C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To I&I Stf 3dInfBn
McGrath, W. J. 3010
Fr 2dMarDiv By20Nov
To 3dMarDiv
Meinecke, D. N. 2710
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDSep
To MACS-4
Morris, P. D. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To AirFMFPac
Murch, D. H. 2502
Fr MCRD SDiego By28Aug
To Ft Devens Mass
Ogden, D. J. 2502
Fr HqBn HQMC WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
Osmondson, E. L. 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To 2dMAW FMFLant
Peet, C. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MB NB Npt

Reed, R. W. 0302
Fr MCCWTC Bridgeport
To USS Washburn By2Oct
Riordan, T. W. 3799
Fr MCB CampPen
To NABTC NAS Pncla By27Sep
Rogers, C. W., Jr. 7399
Fr 3dMAW
To NABTC NAS Pncla By27Sep
Schwaninger, M. E. 7333
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Seaman, J. F. 9901
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
Seay, O. A., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD PI
Shaffer, J. R. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
Stofer, J. M. 7333
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Studer, E. A. 1302
Fr ForTrps FMFPac WDSep
To MAAG Taiwan
Swenson, W. R. 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv By1Oct
To MB Pearl
Taylor, C. W. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv By15Oct
To Nicosia Cyprus
Tibbets, O. P. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To NB Portsmouth
Tirschfield, W. J. 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To Ft Sill Okla
Tutlerow, H. W., Jr. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD PI
Ulises, R. J. 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv By15Sep
To NAS Barbers Pt
Volz, C. W. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Wessels, G. A. 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Wilson, J. W. 7332
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDSep
To 1stANGlico
Wogan, C. M. 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Wuerch, G. P. 1302
Fr MAAG Taiwan WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant

Permanent Promotions

Abney, R. D. Jul
Aiken, T. H. Jul
Alexander, C. R. Jul
Alley, R. H. Jul
Anderson, L. L. Jul
Bailey, G. E. Jul
Baldwin, W. S. Jul
Berchiolli, K. V. Jul
Bishop, R. A. Jul
Bottesch, T. M. Jul
Burkhart, A. E. Jul
Burnette, R. D. Jul
Carlton, R. L. Jul
Caton, J. R. Jul
Chaimson, R. C. Jul
Chase, W. E. Jul
Collins, C. G. Jul
Czerwinski, J. J. Jul
Daugherty, C. L., Jr. Jul
Davis, C. W. Jul
Dominguez, M. T. Jul
Galley, L. E. Jul
Grubbs, W. O. Jul
Hoevar, F. A. Jul
Huffman, D. R. Jul
James, J. L. Jul
Juddkins, P. G. Jul
Keith, C. R. Jul
Kelly, D. A. Jul
Kester, R. L. Jul
Knapper, R. E. Jul
Krebs, J. F. Jul
Larsen, R. E. Jul
Lewis, R. D. Jul
Lovell, J. H., II Jul
Miller, D. E. Jul
Modrzejewski, R. J. Jun
Morris, P. D. Jun
Nappi, L. T. Jun
Nicol, A. L. Jun
Notine, D. M. Jun
Nugent, W. R. Jun
O'Brien, J. J. Jun
Ondrick, R. M. Jun
Oravits, J. J. un
Overmyer, R. F. Jun
Patrick, J. L. Jun
Pederson, R. J. Jun
Polyak, G. R. Jun
Powell, D. A. Jun
Power, T. J. Jun
Ramsay, C. J. Jun
Rezek, G. F. Jun

Reynolds, R. C. Jun
Roman, D. J. Jul
Rountree, L. C. Jun
Rutledge, B. G. Jul
Shannahan, J. K. Jun
Silvear, T. A. Jun
Simpson, P. S. Jul
Spence, J. R. Jun
Sperry, C. B. Jun
Sprick, D. R. Jun
Stevens, J. D. Jul
Stoffey, R. E. Jul
Stumpf, T. A. Jul
Sutton, R. A. Jun
Taylor, R. H. Jun
Telford, J. W. Jun
Thames, S. E. Jul
Thien, R. L. Jul
Thomas, W. L. Jun
Turner, J. D. Jul
Tutterrow, J. H. Jul
Vindich, J. G. Jun
Volz, C. W. Jun
Vorreger, R. W. Jun
Wall, M. N. Jun
Warfield, H. R. Jul
Wells, R. Jun
Wogan, C. M. Jun
Wood, H. C. Jun
Yenerall, G. L. Jun
York, E. E. Jul

Permanent Promotion, Reserve

Cunningham, R. B. Jul61
Kerstein, K. T. Jul61
Lacroix, C. M. Jul61
Meekins, E. L., Jr. Jul61
Monacell, R. A. Jul61
Thornton, R. D. Jul61

Temporary Promotions, Reserve

Andreoni, O. E. Jul61
Bishop, J. P. Jul61
Bryden, D. P. Jul61
Bush, R. M. Jul61
Channell, W. B. Jul61
Devlin, H. F., Jr. Jul61
Dwyer, J. J., Jr. Jul61
Fava, A. E. Jul61
Friedricks, D. Jul61
Hands, J. R. Jul61
Miller, T. P. Jul61
Mleynek, J. A. Jul61
Ridgeway, W. T. Jul61
Riemer, G. D. Jul61
Rollins, G. J. Jul61
Sandra, F. M. Jul61
Zubke, L. H. Jul61

Retired

Shay, G. G. 1302
4thMCRRD 31Jul

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Burkhart, A. E., OIC, TAL, MCRD, PI
Falgout, R. P., FiscalOff, 8th MCR& RD

Death, Reserve

Hicks, L. E. 3Jun
Mt Home Idaho

2d Lieutenants

Transfers

Abernethy, D. L. 3010
Fr ForTrps FMFLant By16Oct
To 3dMarDiv
Baker, R. F. 6701
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarBrig
Barker, J. L. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 3dMAW
Cox, L. C. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
Derbes, D. G. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarBrig

Detjens, P. J. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Dreze, H. D., Jr. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
Faris, J. F. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Flitts, D. S. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
Graebner, P. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
Hands, J. R. 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 3dMarDiv
Holland, J. R. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Latta, J. D. 3010
Fr 2dMarDiv By16Oct
To 3dMarDiv
LaValley, D. R. 0701
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To ForTrps FMFPac
Lindley, E. A. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarBrig
McGill, J. W. 3010
Fr ForTrps FMFLant By20Nov
To 3dMarDiv
Miller, L. J. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Montgomery, J. F. 3010
Fr 2dMarDiv By20Nov
To 3dMarDiv
Munger, G. L. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Reusse, E. O. 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Riblet, W. B. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Simpson, J. I. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Snodgrass, C. R. 2002
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To Port au Prince
Sweetser, W. E. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarBrig
Tamesin, D. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarDiv
Tardiff, M. R. 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To 1stMarBrig
Tribble, J. W. 3010
Fr MCB CampPen By20Nov
To 3dMarDiv
Zell, M. P. 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To 2dMarDiv

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Haley, R. F., II, DepDisbOff, 1st
MAW, MCAF, Iwakuni

Deaths, Retired

Flynn, W. C. 13Jul
VA Hosp Boston
Conner, C. C. 7Jun
USNH Portsmouth Va

Warrant Officers

W-4

Transferred

Entrekin, S. E. 2502
Fr CinCPacFlt WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant

Permanent Promotion, Reserve

Roberts, S. H. Jul61

Retired

Buechmann, F. C., Jr. 3010
MCRD SDiego 31Jul
Lanhan, J. H. 3502
2dMarDiv 31Jul
Patterson, D. K. 2002
MARTC MARTC NAS Glen 31Aug

W-3 Transfers

Anderson, T. E. 3102
Fr MCB CampPen By15Aug
To MCB 29 Palms
Brooks, H. L. 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDAug
To 2dMarDiv
Chapin, C. H., Jr. 3030
Fr FMFLant By20Nov
To MB NS SFRan
Pierce, C. G. 4130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Shisler, F. J. 3020
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCSC Albany Ga
Snyder, B. W. 7002
Fr MARTC NAS Atla WDAug
To 2dMAW

Permanent Promotions

Adams, J. B. Jul61
Albert, R. H. Jul61
Arsenault, R. W. Jul61
Arthur, R. O. Jul61
Boreman, G. H. Jul61
Boudreaux, R. M. Jul61
Burke, R. M. Jul61
Deatrick, C. L. Jul61
Denyer, S. A., Jr. Jul61
Dick, B. W. Jul61
Duncan, D. N. Jul61
Edwards, R. R. Jul61
Englehardt, H. H. Jul61
Gandy, A. O. Jul61
Girouard, E. Jul61
Graef, R. E. Jul61
Greene, R. B. Jul61
Harris, J. W. Jul61
Harvey, L. R. Jul61
Hathaway, J. A. Jul61
Harbecker, D. L. Jul61
Hodge, W. K. Jul61
Jones, J. F. Jul61
Kennedy, C. E. Jul61
Lamonte, S. W. Jul61
Martin, R. E. Jul61
Meek, W. A. Jul61
Miller, N. J., Jr. Jul61
Nault, C. R. Jul61
Nelson, G. B., Jr. Jul61
Nicholson, E. W. Jul61
Perkins, B. O. Jul61
Pierce, J. B. Jul61
Pryor, C. L., Jr. Jul61
Rozycki, E. V. Jul61
Seymour, D. W. Jul61
Shirley, J. D. Jul61
Thathenurst, K. D. Jul61
Tusa, J. N. Jul61
Virden, R. W. Jul61
Wilson, W. L. Jul61
Woods, G. D. Jul61
Wright, I. L., Jr. Jul61
Wyzykowski, J. Jul61
Yost, R. W. Jul61
Zimba, J. P. Jul61

Retired

Pettley, W. F. 2710
2dMAW 31Aug

W-2 Transfers

Anaszewicz, E. A. 2010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCSC Albany
Bowers, C. A. 3202
Fr MB Pearl WDSep
To 3dMarDiv
Durham, G. D., Jr. 5502
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To MCRD SDiego
Fleming, R. R. 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFPac By24Aug
To Indian Head Md
Larocca, B. 5502
Fr MCRD SDiego WDSep
To MB NS SFRan
Sutterley, J. H. 3510
Fr NAG Korea WDSep
To 2dMarDiv
Williams, J. T. 3302
Fr MCS Quant By20Nov
To 3dMarDiv
Wilson, H. E. 0130
Fr MARTC NAS Jax By30Oct
To 3dMarDiv

Permanent Promotions

Berry, N. Jul61
Black, J. R. Jul61
Bowen, M. J. Jul61
Brown, E. L. Jul61
Cain, J. T. Jul61

Chandler, J. D. Jul61
Chaput, R. U. Jul61
Cushman, R. L. Jul61
Dugan, J. A. Jul61
Elder, J. O. Jul61
Flaherty, W. C. Jul61
Garrett, S. E. Jul61
Gentry, E. S. Jul61
Gordon, J. B. Jul61
Holzinger, B. E. Jul61
Hunt, R. T. Jul61
Keller, R. P. Jul61
Kennedy, R. G. Jul61
Kilborn, C. R. Jul61
Mann, H. L. Jul61
Nilsen, D. A. Jul61
Powell, L. E. Jul61
Regan, K. H. Jul61
Richards, I. S. Jul61
Russell, R. A. Jul61
Tobin, F. T. Jul61
Webb, J. H., Jr. Jul61
Wilder, R. C. Jul61

Permanent Promotion, Reserve

Clausen, P. E. Jul61

Retired

Beebe, J. C. 3202
MCB CampPen 31Jul
Boyd, O. A. 2010
MB NS SFRan 31Aug
Fix, E. J., Jr. 3090
MCSC Barstow 31Aug
Meadows, E. L. 3302
1stMarDiv 31Jul
Parker, N. E. 3120
HQMC 31Jul
Purvis, T. W. 2715
ForTrps FMFLant 31Jul
Schroeder, W. F. 0130
HQMC 31Jul
Smith, A. L. 3035
ForTrps FMFLant 31Jul

W-1

Transfers

Blix, W. C. 6402
Fr MARTC NAS Oak WDAug
To 3dMAW
Carnahan, D. K. 2010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To ForTrps FMFPac
Crowell, H. W. 6406
Fr MD USS Boxer WDAug
To MCAS El Toro
Kelly, F. L. 6602
Fr MARTC NAS Bklyn By16Sep
To MCAS El Toro
Knox, C. Jr. 6402
Fr 2dMAW FMFLant WDAug
To 3dMAW MCALF CampPen
McCallum, J. E. 3010
Fr 2dTrkCo USMCR WDAug
To 2dMarDiv
McGreevy, A. V. 3402
Fr MCS Quant WDSep
To ForTrps FMFLant
McNutt, P. V. 2715
Fr MB NTC GLakes WDSep
To 2dMAW
O'Connor, P. R. 3015
Fr MCSC Albany Ga WDAug
To ForTrps FMFLant
Smith, D. M. 6709
Fr MARTD Olathe WDAug
To 1stMarDiv
Sutherland, F. R. 2715
Fr MB NTC GLakes WDSep
To AirFMFPac
Underwood, H. L. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDAug
To 2dMAW
Van Amberg, D. E. 3102
Fr 3dMarDiv WDSep
To MCAAS Yuma Ariz
Williams, J. C. 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDSep
To 2dMAW FMFLant

Death, Retired


Wood, W. W. 24Jun
Homestead AFB Fla

Recent Command and Staff Assignments

Chytka, L. J., ElectronicsOff, MABS-27, MCAS, CherPt
Head, J. M., Asst Adj, MCRD, PI
Peary, L. E., Area Auditor, MCAS, Beaufort
Waldvogel, I. F., AsstWgInsp, 1st MAW

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